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A BOOK FOR DEBATERS, READERS,  
.....ELECTORS AND POLITICIANS.....

Australian  
**Pros...**  
AND  
**...Cons**

A GUIDE TO  
THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS OF  
THE DAY, GIVING THE BEST  
ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES.

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By C. H. CHOMLEY,  
Author of "Protection in Canada and Australasia."

Melbourne :  
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1905.

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# AUSTRALIAN PROS AND CONS

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ARGUMENTS ON BOTH  
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By C. H. CHOMLEY,

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In the following pages the writer has endeavored to do justice to both sides of the questions treated without regard to the view which he may personally hold.

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## PROS AND CONS.

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### THE BUILDING OF A FEDERAL CAPITAL.—PRO

In their laudable desire to curtail public expense the opponents of the Federal capital scheme, like many other economical people who are nowadays inclined to be hysterical upon their pet subject, deliberately shut their eyes to several obvious facts. In the first place they entirely ignore the argument that much, if not all, the initial expense may be met without borrowing a penny, through the great increase of land values in the federal territory, which, if true statesmanship prevail, will be retained as a federal asset, while they also fail to take account of the less direct, but nevertheless certain, monetary profit, which will accrue to Australia if it builds a capital worthy of the country and the century. Again, they either cynically pass by the pledged faith of the rest of Australia to the State of New South Wales, that a new capital shall be built in her territory, or they feebly palter with it, by urging the plea, which it is hard to understand their believing, that New South Wales can be tired by inaction on the part of the Commonwealth into voluntarily surrendering that condition, which she gained only after a strenuous fight. If there is such a thing as public honor in federated Australia it seems to us that prompt steps must be taken to establish our legislature in the territory provided by the constitution—that is to say—somewhere within the State of New South Wales, and not less than one hundred miles distant from Sydney. The above being an obligation of honor and good faith there remains the question, what kind of a city shall we build? Shall we take territory of the minimum area of ten miles square, and erect thereon huts or sheds barely sufficient to protect the Governor-General and

the Legislature from the weather, or shall we design and gradually build a fair city, such as is sarcastically designated by our opponents when they speak of costly marble mansions. Economy, when it forces itself to recognise the kindred virtue of honesty, is all for the hut and shed plan, decrying taste and liberality as useless extravagance.

But this is economy run mad. The truest economy lies in building a city fit for its purpose, which is to house its inhabitants in a way worthy the dignity of the Commonwealth, and in endeavouring so to choose the site and to lay out and construct the city as to make it the most beautiful, if not the most costly, city in the world. It must never be forgotten that beauty is a national asset. Many communities of the old world almost live upon it, upon the decaying beauty of a by-gone civilization which visitors from all parts of the earth go to see. We have not the traditions and we are not likely to rival the art treasures of the Acropolis or the Forum, but it is certainly within our power to so build and embellish our city that no visitor to Australia will depart without seeing it, and thus do much to meet the expenses of the railways, and other expenses upon which enemies of the proposed capital law see an exaggerated stress.

This, however, is only a detail, though an important one. It is a fact that the cost of erecting public buildings and providing the city with all the requisites of the most advanced civilization may easily run into millions of pounds, yet we maintain that this expense can be met without adding a penny to the debt or the taxation of Australia.

It is generally agreed that the Commonwealth must secure a considerable area of suitable land as Federal territory, and as this land is sparsely populated, it will be secured at trifling cost. Now, when the city is built, when Parliament Houses, Government House, barracks, courts, and public departments of various kinds are established in the city, a very considerable number of people who use these buildings, and who are dependent on or minister to the wants of those who do, will be, as our opponents choose to phrase it, "dragged" to the

Federal capital. These will, in their turn, attract others, and since the city will be beautiful in itself, beautifully situated in a pleasant climate, and will have great social advantages, it must rapidly grow to considerable size. If the territory be well chosen the land around will be soon put under cultivation to supply the wants of the capital, and there is no reason whatever why trade and manufactures should not rapidly develop. In ten years, in all probability, the population will exceed fifty thousand, and a city of fifty thousand people cannot come into existence without immensely increasing the price and the rental of land.

In other cities all this unearned increment has gone into the hands of lucky speculators. In this case it will be retained by the Commonwealth, and if money be borrowed will more than meet the interest on the debt, but no debt need be contracted, since there is practically no doubt that inconvertible State notes secured upon the land of the Federal Territory would be a most acceptable addition to the currency of the country to the amount of three to five million pounds.

Thus we see that by reasonable economy, combined with common sense in making the Capital truly attractive, the bugbear of expense can be disposed of, provided the Government forbids its land to become an object of private speculation; and this is practically assured by the feeling of Australia patriotically voiced by the Australian Natives Association.

Turning now to some of the other objections urged against a Federal Capital, we are told first that its establishment is a surrender to provincial jealousy. If that be true, it is too late to complain. The surrender was made and the mischief accomplished on the day that New South Wales was given the promise which we declare should be held sacred; but we hold also that New South Wales was within her rights, and that it is desirable for the new nation to have a new and neutral home for its legislature and all its symbols of nationality. It is true, as insisted upon by the other side, that Parliament is affected by its surroundings. It is altogether too much affected, and while New South

Wales and Victoria entertain such conflicting aspirations on tariff and other matters, it is not fair to either of them to locate the Parliament in Melbourne or Sydney. The proposal to march it backwards and forwards from one city to the other is absurd, and would not even accomplish the alleged aim of making Parliament acquainted with the feeling of both cities. One or two Parliaments would be influenced, as those up to now have been, by the Protectionist Press and boodlers of Melbourne, and one or two elected later, and of largely differing personnel, would be affected by the Free Trade Press and public feeling of Sydney. The obvious common-sense plan is to follow the example of America and Canada by selecting neutral ground as the official centre of the Commonwealth.

We are told by the other side that Parliament will become filled with arrogance, and will escape to a great extent the beneficent influence of the Press, which guides its every movement to-day. If that were true—if a Parliament sitting at Bombala would exercise its own unfettered judgment in all things, uninfluenced by the newspapers—ten millions would not be too much to spend on securing this great boon to Australia, for Press domination is one of the great curses of political life in the Commonwealth. The building of a new Federal Capital will not altogether kill this evil, but it will undoubtedly modify it; and in this fact lies one of the strongest reasons for desiring a Federal Capital.

Very much is made of the plea that busy men may be put to inconvenience by being forced to attend and see counsel in High Court cases decided in a city which is not their home. No doubt this will occasion some grumbling, but does the litigant grumble less who is dragged from Perth or from North Queensland to fight such a case in Melbourne? And as for the counsel and their high fees, is it fair that the little knot of barristers living in Melbourne should have a practical monopoly of High Court business? For counsel and litigants alike, it is far more just that all Commonwealth suits should be decided in a neutral and central locality, in which, moreover, counsel, skilled in the

special constitutional questions which are most often in issue before the High Court, will in all probability make their home.

There is every reason to believe that in the Federal Capital there will gradually grow up a society containing men and women of culture and intelligence, not given to mammon worship, but attracted by the special advantages which they will find in a beautiful city where the affairs of their country are settled, and where the presence of Government House, the Legislature and the public offices must assure a standard of intellect and knowledge at least higher than the average. We assume always that the city will be beautiful and healthy, that it will embody all the best that is known in the arts and sciences applicable to a city's construction. It will thus be an æsthetic object lesson to Australia, which is sorely in need of such a lesson, and since we maintain that it can be erected without being a burden to the people, that the land system adopted will demonstrate the folly of our antiquated land systems which rob the people for the benefit of speculators, and that in its more peaceful, purer air, comparatively undisturbed by the clamor of private interests for special privileges, our legislators will do more honest and better work; and since, finally, not to build the Capital would be a gross breach of faith with New South Wales, we look forward eagerly to the day when the site shall be obtained and the work begun.

#### BUILDING OF A FEDERAL CITY.—CON.

At the present time, when Australia is struggling under a huge load of debt, and when every penny of surplus revenue is urgently required to settle population on the land and develop its resources, nothing but the most extravagant folly can sanction a wild scheme for incurring further debt of many millions in order to plant a brand new Federal City somewhere in the wilderness. It must be remembered that the cost of this white elephant to the community does not, by any means, cease with the expenditure necessary to subdue the forest, to make roads, water works and sewers, and to build the houses and palaces destined to cover the

heads of the scanty population of officials and dependents who must make it at least their temporary home. In addition to all the immense cost of the city itself and the indispensable adjuncts thereto, in order to bring most of the suggested sites into communication with the rest of Australia large sums must be spent upon railways which otherwise would never be constructed.

These are all expenses which will fall upon the public revenues of this generation, and many generations to come, for the national income will never meet such demands upon it, and there must be resort to a large loan. They are, however, only a fraction of the useless expense and waste of labor which will be entailed upon the people. In pursuance of a mere sentimental and grandiose idea, thousands of citizens will be forced to either abandon their present homes, or to make frequent troublesome and unnecessary journeys between them and the Federal capital. In this city will be established the Commonwealth Legislature, the Governor-General, certain departmental head offices, a detachment of the military, and, in all probability, the Federal High Court of Justice.

These institutions and people are all doing their work, such as it is, elsewhere, with equal or greater usefulness to the State than will be possible in the Federal capital. Take, for instance, the High Court. While it holds its sittings in Sydney or Melbourne litigants appearing before it have the services of the best legal talent available for the payment of fees which, though very high, are not artificially raised against them. When the court sits in a Federal City litigants must either trust important interests to the mercy of inferior men resident there, or mark fancy figures on the briefs of the leaders, whom they call away to the wilderness from their practice in the busy cities, and clients will have the further expensive annoyance of leaving their own work, whatever it may be, to attend the court.

In a hundred ways there must be wasteful expenditure imposed on unoffending citizens of the Commonwealth, through the dragging of themselves or those

with whom they have relations to an artificial city, where they have no wish to be.

But putting cost altogether aside there are other, and if possible, more weighty objections to the Legislature seeking a home outside the busy centres of population. In the first place, the establishment of a Federal capital will mean utter and unworthy surrender to the provincial jealousies which stand in the way of true federation, in spirit as well as deed. Everyone knows that, in Melbourne and Sydney, the throbbing centres of Australian life, the Legislature and the Departments would be in touch with all the requisite machinery and with the formative influences upon thought. Nothing whatever but unworthy jealousy between the States prevents either Melbourne or Sydney being recognised as the Federal capital, and, if the spirit of unity is not yet strong enough to permit of a definite choice without heart-burning, an economical compromise would be to let the Government and Legislature rule the Commonwealth from each of these cities in turn for a fixed period of years. It may be said that the provision of two sets of Government offices, etc. and the periodical transfer of whatever material needed transference would involve expense. True, it would, but not one thousandth part of the expense necessary to build a new and lonely city. And, further, this plan would have the advantage of acquainting Parliament with such differing ideals and modes of thought as may prevail in the rival cities, thus bringing it into touch with the political aspiration of the most important communities of the Commonwealth. Contact with all that is busiest and most progressive in a country is more than ever necessary in these days when politics are so much concerned with aiding industrial development, and, as a matter of fact, the instances in which the greatest city of a State is not its capital city are few and unimportant. Among them are the cases of the Canadian Dominion, and the United States, two federations in which prevailed, to some extent, the provincial jealousies which affect us here, but there is no evidence whatever that good government has been advanced in the United States by the exclusion of New York, nor in Canada by the exclusion of Montreal from

the dignity of a capital city, while in neither case was there involved the fatuous expenditure of the millions which will be wanted if trees and cottages in Bombala or Tumut are to give place to marble mansions. It is a very serious thing to remove our legislators and our public offices from the salutary influence of hearing in the home, the club, the street, the train, what the public, whose servants they are, thinks and feels about their actions. They are impressed quite enough with their importance now, and are only too ready to arrogantly misuse the power which has been entrusted to them, and these tendencies will be very appreciably exaggerated if they are poked away in splendid isolation, where they can be reached, advised, or reprimanded, only through the press which many of them now contemptuously refuse to read, or by correspondence of which the very mass that would fall upon them would almost excuse, as it certainly would cause, cynical neglect. To build a Federal capital, distant from the present haunts of men will be to adopt the most costly means possible of making members of Parliament and the public service our masters instead of our servants, and narrow provincial-minded servants at that, meeting and exchanging ideas with scarcely anyone outside their own official caste, and surrounded with a hundred evidences of their own costly triumph over the public interest. In all probability the Federal capital will never be more than a toy city of parliamentarians and bureaucrats—to segregate these from the rest of the people is one of the avowed aims of the bush capital advocates—while if it be urged that Bombala or Tumut will some day grow into a populous industrial centre, then other industrial centres will become jealous of it, and unless a new capital be built, most of the so-called objections will be prevalent that are now urged against Sydney or Melbourne. To sum up, the proposed expenditure on a Federal capital seems to tens of thousands of sober-minded people a gross outrage upon economy and commonsense, and of those who declare that any departure from the plan would be a breach of faith with New South Wales, they ask only delay, feeling sure that before long public spirit in New South Wales will grow

strong enough to freely resign what is written in the bond, and take the unhampered verdict of Australia upon the choice of a national capital.

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### COMPULSORY ARBITRATION—PRO.

The advocates of Compulsory Arbitration between employers and employed seldom claim that it is an ideal system, or even one which must exist for ever as part of the social scheme. Socialists, who are its strongest supporters, look forward to a time when there will be no employers or employed between whom to arbitrate, all workers being in the employment of the State, and men of other schools of reform believe that there will come a day when fair competition will regulate these matters peacefully and without need of appeal to external authority. In the meantime, labor being unable to make fair terms with capital except by organisation, the supporters of an Arbitration Act consider that the community is best served by laws which substitute for the barbarous methods of the strike and lock out judicial pronouncement upon the disputes between organised workmen and organised employers. There are many complex provisions in the Compulsory Arbitration laws of New Zealand and New South Wales, where the system is at work, and in the Commonwealth Arbitration Bill, which provides for its establishment throughout Australia; but the essential aim of all such laws is to make an Arbitration Court the sole and ultimate judge in disputes which may arise between masters and men. The Court is to hear evidence from both sides and thereupon determine what hours shall be worked, what wages shall be paid, and whether either side has broken any conditions binding upon it. Strikes and lock-outs are absolutely forbidden, and neglect to comply with an order of the Arbitration judge is punishable as contempt of court.

To all this few reasonable people have any serious objection to make, for it is obvious that employers, employes, and the public generally gain immensely when

industry is no longer liable to be paralysed by industrial disputes. The theorist certainly urges the academic argument that freedom is curtailed by an order of the Court dictating to an employer what wage he shall pay—to the workman what wage he shall receive; but it is obvious that on the workman's part, at least, this freedom is illusory—that his reception of a certain wage is not a matter of choice, but is dictated to him by stern necessity, which more often than not would allow him much less than the Court. Accordingly the opponents of Arbitration are driven back on asserting that it means tyranny to the employer, and on declaring that the Act will not work—that if the Court should happen to decide against the men they would refuse to obey its commands.

The cry of "pity the poor employer" calls forth few tears in a society where it is common knowledge that Labor suffers great injustices, which it is the aim of all reform to sweep away. The assertion that workmen will not obey the Court when it decides adversely to them is disproved by the experience of both New Zealand and New South Wales, where there have been several adverse judgments, and where the Court has never yet been flouted. In New South Wales, it is true there have been threats of revolt. Men have stood out at first, but common-sense has reasserted itself and the law has been obeyed. In New Zealand, where the Arbitration law has been longer at work, it is faithfully observed by both sides, and employers who at first denounced it as unwarrantable interference with their liberties now express themselves on the whole satisfied with its results, while Dr. Victor S. Clarke, Special Commissioner of the Washington (U.S.A.) Labor Bureau, in his official "Report on Labor Conditions in New Zealand," after learning all he can from all sources, expresses the highest approval of the Arbitration Act.

The experience of New Zealand and New South Wales has been so favorable that no party can be found to oppose the principle of Arbitration in the Commonwealth. The struggle centres round what are called the preference clauses—clauses which enact with some

modifications that the Court may order an employer to give work to a member of a Trades Union in preference to a non-member where both are equally competent. This, however, is denounced by conservatives and individualists in unmeasured terms. It is declared to be gross tyranny designed to force men into the Unions, which they can only enter by subscribing to certain political views under penalty of being unable to earn a living in their trade. It is further hinted that men may even be refused admission to the Unions from a sordid desire on the part of existing members to keep up wages for themselves and create a privileged aristocracy of labor. That they have any such object in view the Labor members strenuously deny. They point out that the Unions are continually urging all workers to join them—that they spend a great amount of time and labor in seeking recruits; and that when they are secured every endeavor is made to prevent them falling back into the ruck of unorganised workers. That the preference clause will tend to drive all men into the Unions is not disputed; only when every man is a Unionist will Labor be able to exert its full power and attain to its full rights. It is not tyranny to coerce a man for his own good when his good in the struggle between Capital and Labor cannot be otherwise attained. The preference clauses, perhaps, mean conscription, but the conscription is necessary in a bitterly fought fight against a powerful foe.

As to the objection that a man may not earn his living except by swallowing certain political doctrines, the answer is that individually he need do nothing of the kind. He must pay dues to a Union which no doubt will have a political policy, just as a citizen must pay the country's taxes whether he approve the country's policy or no. In both the Union and the State there is majority rule, but everyone has his share in framing the policy to which he must submit. Without the preference clause it would be open to non-Unionists, bearing none of the burdens of their unionist fellow-workers, to share in all the benefits of the law which has only been wrung from political foes by organisation, and which can only be maintained by the

same means. Thus, though the preference may be a stern measure, it is a just and a necessary one, absolutely essential to the effective working of the Arbitration Act, which comes as a great boon to all parties of the State in giving peace and order instead of industrial anarchy and strife.

### COMPULSORY ARBITRATION—CON.

The Compulsory Arbitration Acts which have been adopted by New South Wales and New Zealand, and which were recently copied by the Australian Parliament as the latest nostrum for curing industrial ills, have, in common with most other socialistic legislation, the radical defect of sapping self-reliance, of crushing out individuality and freedom, and presenting opportunities for corruption and oppression. Compulsory arbitration, indeed, takes further steps in these directions than any other legislation hitherto passed or seriously proposed in Australia, for the compulsory preference clauses are expressly declared by its advocates to be absolutely essential to the efficiency of the law. These preference clauses practically enact that unless a man join a union he must starve or seek some occupation in which no union exists, for all employers will be forbidden by the court to give him work. This provision of the law would be monstrously oppressive even were joining the union of his trade a matter within the worker's choice. But it is not. The Labor leaders and the Unions may profess holy horror at the idea of excluding workmen from membership, but they have done it—as, for instance, in New South Wales, where certain wharf laborers seeking work were told that they must first become members of their union. They applied for admission; were again and again refused, on the ground that the books were full, and were thus reduced to seeking a precarious livelihood as casual laborers, through the working of a measure which is claimed to deal out fair and equal justice all round.

It may be alleged that this is an extreme and unusual case; nevertheless, it happened, and no one who is acquainted with the great power of Trades Union executives and the unscrupulous use they sometimes make of

it, can doubt that a man would be frequently "downed" and forced to the verge of starvation because he is personally disliked by Union officials. Arbitrary power over others' lives and liberties always has a deteriorating effect, and therefore, under a regime of preference, it is certain that Union officials will sink below the level of impartiality and justice to which they attain to-day.

Let it be granted, however, that the Preference Clause will be used with the utmost fairness; even in that unlikely event it would entail obvious oppression in forcing a man to join a body which he might intensely dislike, in order to gain his daily bread. Nothing of the kind has been attempted in Australia before, and this attack on personal freedom cannot fail to have most disastrous effects upon the whole of political and social life.

So far we have dealt with the preference provisions because they are declared by arbitrationists to be essential to their measure, but all that has been said applies, though in a less degree, to compulsory arbitration without preference. The adoption of such a measure sounds a note of despair. It shows that our working men and their friends have lost faith in the ability of Labor to work out its salvation through the freedom for which the old reformers made such gallant sacrifices. Strikes were no doubt barbarous and cruel, but they showed the spark of virility in those who sustained them, and the amelioration of conditions so often won through their means raised labor in dignity and independence. Men who believed in the justice of their cause were prepared to fight for it; now they must plead for it, and are entirely dependent on the ideas of justice held by an official who, in such questions as wages and hours of labor, has no standard to appeal to. Under the old system of sturdy individualism working men were entitled to all that they could get, and were spurred on to continual efforts for legislation which would secure to every man the whole fruits of his labor. Under the new arbitration system they are petitioners for a boon while their old ideas are perverted, so that the highest

ideal is not reward according to conscious merit in labor, but the dull, dead level of socialism, undisturbed by independence, a level on which the best and the worst fare alike. This, we are told, is academic talk, but it is not so regarded by the trades unionists of England, who have recently, by an enormous majority, refused to accept the principle of compulsory arbitration and to surrender their right to strike.

In New Zealand, it is said, the Act works satisfactorily. Employers pronounce their benediction upon it. This very fact ought to make the working man suspicious for New Zealand is a country where some years ago the ideal of Labor's rights was leading towards freedom, and it seemed that there, more than anywhere else in the world, was a chance of the laborer reaping the whole reward of his labor. Then came the Arbitration Act, giving the workman in some cases more than he had before, in other cases less, and in all cases stereotyping his wages at something less than he would be entitled to under fair economic conditions. No wonder the landowner and the capitalist look complacently on the Act so long as the workmen respect its provisions, for though here and there they may have emerged victorious from an industrial battle with their workmen in the past, they knew that the war as a whole was going against them, and they naturally welcome a peace which has secured them in possession of nearly all that they stood to lose. It has been an inglorious peace for labor, diverting its attention from true reform, and a peace welcomed by monopoly, which is secured while it lasts in many unjust privileges. Therefore, from no point of view can the principle of arbitration be welcomed by true reformers. It effects a little and very doubtful good at the cost of individual liberty among employers and employed, prevents a knowledge of the principles underlying just distribution of wealth, and opens the way to all kinds of abuses. With preference to Unionists arbitration forces on a British Court the odious duty of forbidding a man to earn his daily bread. Without preference it is claimed that arbitration is unworkable because the employer who obtains a judgment against an individual worker

has no means of enforcing it, except by sending the man to prison. This course would not benefit the employer in the least, whereas he might obtain substantial damages against the Union into which the Labor party would force all workers, or at least all those who might be graciously permitted to join. Thus we are faced by the alternatives of Arbitration without preference, with the useless gaoling of individual workers who break the conditions of their employment, or Arbitration with preference, under which a worker must humbly sue permission from Union officials for the right to earn his living in a free country. Both these alternatives create such objectionable and barbarous conditions that, if no other evils were entailed by Compulsory Arbitration, the truest friends of liberalism and reform should use all their efforts to prevent its blighting influence falling upon the Commonwealth of Australia.

#### ELECTIVE MINISTRIES—PRO.

Whatever Party Government may have to recommend it in England, where it is the result of natural evolution, there is a growing feeling in Australia that we have lost far more than we have gained by the indifferently successful endeavor to transplant it into a new and uncongenial soil. We have no historic parties such as those of the old world, and Government on so-called party lines imposes most hurtful restrictions on the liberty of Parliament. It may not choose the best men for administrative purposes, but must submit their choice to the will of the most prominent man of the most numerous faction; and if it disapprove of any one of those chosen it cannot eject him from office without dismissing the rest of the company. In legislation, as well as choice of administrators, Parliament is also shackled by the present system. It may heartily approve of a Bill brought in by the Ministry, but nevertheless entertain very strong objections to some special clause, as, for instance, that giving preference to Unionists in the Federal Arbitration Bill; yet it may not excise this clause without taking the responsibility

of forcing a change of Government and stopping the business of the country, or of bringing about a dissolution and thus stopping business still longer, with the additional evil of forcing the expense of an election on individual members and the State. The threat of resignation or of penal dissolution in fact tends to make a strong leader virtually dictator, and to take the business of legislation out of the hands of Parliament, whose function is restricted to registering his wishes or using all its efforts to get rid of him, however useful he might be to the State if kept under proper control.

A further objection to the present system of Government is the terrific waste of time necessarily entailed by it. A weak Government comes into office, and immediately half the House devotes all its energies to an attempt to block the Government's legislative proposals and hamper its administration and to proposing votes of censure, in the hope of driving the Ministers from office. If the Opposition is unsuccessful in this it nevertheless succeeds in wasting the time of Parliament and the money of the country, while if it is successful the waste is greater still, for when a new Government comes into office the whole dreary programme is gone through again.

Of all this it would be hard to find a better object lesson than the first session of the second Commonwealth Parliament, where, in little more than six months, three Prime Ministers, each of them powerless to expedite business in the face of the Opposition of the moment, have attempted to lead the House and to place upon the Statute book a measure of which all parties in Parliament profess to approve. And after all these absurd resignations, the alleged theory of responsibility hopelessly breaks down and proves to be the merest cant. Mr. Deakin alleged that he could not conscientiously do his duty as Prime Minister because Parliament insisted on infringing State rights by voting for the application of the Federal Arbitration Bill to State servants. Mr. Reid, as Leader of the Opposition, felt so strongly on this subject that he crossed the House and supported Mr. Deakin, who was defeated. Now Mr. Reid, installed in office as Prime Minister, takes

up, passes into law, and proposes to administer the Arbitration Bill, in which Parliament has infringed State rights by subjecting State railway servants to its provisions, while in this course Mr. Deakin and late colleagues of his have supported Mr. Reid. If this Bill is so hurtful that Mr. Deakin found it necessary to throw the country into confusion rather than retire from the office which Parliament desired him to retain, how comes it that he can conscientiously support it now? Either Mr. Deakin was making use of the Party Government system in order to attempt dictation on a legislative question to Parliament, or his protest was meaningless, since he does not follow it up by his vote as a private member. In any case it is proved that the country has gained nothing by the waste of time involved in his resignation, but has been obliged to suffer it in order to assert its paramount legislative privileges which could never be questioned if Ministers filled their proper sphere as heads of the departments and the executive committee of the House to initiate and direct the work of legislation.

The evils of this Ministerial usurpation and constant struggle for office are so obvious that Party Government has been unsparingly condemned by such men as Herbert Spencer and Ruskin, John Bright, the historians, Froude and Freeman, and the great Canadian authority, Goldwin Smith. Party Government has been described by someone as a system under which half the cleverest men in Parliament attempt to carry on the affairs of the country and the other half try to prevent them. In the process of preventing Government by the Ministerialists all leading members of the Opposition and many of the rank and file are frequently obliged to find fault when in their hearts they approve; they are obliged to exaggerate all errors of administration, and often in opposing the action of the Government they give valuable assistance to the enemies of the country. A notable instance of this was found in the late Boer war, where the constant and bitter criticism of the British Government by the Liberal Party under Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman—a criticism which, under the Party system, necessarily was most occupied with the

war, as being the most difficult and important business the Government had on hand—not unnaturally led the Boers to believe that the Liberals were their friends. English Liberal Party papers, which they eagerly read, gave them encouragement to go on fighting a hopeless cause, since the tone of these papers and of the Parliamentary speeches which they reported inspired the Dutch with the hope that a change of the British Government would lead to favorable terms of peace being granted to them. Foreign neutral countries were also led to adopt an unfriendly and truculent attitude towards England, because her party quarrels assured them that the country was disunited.

In other cases the Party system has affected England most adversely in international relations, because under it there is not the continuity of policy which is possible where Ministers are chosen irrespective of party. Continental statesmen are chary of negotiations with England, since they know that what is done by one foreign Minister to-day may be upset by another foreign Minister to-morrow; and it is largely this vacillating policy towards foreigners—this constant and arbitrary change of view—that has led to England being so obstinately regarded in Europe as “perfidious Albion.”

These special disadvantages of Party Government are more felt in the United Kingdom than in Australia because we have practically no diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and no enemies in arms to derive encouragement from our factions, but all the evils of the faction system are with us, corrupting the Ministerial side of the House as well as the Opposition. Members of a Government are obliged to support in Parliament measures which they have condemned in the Cabinet; their followers must give up the right of private judgment, and often vote against their conscience for the sake of Party discipline, with the result that the character of Parliamentarians suffers as well as the quantity and quality of their work.

An increasing number of people hold that the only remedy for all these evils is the institution of elective Ministries, the whole House, irrespective of party,

choosing the best man it can find for administrative office, and abandoning the absurd idea that he should resign that office because another Minister proves unsatisfactory, or because Parliament disagrees with the Cabinet on questions of legislation. Ministers are supposed to be the servants of Parliament—its executive committee—which they would become in reality if they were elected for the life of Parliament; whereas they are now, in fact, its masters. Under the election system administration and legislation would go on unchecked by the changes of Government, which have occasioned such scandalous waste of time in the Commonwealth. No Minister or member would be forced to do violence to his conscience in supporting a policy of which he did not approve, and no member of the Opposition would be forced into factious fault finding.

These arguments apply with equal force to the Governments of the Australian States and of the Commonwealth; but in the latter there are special objections to the party system under which the Ministry practically dictates to Parliament while it retains a majority of one House, and leaves office when outvoted there. The House of Representatives and the Senate are elected on an identical franchise, and, except in certain well defined particulars, are supposed to have equal power, and it is therefore totally at variance with the spirit of the Constitution to make the Ministry responsible to one House alone. In America, which in many ways followed British precedent, there was no attempt to establish a system quite unsuited to the needs of a federation, while in Switzerland, another federation, elected ministries control all the Departments of State and initiate legislation with the best possible results. In Switzerland the executive consists of seven Ministers elected for three years at a joint sitting of the two Houses of Parliament which correspond very closely with our Senate and House of Representatives. Every member of the Cabinet may sit and speak in either House, but does not vote. Ministers cannot be removed by Parliament, except for gross misconduct; and on the other hand they cannot threaten the Assembly with a penal dissolution.

There is no reason why Australia should slavishly follow the example of Switzerland, and so far it has not been suggested that elected Ministers should be deprived of voting power; but the great points worthy of notice in that example are that both Houses shall have a share in the choice of Ministers, that their administration shall be undisturbed though Parliament disagree with points in their legislative policy, and that the House of Representatives may pursue its own legislative course without fear of dissolution.

From the adoption of such a principle it is clear that certain other constitutional changes would result. Parliament, for instance, would acquire a power to deal with administrative policy which it now can exercise only through the dismissal of Ministers, and the functions of the Governor-General would not be quite the same as they are at present when he takes the corporate advice of a cabinet in which no difference of opinion is allowed to find expression. All these matters, however, would be easily capable of adjustment if Parliament as a whole took back into its own hands the power which is usurped in ever greater degree by the chief of a party or faction holding the position of Prime Minister. In differences between Ministers Parliament itself would be the judge. If the Treasurer, for instance, wished to effect certain economies inconsistent with the plans for expenditure cherished by the Minister of Education Parliament would decide whether or not the expenditure was justified, without such differences of opinion occasioning, as now-a-days, a "Cabinet crisis," with very probably a change of Government or a dissolution as their sequel.

Elective Ministries are recommended by theory and justified by experience; they tend to render ministers secure from factious interference in their proper sphere as administrators, and to free Parliament from brow-beating in its proper sphere of legislation and general control of the country's affairs.

#### ELECTIVE MINISTRIES—CON.

No form of Government is perfect; but, whatever its imperfections, responsible and party Government has

so far shown itself that most suited to the genius of free peoples of the British race. In America, where that form of Government has been departed from, the departure is far more radical than that contemplated by reformers here who wish to insert the new brick of elective Ministries in the framework of our present constitution. In America, where responsible Government is unknown, the Ministers are nominally chosen by the President—really chosen by him when he bears a name and reputation powerful enough to give him freedom—but as a rule practically nominated for office by the Party which puts the President in power. And in America it happens that party bitterness, tyranny and unscrupulousness go to greater lengths than among any other people of British origin. The machine works, works through party, and not particularly well; but Government by elective Ministries in Australia, without some officer corresponding more or less to the American President, would probably not work at all.

Roughly there are two alternatives. Either the elected Minister would become a practical autocrat in his administrative Department, or Parliament would have to interfere so constantly with details of administration that the result would be chaos. At the present time individual Ministers are under the wholesome restraint of opinion in the Cabinet, and the whole Ministry is under the control of Parliament, for it can carry on its administration only in such a way as the majority of the Representative House approves. There is no need for constant Parliamentary interference in departmental affairs, since any member of either House can acquire full information as to what is being done. An adverse vote and consequent resignation must follow anything important of which a majority seriously disapproves, and Ministers can consequently be trusted to exercise judgment and circumspection.

It is urged by those favoring the elective principle that, under the present system, a good man frequently loses office just as he has gained a thorough knowledge of his Department. This is true and sometimes regrettable, but it must be remembered that no reasonable tenure of office would make a Minister an expert in the

same sense as the permanent heads of the departments who control its working, and that the Ministerial function must always be the regulation of policy rather than of detail. Thus a good administrator's experience is not lost to Parliament even when he retires from office. He still has a powerful voice in the country's policy, whereas the expert Ministers, who, it is urged, would be obtained by election and security of tenure, would exercise a despotism tempered by chaotic Parliamentary interference.

Turning from the question of its effect on administration, let us consider whether elective Ministries would have any real preventive effect upon Government by Party. As long as parties exist, and in some shape they must exist until all men think alike in political matters, a party or combination of parties must control the Government under any system that can be devised. Ministers will be elected from the preponderating party in Parliament, whereas they are now informally chosen from that party, through the Prime Minister who leads it. Party will remain in the ascendant, but will be forced to maintain its hold over its ministerial nominees by irritating interference with, or surveillance of, details, unless it chooses to make them irresponsible despots in their several offices. In this case Parliament would not have more, but on the other hand far less control over its executive committee than it now possesses in the power to cause their dismissal through a want of confidence motion.

Party Government, if it be an evil, is an evil absolutely beyond the reach of cure in free countries by any such tinkering device as the institution of elective Ministries. The majority will always insist upon its right to rule, and Party Government, though by no means perfect, is the best means yet discovered for the exercise of this right. It is quite true that it involves a certain waste of time in changes of Government or want of confidence debates when a weak Government takes office; but when parties are fairly equally balanced the ultimate result of these things is usually a coalition; that is to say, the formation of a new party embodying the views of a majority in Parliament and

the country. Even this "waste of time," so-called, has its uses, not to be despised, in prominently bringing before the country, whose servant Parliament is, the political questions, great or small, which urgently demand consideration and settlement. Want of confidence debates are fruitful sources of political education and prevent political thought stagnating in the electorates. It is the fashion to sneer at Parliamentary tactics as mere struggles for office, but like most sneers this one contains a very large measure of injustice. Men do not struggle for office unless they believe they represent preponderating opinion in the country. If they have no higher motives, they know that attempt at office is otherwise useless; and when there comes a period of short and unstable administration, such as that comprising the first session of the second Commonwealth Parliament, it is clear proof, either that a general election is required to settle the true issues upon which the country is divided, or else that coalition is necessary to unite former opponents by a new nexus of opinion.

Much is made of the fact that Party Government demands compromise from members of Parliament. The member of a Cabinet or of a party cannot give full effect to his own views and ideals. This is perfectly true, but neither can he do so in any walk of life. In Parliament and everywhere else, if a man is to work with his fellow creatures he must surrender something of his aims in order to advance the rest, and no more in Parliament than elsewhere need the honorable man give a vote against his conscience. Parties are, or may be, formed on broad lines within the limits of which there is room for individual opinion, and when the party takes a road which a member of it cannot conscientiously follow he is at liberty to leave it. It is easy to give undue weight to such names as those of Spencer, Froude, Ruskin and Bright, all more or less associated with condemnation of Party Government. Some of them attacked its extravagances; others had an ideal system in view, and in every case it is more the spirit of faction in the people than the machinery devised for government that is really hit by their reprobation. The instrument is imperfect, primarily because the people are im-

perfect, refusing or being unable to all see eye to eye concerning the good of the State and to unite all their strength in advancing it. Nevertheless, there are some alterations in the present system which enthusiastic believers in it are urging as very necessary improvements. To return to the example of the present Commonwealth Parliament, many of its supporters condemn the resignation, first of the Deakin Ministry, and second of the Watson Ministry, as quite uncalled for by loyalty to the system of Responsible Government. Legislation, they say, is the business of the House, and though a Ministry is possibly justified in resigning if the legislation which it considers essential to the country's welfare is disapproved by Parliament, they can see no justification for resignation where a large majority agrees with the Government in principle and differs from it only in matters of detail. No Government, they contend, should resign office merely because it is out-voted in committee on some clause of a Bill.

There seems to be a good deal of truth in this view. It may be that late Ministerial changes had a much deeper cause than the ostensible one of defeat upon the Arbitration Bill. Mr. Deakin, indeed, declares that he did not feel justified in governing the country when Parliament insisted upon an interference with State rights involving a policy which he could not conscientiously administer. Mr. Watson declared that he could not conscientiously administer an Arbitration Act in which Parliament chose to mutilate the preference to Unionists, which he claimed essential to industrial peace. Yet both these Ministers would presumably take office again when the Act in the form for which they expressed such abhorrence is on the Statute Book, and would administer it without qualms. It is not quite obvious to many supporters of Responsible Government why they should be able to administer the Act as amended in view of past declarations. The contention is in fact, that Ministers should not resign while their general legislative and administrative policy is satisfactory to the House. They are responsible to Parliament, which can insist upon that responsibility by direct vote

whenever it chooses to do so, and should maintain their office as long as they can do it with efficiency in the opinion of Parliament. The essential differences and the close approximation in strength of three parties tending to make all stable Government impossible until some new party nexus was evolved may have made the late resignations inevitable, but a very sparing use of the threat of resignation to force compliance with a Government's legislative proposals would certainly do very much to restore Responsible Government to the approval of many who are now trifling with the idea of elective Ministries. As to the threat of dissolution, of which much nonsense is talked, it must be remembered that such a threat can have no terrors unless parties are so evenly divided that stable Government is impossible, or unless the House does not represent the country, in which case, among a free, self-governing people, a dissolution is indubitably desirable. Of the state of facts actually existing, it is the function of the Governor to judge, and, forming his judgment, he is guided by all the information available, by no means holding himself bound by the advice of perhaps prejudiced Ministers.

A special claim for elective ministries has lately been made in Australia on the ground that though Party Government may be tolerable in a State it is unworkable in a Federation. One of the arguments relied on is the injustice of making Ministers responsible to one House only when both are elected on universal franchise, and have powers far more nearly approaching one another than those of corresponding bodies in non-federated communities. The difficulty of reconciling the claims of two Houses of nearly equal power goes far too deep for the election of Ministers to solve it. Nothing but common sense and mutual concessions can possibly do that, and as a matter of fact the Senate is deprived of no rights through the existence of Responsible Party Government. While the House of Representatives is, in fact, the most important House, there of course most of the Ministers will be found, and it would be so even if Ministers were elected by the two houses sitting as one, unless, of course, it were constitutionally provided that the number from each House must be equal. This

would not be tolerated while the Representatives numbered twice as many as the Senators, and even if it were, the majority, divided upon party lines, would choose Ministers of the right color to suit them. In other words, there is no proof that the present system of Responsible Government will not work in the Commonwealth, while the substitution of elected Ministers would not do away with Government by Party. A great point is made of the fact that elective Ministries are apparently successful in Switzerland, but the example is really worth very little to us, for the whole political genius and traditions of the Swiss people are utterly different from ours, while in comparison with our national affairs theirs are merely those of a great village. In Switzerland Ministers do not vote in either House, legislation can be carried by the initiative referendum, the people manage their own affairs in a direct manner quite at variance with the representative principle which prevails here. Unless we are prepared to abandon that, to have Ministers without votes, legislation by mass meeting, and a Governor-General of quite a new pattern, we cannot make any rational imitation of the Swiss elective Ministry. We can, however, strengthen public opinion against capricious Ministerial resignations and against unnecessary dissolutions, in which case the agitation, such as it is, for elective Ministries will soon die a natural death.

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#### EXEMPTION OF IMPROVEMENTS FROM RATING.—PRO.

The present rating system of Victoria increases the amount of local taxation on a landowner in exact proportion to the amount of capital and labor which he expends upon his land. It is, therefore, in essence a fine upon industry and improvement, and, further than this, it rewards slovenliness and want of industry, for if a house is allowed to fall into disrepair, so that the rental value decreases, the rates upon it are decreased also. To allege that the income tax and probate duties

are also fines is nothing to the point. Whether this be true or not it does not alter the fact that we deliberately put a penalty upon improvements through our local system of taxation, when Queensland, New Zealand, and other countries have shown us a better way.

Under the new system land which owes its value to natural and social causes, irrespective of anything done upon it by its owners, would bear all local taxation, while the improvements which are due to individual enterprise and industry would go free. And this is eminently fair, because, while municipal expenditure on bridge and road building, draining, lighting, etcetera, always adds to the value of land in the municipality, it seldom adds anything to the value of improvements; it can never, under any circumstances, raise them in value above the cost of their replacement, and it frequently actually reduces them in value.

The instances given on the other side of the hotel in the wilderness and the suburban houses are exceptional, but, here, it may be granted that where buildings are erected in an inaccessible and unsuitable position, a road, tramway, or bridge, which makes the position accessible and suitable, may bring the bricks and mortar nearer to cost price than they were before. It can never raise them above it. At the same time it always gives great added value to the land which is rendered accessible and suitable for various uses formerly foreign to it.

On the other hand, the buildings or improvements are more frequently rendered less valuable by the expenditure of public money. Suppose a man builds a house, the material for which is carted at great expense over a bush track. A railway is built. All the materials of house building can be brought to the spot much cheaper, and the value of the house goes down, because it would now cost much less to replace. Things like this are an every day occurrence, as those farmers can tell who have paid heavy cartage on fencing wire or wire netting, and afterwards find their neighbors transporting it at a much lower cost by rail.

Thus, in principle, we see that it is just to tax land in proportion to value, which always has relation to

public expenditure, and unjust to tax improvements, of which the value has not the same relation to it, and which is more often decreased than increased. The new system has also the practical advantages which can confidently be predicted of just legislation. It discourages land speculation and the holding of land out of use by increasing the taxes on vacant land and subjecting the owner to no penalty when he improves it. The exemption of improvements tends to lower rents and prevent overcrowding by causing more houses to be built, and thereby increasing the competition of owners for tenants. In time it would depopulate the slums of Melbourne and secure their rebuilding, because no one would be content to live in a street of crowded hovels, when a home was offered to him somewhere on the thousands of acres which lie vacant around Melbourne to-day.

In the country taxation would be rendered less onerous to the farmer who has cleared and improved his land, more onerous to the neighbor whose property, speculatively held, is a breeding place for scrub and rabbits. The neighbor would have strong inducement to sell or to improve the property in order to obtain a return for his increased rates.

Again, the exemption of improvements would make the poor man, the small holder, pay less, and the rich man more, than he does at present. This is obvious in reason, because it is the rich who hold the best sites where land value is very high in proportion to the value of improvements on the land, while the poor man very often occupies a cottage more valuable than its site, or a farm where two-thirds of the value consists of improvements. On the big squatting station, on the other hand, the value of the property consists in overwhelming measure of the value of the land. What is taught by reason is borne out by the experience of Queensland and New Zealand, where the exemption of improvements is provided for. The Town Clerk of Brisbane, questioned on the matter, replied to Mr. Arthur Robinson, M.L.A., in 1901, that the system was giving entire satisfaction. It was introduced for country lands in 1887, and extended to town lands by Sir Samuel

Griffith in 1890. Figures supplied by the Town Clerk of Brisbane gave the difference in the rates paid there on certain small properties in 1890 under the old system, and in 1891 under the new. On one the rates were reduced from £1 0s. 10d. to 16s. 10d.; on another from £3 13s. 8d. to £1 5s.; and on a third, somewhat more valuable, from £6 10s. to £5 5s. In New Zealand the rates paid before and after improvements were exempted are strikingly different on different classes of property. A speculator, for instance, who was charged only £6 5s. 3d. under the old system had to pay £15 13s. 9d. under the new, while, on the other hand, a farmer had his rates reduced from £7 14s. 2d. to £4 10s. 9d., and a miner from 14s. 8d. to 3s. 4d.

Such examples as these show clearly that the reform reduces the burden of the poor man's taxation, in spite of the efforts of Conservatives to prove the contrary. It is alleged, for instance, that rates from that part of Melbourne where improvements are most valuable are more than half those received from the rest of the city, and that, therefore, if the improvements were exempted the poorer owners of outside Melbourne properties would be obliged to pay more. But of this there is no proof whatever, as the land values of this portion of Melbourne are much greater than in the other parts, and it would, therefore, continue to pay more taxation.

Scarcely anything can better exemplify the folly of the present rating system than the fact that the owners of the magnificent Equitable Building, on the corner of Collins and Elizabeth streets, were obliged, in 1901, to pay rates on a valuation of £9250, because they had spent £300,000 in a building which employed labor and beautifies Melbourne, whereas the owners of the opposite corner, of the same area and slightly greater value, paid rates on £4566 only, because their buildings were ramshackle, old, and comparatively profitless. The Equitable people, it is urged by our opponents, should pay more because they can afford it. It is true they can afford it, but in benefiting themselves they have benefited the city; whereas, if the rates were equalised on the two properties, the owners on the other side of

the road would be quickly induced to also employ capital and labor to their profit and the advantage of Melbourne.

Against the common-sense plan now advocated, there are numerous, more or less fanciful objections, among others, that land and improvements cannot be valued separately. This is, of course, absurd, seeing that they are separately valued for this purpose in Queensland, New Zealand and South Australia, and that in Victoria they are separately valued under the Water Act, for probate, and for many other purposes. Here and there difficulties may occur, but even in the case of old clearings, whenever their value is not more than exhausted, as evidenced by the fact that scarcity of timber has made clearing a disadvantage, there is almost always uncleared land near, from which the cost of removing timber of similar class can be estimated. It must be always borne in mind that the value of a building, a clearing, or any other improvement, is not what it may have cost, but what it would cost to replace or effect to-day. And even if some improvements failed, through human fallibility, to obtain the exemptions to which they are justly entitled, that is the poorest of reasons for objecting to exempt all the improvements that can be exempted.

The arguments as to difficulty in municipal borrowing resulting from the new system are scarcely worth notice. New Zealand and Queensland have not experienced this difficulty, and it would not be experienced here, though loans would much more seldom be needed, since the reformed rating system tends to an increased revenue by promoting a spirit of enterprise and industry.

It is not only in Australia that rating reform has found favor. All the greatest municipalities of Great Britain are urgently demanding it from Parliament, and Bills have been more than once introduced, though they have not yet passed, giving them power to adopt it. The New Zealand municipalities operate under a permissive Act, giving ratepayers the right to demand a poll whereat the choice lies between the old rating system and the new. The latter has been adopted by

some seventy councils, and those which have adopted it have never gone back to the former, though they are empowered to do so. In Queensland the exemption of improvements is compulsory. All that the reformers ask for in Victoria is a permissive Act giving municipalities local option in the matter. They trust that education would soon lead to rating reform becoming universal, and as for the objection that polls would involve expense to the ratepayers, they hold that, even where the poll was fruitless, the knowledge given by discussion of the question would be the cheapest thing ever obtained by the expenditure of municipal money.

### EXEMPTION OF IMPROVEMENTS FROM RATING.—CON.

At the present time municipal rates in Victoria are levied upon the annual rental value of the properties assessed. If a property will let for £100, and the rate is fixed at a shilling in the pound, the contribution paid by that property to the municipal revenue is one hundred shillings, or five pounds. Where a property consists of vacant land which has no present letting value, the annual value is reckoned under the Local Government Act at 5 per cent. upon the capital value, and upon whatever this sum may amount to the rate of one shilling in the pound, or whatever else it may be, is levied.

Under this system all land in private ownership, whether occupied or unoccupied, pays its share of local taxation—a fair share in either case, as held by a majority of those who understand municipal Government, though this is disputed by the self-styled reformers who would levy the rates upon unimproved values only.

This new system, they point out, is followed in New Zealand, Queensland, South Australia, and some of the provinces of the Canadian Dominion. In Victoria, their opponents reply, local government, under the old system is more efficient than in any of these countries; there is nothing in Victorian institutions, of which the people are more justly proud than their excellent municipal system.

On so-called principle the reformers urge that a man holding land valued at ten thousand pounds, with buildings worth twenty thousand upon it, should pay no more in rates than the man owning vacant land valued at ten thousand. To ask more from the former owner, they fancifully say, is to fine him for improving his property. They might, on the same ground, condemn the income tax, saying it is a fine on industry; or legacy duties, on the ground that they are a fine upon accumulation. Supporters of the present system look at the matter in a commonsense way, and say that the man has built the house because he can afford it and expects to make money out of it. He carries out his business under the municipal regulations, and, as a householder, enjoys the benefits of the municipal roads, municipal lighting or other improvements, and should, therefore, be made to pay for them.

It is contended, on the other side, that municipal works, while they add to the value of land, do not add to the value of buildings or other improvements thereon, and that, therefore, the improvements should not be taxed. This contention, however, will not hold water. A man plants an orchard in a locality wanting roads, or on the wrong side of a deep river. He cannot get his fruit to market. In this case it is absurd to say that added value is not given to the improvement—the fruit trees—as well as to the land in which they grow, when the municipality builds a road or bridge and puts the orchardist in communication with purchasers.

Take, again, the case of an hotel, which is isolated, and afterwards has a main road carried past it. The building which was formerly unsaleable may now have great value. Once more, suburban houses are built far from a railway station, not one of the owners could get back the money he has laid out in bricks and mortar. Then an electric tram is carried down the street. Immediately all these houses, as well as the land they stand on, become worth more than they were before. They have a greater rental value given by the tramway, and, therefore, the rates upon these properties—land and buildings together—are raised.

Thus the supposed injustice alleged to arise from increased rates on the improvements which are not made more valuable by municipal works is largely discounted. The theory does not work out in practice.

A favorite comparison, with the advocates of the new rating system, lies between the Equitable Life Assurance Building in Collins Street, and the buildings on the corner of Collins Street, on the opposite side of Elizabeth Street. They are erected on land of about the same area and value, but are alleged to pay rates amounting to only about half those levied on the Equitable Building. Granted that this is so, what injustice is proved? In the first place, far larger income is derived from the large edifice than from the small, and the owners can therefore afford higher rates; in the second place, an allowance is made to the former in a reduction of their income tax, for rates are deducted from taxable income.

Among the many objections to the new rating system is the difficulty of distinguishing between the value of land and the value of improvements. This is not great in towns where improvements consist in building, but in the country, where the land has been improved by removing timber—perhaps, fifty years ago—in draining swamp lands, or in manuring and sowing down paddocks in grass, the difficulty is very great indeed.

It is sometimes said that where land has been cleared for a long time and the country is denuded of timber, its removal is no longer an improvement, but a detriment, and should, therefore, not be allowed for. This may be all very well in theory, but in practice nothing will persuade the farmer, who has spent ten pounds an acre and years of toil in clearing his land, that he is not suffering insolent injustice in being told that he has not improved his land, but disimproved it. In cases like this, and many others, the new system would cause heart-burnings and endless expensive rating appeals. Further, all that great body of municipal law upon which valuable text books have been written, and with which councillors and rate-payers have laboriously made themselves acquainted,

would become so much rubbish, as far as rating is concerned, by the introduction of this new principle.

In the matter of loans municipalities would be injuriously affected. The security they have now to offer is rating power over the properties within the municipality—under the new system it would be upon the land only, and, further, since to raise the same revenue a rate of two shillings or more would be required instead of a shilling, when the rateable property was reduced to half its present amount, or less, by the exemption of improvements from taxation, a borrowing council would be adversely affected in the English money market. The rate levied would appear enormously high, and though it be said this could be explained, the fact remains that the council would be prejudiced in the eyes of busy men who have no time to acquaint themselves with the faddist details of our law.

It is claimed that this alteration in the incidence of rates would fall more heavily on the rich than on the poor. Sir Samuel Gillott has pointed out in the Victorian Assembly that, under the present system, the portion of Melbourne enclosed between Flinders and Bourke Streets and Spring and Spencer Streets pays £45,000 annually, as against less than £40,000 paid by the much larger area and population outside those boundaries. Within the streets named are nearly all the great buildings owned by wealthy individuals and corporations, therefore, to exempt them from rating would necessarily throw a heavier burden on the poorer owners of other land less highly improved, if the same revenue were raised from rates.

It is, indeed, admitted by the "reformers" that the poor man's cottage is to pay as much as the rich man's mansion, if the building be on land of equal value. The excuse made for this injustice is that it seldom occurs, and that if the poor man chooses to build upon valuable land it is quite fair to tax him out of it. This argument fails to satisfy opponents of the new system, and they further object that if it is effective it will encourage over-building and consequent loss, landowners being forced to erect houses which can give no adequate

return, under penalty of paying heavy taxation for no return whatever. It may even lead to building on wretchedly small allotments, since an owner will naturally desire to have on his property as much as possible of untaxed house and as little as possible of taxed land.

Finally, it is certain that there is no real desire in Victoria for this alleged reform. The ratepayers, with the exception of a few radicals, either do not understand it or are indifferent or hostile; among municipal councillors a great majority are strongly opposed to any change.

This is so far recognised by even those who have proposed Bills to introduce the new system here, that they have made them permissive, leaving to every municipality the option of continuing to rate on the old plan, or of adopting the exemption of improvements. But even with this concession these Bills have been rejected, since it is felt that the sections permitting polls to be held in order to test local opinion would give a few faddists most undesirable opportunity for agitation and attacks upon a system which is working well, at the expense of the ratepayers generally, who would be saddled with the cost of abortive polls.

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## A GOVERNMENT TOBACCO MONOPOLY.—PRO.

To those who believe in Socialism, or in an approach towards Socialism, a monopoly of the tobacco industry will be justified as a matter of course, since it is portion of the general scheme, but there are many reasons urged by non-socialists for the nationalisation of this particular industry.

In the first place, it differs from nearly all others, with the exception of the drink traffic, in being regarded by every civilised nation as one from which the Government may legitimately expect to obtain a large revenue. When the average man in Europe, America, or Australia smokes a pipe of tobacco he is paying more to the Government than to any and all

of the persons concerned in producing the tobacco, unless, indeed, the manufacturer is the Government itself. Free-trade England, Protectionist Germany and France, with its State tobacco monopoly, alike look to the smoker to provide millions of revenue in return for indulgence in his luxury. The question, therefore, of duties upon privately produced tobacco, or of a State monopoly of production, becomes simply one of convenience and efficacy in securing the greatest revenue with the least burden to the consumer. Some countries, such as Germany and England, have found the former method most satisfactory; others, such as Italy and France, adhere to the latter; and there are special reasons for thinking that under present conditions Australia would be wise to follow the example of Italy and France.

In free-trade countries it may be granted at once that there is much to be said for leaving the manufacture and distribution of tobacco in private hands. If duties on imported tobacco are equalised by excise duties on that made within the country, the whole amount of the duties is secured by the State as revenue, and competition between manufacturers at home and abroad ensures that the public shall receive a good article at a reasonable price. But this equality between excise and import duties scarcely anywhere exists. Even in free-trade England the latest movement has been an alteration of the Customs duties, securing substantial protection to the home manufacturers, with the result that a ring can be formed among them to raise prices to almost the level at which imported tobacco, paying a higher duty, can be sold. The result must be, that while the revenue will lose the difference between the import and the excise duty, the public will not gain in securing cheaper tobacco—the manufacturers will gain in higher prices for the tobacco that they sell.

Such a ring is a certainty of the future in England. In Australia, it actually exists. The local manufacturers of tobacco are in agreement not to compete with one another, and they reap an enormous profit, which should go either to the Government as revenue, or remain in the pockets of the smoking public. The method

by which these great profits are made is simple. On imported smoking tobacco, the duty is 3s. 3d. per lb. The import duty on tobacco leaf (each pound of which will make more than a pound of smoking tobacco) is only 1s. per lb. The excise duty charged on tobacco manufactured here is 1s. 6d. per lb. Thus duty on leaf and excise on manufacture together give the Government only 2s. 6d. for every pound of tobacco made in Australia from imported leaf, and only 1s. 6d. from every pound made from local leaf on which of course there is no import duty, as against 3s. 3d. from every pound of tobacco imported. Naturally importation is checked, and the revenue suffers, and at the same time the public does not gain because the tobacco ring raises the price of the article made here to just a little below the price at which it could be imported. Now, if the Government made or imported all the tobacco used in the country it would gain all the profits on the sale.

But, say the free trade opponents of a tobacco monopoly, why not take this step? Why not equalise the excise and import duties? Because, we reply, it is impossible. There will not be free trade in tobacco for years to come, because the protectionists are too strong, and therefore the only way to safeguard the revenue and the people is for the Government to enter into the tobacco business.

To those fearful of socialism, we reply, look at France and Italy. There is no socialism there, yet they have Government monopolies, and gain a large revenue from them. And even if this movement did encourage socialism, it would be better to risk it than to permit the existence of a great and wealthy private monopoly, for these bodies always have a demoralising influence on politics.

Another argument urged against the proposal is that Governments do not manage businesses as well as private individuals. Our Government will be wasteful, unenterprising, and will not give us as good tobacco as individual manufacturers. By way of example, they declare that the tobacco of France is bad, and not cheap. It is true that Government is seldom a good

man of business, but even though there may be muddle in our railways, for instance, who would change them for private companies that would reap exorbitant profits? And the manufacture of tobacco is a comparatively simple business, to which a Government department should be equal. As to the tobacco of France being bad and dear, that is largely a matter of opinion. Twenty very fair cigarettes can be bought in any shop for fivepence, and though Englishmen do not like French tobacco the French think it the best in the world, and Englishmen think German tobacco wretched, though in Germany there is no tobacco monopoly. There is no reason to believe that our Government would not manufacture tobacco to suit the taste of the people.

Again, it is urged that under a Government monopoly, there would be no encouragement to Australian-grown tobacco; that the State would import all it needed, because it could get it cheaper and better abroad. To this, there are two answers—the free trade answer that if tobacco can be bought cheaper and better abroad it should be bought there; and the protectionist answer that the Government of a protectionist people would see that a fair chance was given to local growers to supply material. We are told that growth of tobacco would be discouraged except in certain places and under supervision, lest the growers might manufacture on the sly and sell tobacco in contravention of the monopoly. No doubt supervision would be needed, but it is needed now in case tobacco should be manufactured without paying excise duty, and it would be impossible for interference with individual liberty to go further under any Government monopoly than it does now in the free trade United Kingdom, where the growing of tobacco leaf in England and Ireland is absolutely forbidden by law. The Government does not want the trouble of watching small plantations and preventing tobacco from evading duty, and therefore it calmly says there shall be no plantations at all, much to the disgust of the Irish who have land suitable for tobacco and regard this as gross tyranny.

Looking at the matter from every point of view, therefore, there is justification for a Government tobacco monopoly. The anti-socialist may regard free trade as preferable, but the wise free trader must recognise that free trade in tobacco is now impossible, and should recognise that he is far more likely to get it in the future from a Government which gives up its profits on manufacture for an equal or greater revenue from corresponding excise and import duties, than from monopolist manufacturers who would cry out that free trade was ruining them in order to benefit foreign competitors. A Government monopoly is at the worst the lesser of two evils. If it means worse tobacco and un-economic manufacture, it means increased revenue and death to mischievous private monopoly, and at the same time the increased cost of manufacturing and the deterioration in quality are mere assertions which are by no means proved.

#### A GOVERNMENT TOBACCO MONOPOLY.—CON.

From the socialist point of view it is needless to say that nothing can be urged against a State monopoly of the tobacco industry. It is, as admitted by the other side, portion, and an important portion, of the general socialist scheme, for which reason, among others, it should be resisted by anti-socialists with all their force. It is true that tobacco monopolies exist in France, Italy, and other countries which are not yet socialist, but they are all countries which interfere with individual liberty in a manner intolerable to the average Britisher. They have the conscription for military service; police espionage of hotels and lodging houses; police and military interference everywhere. The tobacco monopoly is congenial to their general scheme of Government, while it is absolutely foreign to ours, or, at least, to what ours used to be until we entered upon this and a dozen other projects which infringe the liberty of the individual to conduct his own business in his own way.

We do not deny that tobacco and alcohol are treated by all civilised Governments in a different manner from most other products, in so far as they are made

the subject of great revenue demands. The justification—if there is any—lies in the fact that both are luxuries, while in the case of alcohol special restrictions beyond those for the protection of the revenue may be necessary, in order to prevent drunkenness, rowdyism, and other evils. But, as far as tobacco is concerned, there is no reason in doing anything which does not help the revenue, while protecting the public from extortion, and all this can be accomplished by equalising, or nearly equalising, the excise and import duties. This is practically admitted by the other side, which takes refuge in the plea that because a good thing is impossible of present accomplishment, we should immediately adopt a bad plan which will entail many evils.

Before discussing them, it may be asked what is the authority for asserting that the admittedly high and injurious protection on tobacco cannot be reduced or abolished? The presumption is all the other way, for there has already been a substantial reduction. The Victorian tariff levied a duty of 3s. upon imported manufactured tobacco, and of 1s. upon imported leaf, with an excise duty of 9d. per lb., thus giving the local manufacturer of tobacco from imported leaf protection amounting to 1s. 3d. per lb. against a protection under the Commonwealth of only 9d. per lb. The corresponding figures for tobacco made from local leaf are 1s. 9d. protection, under the Commonwealth, and 2s. 3d. under the old tariff of Victoria.

The high protection which has been happily reduced undoubtedly gave local manufacturers the chance of extorting monopoly prices, and seriously depleted the revenue. Things are immensely better now, and the present Australian tobacco trust probably does not make more than ten per cent. on its real capital. It is still in possession of undue tariff privileges, but there is every hope of their curtailment, and even if they were not curtailed it would still be better to endure patiently the ills we have than fly to others that we know not of.

But, say the advocates of a Government monopoly, we know that it works well in France and Italy. That was not the opinion of the German Parliament, which

thrashed out the whole matter in 1882 and decided by a great majority against following French example. The conclusion come to was that France had worse tobacco, and less revenue, from its monopoly than would be given by private enterprise and a reasonable system of duties. The average wholesale price of tobacco is much the same in England and France, while from each pound consumed the British Government reaps more revenue than the French. As to quality, tastes in tobacco certainly differ, but there is an overwhelming mass of opinion that the Britisher gets a better smoke for the same money than the Frenchman. It is indeed inevitable, for there is no exception to the rule that Government does not conduct business enterprise with the same economy and skill as private enterprise. We are asked would we like our railways run by private companies? Certainly not, for private railway companies necessarily mean private monopoly, and to check inevitable private monopoly it is better to suffer the comparatively slovenly extravagant methods of Government control. In the case of tobacco we are not faced with the same alternatives.

Besides the evils arising from bad management, there are other serious drawbacks to the establishment of a Government monopoly. It would add to the great army of public servants which it is our desire to reduce, and in France the licenses for the sale of tobacco, which are issued by the Government, are a direct cause of corruption. They are given to friends or pensioners of the administration, and are revocable at will, thus being regarded as spoils of office, and the price paid for them is so much less than their value that they are sub-let by the lucky holders of them. Thus, the Government loses revenue, and the disposal of the licenses has a demoralising effect. It may be said that in Australia we should act with higher morality and more good sense, but it must not be forgotten that a Government monopoly of the tobacco trade involves troublesome Government supervision of the sale as well as the manufacture, if the public is to be guarded against spoliation by rings and trusts. This licensing and supervision might be managed with good sense and fairness, but there is obvious danger that it would not, and

the much-vaunted example of France offers presumption to the contrary. Under the system of duties, it is pointed out by our opponents that tobacco growing is forbidden in Ireland, and from this they argue that in Australia, under a Government monopoly, there would be no more interference, and no more irritating checks upon the grower than there are now while duties are in force. But this is a manifest non sequitur. England unjustly checks the development of local tobacco culture. Our Government, which also levies duties, does not check, but encourages, it. There is a danger, of course, that home-grown tobacco may be manufactured on the sly and thus avoid payment of excise duty; but all the city importers and manufacturers who have to pay duty are allies of the Government in preventing a course which would not only defraud the revenue, but injure them by unfair competition. Consequently, the tobacco-grower is left free to choose his own locality for experimenting, and generally to manage his own business in his own way. With a Government monopoly this would not be possible, because, if the State is to derive more revenue than it does at present, the temptation to illicit manufacture and sale will be manifestly greater than it is now, and also because there will be no body of private individuals keenly interested in keeping a watchful eye upon the operations of tobacco growers.

If a monopoly comes into existence the unfortunate people will find themselves harassed and regulated out of existence, and will probably not be allowed to pursue their existence at all, except in specified localities, as unless several of them are gathered together the expense of supervising them will be too great. Again, Government departments are notoriously lazy and unprogressive. They will make no experiments to which they are not forced, and so the cheapest stock brands of tobacco will be imported, and made up in the same old way. There will be no room for the enterprising agriculturist to put a new thing upon the market. The Tobacco Department will wish to make the best record for its operations, and will force upon the people the product which can be obtained with the least cost and trouble to itself.

For all these reasons—because it is a mischievous step in the direction of socialism; because the examples of its working are not encouraging; because experience and reason alike lead us to expect a worse article at a higher cost; because it will check tobacco growing here, and hamper those engaged in it; because it will add to the army of public servants and open temptation to jobbery; and because there is another, a better, and a feasible way to check such evils as admittedly arise from private monopoly in the tobacco business, it would be a reactionary and calamitous step to establish a Government Tobacco Monopoly in Australia.

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#### PROHIBITION OF THE DRINK TRADE.—PRO.

It is a drastic proposal, no doubt, to absolutely prohibit the manufacture, importation and consumption of all alcohol beyond that required in medicine; and yet who can doubt that if the proposal were carried into effect the world would gain infinitely in happiness and wealth? Opium is a curse in some Eastern countries, and sane, civilised opinion sees no tyranny in the suppression of the opium traffic. Alcohol is ten thousand times more baneful to Europe than opium is to Asia, and yet the advocates of liquor prohibition are laughed at as cranks or denounced as tyrants. The opponents of prohibition belong to different classes. There are the selfish and unthinking who enjoy their own glass of wine, or beer, or spirits, and would not surrender it in order to benefit millions. Then there are the conscientious theorists who deplore the evils of drink, but honestly believe that greater evils would be entailed by the coercion involved in its total prohibition. They are never tired of repeating that you cannot make men moral by Act of Parliament, and so pleased are they with this catchword that they vehemently resist any proposal to try. They speak of the injury done to character by forced abstinence from temptation, and the violation of personal liberty resulting from interference with the doings of one's neighbor. Every man, they maintain, has a right

to go to hell in his own way without interference from the State. Possibly he has, but the prohibitionists maintain that he has no right to drag others down to hell with him as the drunkard does in every country that we know.

In the best of all possible worlds there might be much to say for the theorists who uphold liberty, but in this world as we know it, where hopeless poverty drives to drink, and drink reacts terribly upon poverty, there is no time for theorising upon liberty. Where we see an admitted horrible evil we should strike at it with such weapons as are ready to our hand, and one of these is suppression of the drink traffic.

It is not the idle and selfish, however, not the conscientious philosophic prigs, who form the real bar to prohibition. Their opposition could be easily overcome were it not for the enormous monetary interests involved in the degradation of humanity by alcohol. Brewery owners, distillers, vigneron, and hotel-keepers are, man for man, as honest, upright and benevolent as their fellow creatures, and include many distinguished friends of humanity among them. But let it be proposed to abolish, or even to limit, their privilege of growing rich upon a traffic which does incalculable harm, and their character is at once transformed—they fight like devils for their rights in others' wrongs.

It is the very fact that, personally, many of them are decent men that helps to give these classes their noxious influence, but their virtues are trumped by as compared with their wealth which buys reputation and position of the highest. So many English brewers have been elevated to the House of Lords that wits have suggested the "Beerage" as a more appropriate name than the "Peerage"; and it is notorious that the present Balfour Government dare not even please its own followers in the matter of the Licensing Bill, because it fears the resentment of "The Trade." When brewers and distillers can thus dictate to Government there is not much of the liberty for which anti-prohibitionists are so tender, but the awful power of liquor over the moral and social life of the people is infinitely worse

than its influence in politics—except in so far as the latter sustains the former.

Imagine, for a moment, what England or Australia would be if drunkenness were wiped for ever from the face of it. The police courts and the insolvency courts would be robbed of nine-tenths of their business; even the hangman would be less busy; benevolent societies would have to bestir themselves in search of objects for their funds. Astounding figures could be quoted, but it is enough to mention that the drink bill of the United Kingdom for 1902 was £179,500,000; that of Australia £15,000,000. No figures, indeed, are needed to teach any one what a stupendous drain is made upon the wealth of the people not by drunkenness only, but by what is called moderate expenditure on liquors. Until the working classes of England become more temperate they can gain and keep no good thing. The high wages of the mining districts go for the most part in drink and wastefulness, with the result that in more temperate France workmen with less than half the miner's wage have comfortable homes and lead a decent home life that makes their dwellings paradise as compared with those of the better paid Englishman. If temperance were universal, if, better still, not a penny could be spent on drink, the working man would have time and money to spend upon his books, upon his home, and upon the union through which he hopes to advance the rights of labor. These things would be worth infinitely more to him than the sacred right to get drunk in the public-house, and kick his wife to pieces in the home; and though it be admitted that the compensation cost of buying out the liquor trade would be enormous, two years' sobriety on the part of any nation would create enough extra wealth to pay the cost over and over again.

#### PROHIBITION OF THE DRINK TRADE.—CON.

A proposal to prohibit the drink trade is one of those fantastic philanthropic dreams which are not only useless but positively harmful, because they distract public attention and reforming zeal from that which is really practicable to that which is visionary.

In England or Australia there is not the slightest chance of the use or manufacture of alcohol being prohibited. The money interests, as prohibitionists admit, are enormously strong, but what the prohibitionists fail to recognise is that stronger even than money is the instinct of liberty, which makes every man revolt against proposals to forcibly control his tastes and desires. If the general public desired to forbid the use of alcohol in England it would carry out its will in spite of the liquor interest, just as it abolished slavery in spite of the slave-holding interest. But there is no such desire, and probably never will be.

Intelligent anti-prohibitionists recognise just as much as their opponents the awful evils—which can scarcely be exaggerated—of drink among the poor. But they are estranged by the bigotry, the narrow-mindedness, and the fanaticism of the temperance men, who denounce the use of alcohol even where it is absolutely harmless and even beneficial, and who claim that drunkenness is practically the only cause of poverty. Poverty, on the other hand, is the chief cause of drunkenness, or at least of its prevalence among the working classes where it does most harm. The man who is hopelessly poor and has nothing to look forward to; the woman who has lost her character, or who is half starved, naturally takes to drink, and it is beginning reform at the wrong end to attempt to cure poverty by abolishing drink, instead of attempting to remove the evils of drink by abolishing poverty. It is in this direction that the intemperate temperance reformers do so much harm. They close their eyes to the fact that our present land system makes poverty inevitable, and they assist Conservatives to maintain the unjust privilege of land-owners, by creating the impression that the poverty of the masses has another radical cause. Violent temperance men are thus the unwitting foes of reform and the friends of Conservatism, for they play its game by distracting attention from the true goal and dissipating the energy necessary to attain it. If drink were abolished to-morrow it would not permanently ameliorate the monetary condition of the masses. Sobriety is an asset to the workman now because it is something of a

distinction, and the sober man therefore gets better wages than the average man who is not absolutely sober. Abolish drunkenness altogether, increase thrift, and the result will be a reduction of wages to the standard on which the average man, who under new conditions will be the thrifty, sober man, can barely do his work and feed his family. This is inevitable under the present system for wages are fixed by competition and tend to the lowest point at which the workman will consent to live and reproduce his kind. The very sobriety and thrift of European laborers, as compared with those of England, has an intimate connection with the lower wages they receive. They can live on less, and therefore they are forced to take less. This is sad but true, and in all probability the less sober English have more energy and capacity in them to fight for freedom than the more sober French, whose very virtue has been exploited until it becomes a necessity of their existence.

In still other ways a universal raising of the standard of sobriety without reform of our taxation system would impoverish the workman who is sober now. Drunken, disreputable neighborhoods tend to reduce rents; everyone knows that houses near objectionable public-houses can be had for much less than in better surroundings. With the abolition of drunkenness rents would generally rise, while wages would generally fall. The land-owner and capitalist would reap the benefit of this great moral reform which should be an immense boon to the working man. The sober working man is subjected to severe competition now, but with drink wiped out of existence he would have the further competition of the submerged thousands or millions who are now not only unemployed but unemployable—physical and moral outcasts of no account in the industrial army.

“Do you then justify drunkenness,” we are indignantly asked, “on the score that it gives an advantage to the sober man?” Not in the least. We merely condemn the chimerical attempt to abolish drinking by the prohibition of alcohol. In the first place it is absolutely impracticable. The forces do not exist which could carry it into effect. In the second place the idea

is conceived in a wrong spirit. True reforms do not come from force but from freedom, and if prohibition were ever carried it could only be as part of a scheme crushing out all individual liberty. If a benevolent despot could shut out alcohol from our land to-morrow, he might accomplish untold good. A free and sober people retaining their instincts and love of liberty unimpaired would then be in a better position to fight for the great economic reform which alone can abolish poverty. But we live in a real world, not the world of fairy tales. We have no benevolent despots, and, while wasting our strength, destroy our self-reliance and encourage tyranny in attempting to enforce total abstinence by Act of Parliament. Things being as they are, the manifest duty of temperance men and philanthropists is to preach sobriety, regulate the drink traffic and avoid chimerical schemes of prohibition, while working hard to abolish the robbery of the people, which drives them into poverty and leads them to drink by which their poverty is aggravated. Under the rule of justice, which gives to every man all that he earns, men will earn enough to make even the poorest of them self-respecting citizens, and temperance reform will have a field for work in which it may accomplish mighty things.

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### PROTECTION.—PRO.

Without a volume wherein to do it, there is no possibility of advancing more than a few leading arguments in favor of protection, nor of treating even these in detail, but in the space available we shall endeavor to show that the Protectionist nations of the world are guided by a true instinct when they refuse to suffer the unfettered competition of other countries in their home markets.

There is no need to claim that protection is justified in all countries at all times, since we are here concerned with its necessity in young communities, and especially in the Australian Commonwealth, which can be truly prosperous and progressive only if manufacturing goes hand in hand with the development of our lands

and mines. Australians have no desire to become mere hewers of wood and drawers of water for the more populous countries of older continents, and that this is an obvious danger under free-trade conditions is admitted by even such a staunch free-trader as John Stuart Mill, who advocated temporary protection to manufacturers willing with such encouragement to embark their capital in manufacturing enterprise for which their country was naturally fitted. He saw clearly enough that without such protection initial difficulties might be too great. A new country offers a small market; it does not contain the same amount of skilled labor on which to draw, the necessary machinery and plant are more costly, wages for men of equal skill are higher than in older countries, while the manufacturers of older countries have a jealous eye on competition, and are perfectly willing to sell their goods for a time at a loss if by so doing they can strangle a competing industry at its birth and retain their former markets. What Mill failed to see was that protection limited to a term of years cannot compensate for these disabilities, since the vast aggregations of capital in Europe and America are quite prepared to step in and crush Australian manufacturers as soon as their protection is withdrawn; while it is further maintainable that we shall be better off through continuing to pay a higher price for locally made goods than by either abandoning our local manufacturers, or forcing them to submit to the cut-throat competition that lowers wages and debases society elsewhere.

While adequate protection exists local competition among protected manufacturers tends to bring prices down to a reasonable level, in some cases to a lower level than that at which goods of an equal quality could be imported. This is only so in those industries, such as bootmaking, which demand the possession of little capital or machinery from a man desiring to begin business on his own account. Boots of certain classes are made cheaper in Victoria than they are in England, and profits and wages in the Victorian boot trade are distressingly low. Competition has been overdone, but protection has reduced prices in spite of the free-trade

contention that it can never do so. The general rule is that prices, wages, and profits are slightly higher than they would be without protective duties, and that the protected industries are guarded from the attacks of foreign competitors, who would otherwise cut prices in the hope of ruining the industries of Australia.

We are told by free-traders that once a protective duty is established the protected manufacturers may combine to form trusts, which will raise prices and fleece the people. This is an admitted danger, but one which can be guarded against by such a provision as that in a proposed clause of the Customs Act allowing temporary removal of the duty on any article wherein a monopoly or combine exists. Protection is a trust; it is intended to give the local manufacturer a certain advantage over foreign competitors, which he is expected to share with his work men and the country generally; if he is untrue to his trust and greedily endeavors to monopolise all this advantage himself he may be subjected to a sharp dose of that unrestricted competition from which Protectionists are willing to safeguard him while he acts with moderation. Protected America, where no such restriction exists, certainly offers the worst example to be found in the world of domination and tyranny by trusts and monopolies, but even in America there are signs that combines within this huge area must succumb to the competition of local manufacturers who will not submit to their dictation; while the consumers themselves, though still true to protection, are not unwilling to give some of their monopolies a cold douche of free-trade, in order to bring them to their senses.

In putting the case for protection here no claim is made that it does not generally and moderately raise prices, nor that blind devotion to protection may not entail great evils. But the most effective medicines in diseases of the body, as of the State, must be used with discretion. Strychnine stimulates a weak heart, but given in excess will cause convulsions and death. Protection stimulates industry, but applied in excess will paralyse it; and to take another familiar illustration, though we light a fire to warm ourselves we are not



accused of inconsistency because when we get too hot we put out the fire.

Moderate protective duties on goods which Australia is capable of producing to advantage are likely to induce men to enter upon their production, thus causing a greater differentiation of industry than would exist under free-trade. A slight tax, amounting to the difference between local and imported prices, is undoubtedly imposed upon the producers of wheat and wool and such other commodities as are raised in such quantities as to be incapable of protection. In return for this tax they secure the existence of varied employment for their sons, the growth of manufacturing and business centres which are also the centres of social and intellectual life, the fostering, in fact, of civilising, progressive forces which could never make their way in a purely pastoral and agricultural community. The tax is at the worst a small one, and in many cases merely temporary, but, even were it permanent, Protectionists assert that it is not too much to pay for a higher standard of living and a greater differentiation of industry. In addition to these advantages, a well-devised Protectionist system assures local supplies of food, of coal, of metals, and the machinery, men, and material necessary to produce arms and munitions of war, thus giving to a protected community a self-respect and a degree of safety in war time, never to be attained by a nation dependent for these things on commerce which may be strangled at blockaded ports.

This is the Protectionist case in its essentials, and stripped of the many true, but subsidiary, and the many foolish and fallacious claims which are made in its behalf.

To free-traders who reiterate that protection means dearer goods the well-informed Protectionist admits that sometimes—perhaps often—it does, but insists that cheapness can be bought too dear in dependence upon foreigners and the stagnation of local enterprise. Where, he asks, is to be found a country paying better wages to the best labor than America, under the highest protective tariff of the world, or a country that can show a

more marvellous increase in population, industry, and trade? The tariff may be too high; it is foolishly allowed to be used as an instrument of tyranny by the trusts; for, like all other good things, a protective tariff is capable of being abused, but it has immensely stimulated manufacturing enterprise among the American people. England, it is true, made remarkable advances under free-trade, and for a time led the world in manufacturing industry, but her development was coincident with the application of science and invention to manufacturing arts in a dozen different ways, and with a demand for their products from nations and colonies which were building railways and laying the foundations of later manufacturing development for themselves. In their case it has come, not under free-trade conditions, but conditions of rigorous protection, and in the case of America, France, and Germany, it has of late years been no less rapid and striking than the rapid industrial advance of England after the repeal of the Corn Laws. These Corn Laws, it must also be remembered, represented protection in its very crudest form, a form indeed which Protectionists are not concerned to justify in a small but populous country like Great Britain, which is probably not physically capable of producing all the food that it requires. There were huge duties upon foreign wheat; when it was under a certain price wheat could not be imported at all, and while rents rose enormously to enrich landlords the higher price of corn did not benefit the farmer or the laborer. The duties stood at a height which showed protection had gone mad, but even under these circumstances a stiff tax on the value of land—increased enormously by the corn duties—would have diverted much of the profits into the public revenues, in relief of other taxation, and by forcing all valuable land into use would have reduced rents and added to the wages of agricultural laborers, who in their turn would have become customers for the products of English manufacturers. Protection demands other liberal measures as its allies, and because extortionate duties upon a necessary of life were once used to enrich the landed gentry of England Protectionists are not called upon to either deplore their abolition or

to admit that other protective duties under other circumstances would not now be of benefit, not only to Australia, but to England. Wages are higher still in England under free-trade than in France or Germany under protection, but they are lower than in protected America or Australia. If it be answered that the former are old countries and the latter new countries, where access to the soil is more free, the Protectionist replies that France and Germany are hampered by the conscription and vast standing armies; that they have not the mineral wealth of England, nor her commanding insular position; that their development has been checked by life and death struggles from which England has been free; that unionism and factory legislation are more developed in England than elsewhere; and that in the sum of these conditions are differences striking enough to account for such differences as there are in the wages of labor. Further it must be pointed out that under increased protection wages have substantially increased, while hours of labor and prices of commodities have substantially decreased in France and Germany. All great countries, free-trade or protectionist, have made immense advances in the production of wealth and volume of trade. England's great strides were taken many years ago, and her annual increase is now largely exceeded by that of America, of Germany, and of France. There is no doubt that England gained much industrially by the sweeping away of her corn duties; it is doubtful whether she has not nationally lost more by the decay of her agriculture, and whether moderate corn duties would not have largely modified the danger from which she now suffers of starvation in time of unsuccessful war. Leaving European countries to consider the States and colonies of Australasia, we find that the two most prosperous of them, Western Australia and New Zealand, have had a protectionist system for years. On the other hand we find free-trade New South Wales more prosperous than protectionist Victoria. Protectionists are led by the "Age" and other blind guides to deny the fact, which is both dishonest and unnecessary, for, other things being equal, it stands to reason that a large country like New South Wales will progress faster than a small country like

Victoria. In days gone by other things were not equal. Victoria had immensely rich goldfields, which poured forth wealth and attracted the most energetic and restless people in the world; she had more liberal land laws, and she had the men to develop her accessible and fertile country. In those days Victoria obtained a decided lead of New South Wales, and for a time she kept it. Then, as the gold yield fell away, as the best lands were monopolised, and the restless spirits were deprived of an outlet for their energies, they began to drift away, many of them to develop the latent resources of New South Wales. Her coalfields became a more solid and almost as great a source of wealth as Victoria's gold mines; her vast territories were thrown open on liberal terms to settlement; it was discovered that wheat would yield abundantly on what had hitherto been mere pasture; her pastures were stocked with flocks and herds which Victoria could never hope to rival; the great area and resources of her land began to make themselves felt, and conditions of life became more favorable in New South Wales than in Victoria, in spite of their different fiscal policies. So far natural, permanent, and legitimate advantages helped New South Wales to a higher place than the rival colony, but, in addition to them, were the temporary and illegitimate advantages seized upon by her politicians who borrowed enormously for public works, and further lavishly spent the proceeds of land sales—which should have been regarded as capital—on enterprises which caused a demand for labor and consequently raised wages.

In yet another but a praiseworthy manner New South Wales legislation made the country attractive, when it provided for a tax on the unimproved value of land, thus checking the land speculation, the high rents, and the high prices which discourage enterprise in Victoria, and make it difficult for a man to get a footing on the soil. Under these circumstances even the manufacturing industries of New South Wales made surprising progress for a free-trade country until prior to federation her male employes out-numbered those of Victoria. There is nothing, however, to suggest that they would not have been more numerous still under

protection, for an analysis of the respective manufacturing industries of the two States shows that, while New South Wales leads in iron working, saw milling, and some other trades dependent upon superior natural advantages, and incapable of much aid from protection, she is far behind Victoria in the number of hands employed by clothing factories, boot factories, woollen factories, glass and bottle works, distilleries, etc., the products of which enter largely into competition with foreign goods. But the most conclusive proof that manufactures have been stimulated by protection in Victoria lies in the fact that since federation the number of their employes has become very much greater than the number employed in New South Wales. The Victorian manufacturer suffered a diminution of his protection, but when, in return, the whole Australian market was thrown open to him and at the same time somewhat sheltered from foreign competition, the development of his industry which protection had fostered enabled him to seize on the opportunity; while the struggling manufacturers of New South Wales though they now enjoy precisely the same advantages, are hopelessly distanced because they were not prepared and equipped for the struggle. Victoria owes its commanding position as the manufacturing State of the Commonwealth solely to the fact that it was a protectionist colony before the Commonwealth existed. At the present time there are Protectionists who advocate all-round increases in the Australian tariff, believing the competition of millionaire corporations paying lower wages in other countries is too severe to be resisted. There are other Protectionists who are on the whole satisfied, and who believe that while a moderate handicap encourages to the best efforts, too great a handicap leads to laziness or over-confidence, thus contributing to disaster. The Protectionist manufacturer naturally claims the highest duty the State will give him; the educated Protectionist who is not a manufacturer naturally seeks to limit his advantage to the lowest duty which will keep him at work for the best interests of the Commonwealth. He knows that mistakes may be made in either direction; when convinced of them by the stern logic of fact he is always ready to apply the

remedy; and the aim he keeps constantly before him is to encourage desirable industries in our midst by lessening the fierceness of foreign competition to a point at which our employers and workmen will not feel the task of meeting it a hopeless one.

### PROTECTION.—CON.

Volumes, it is claimed, are needed to justify protection, and judging by the many volumes written on the subject it needs a deal of justification. In the course of this process, such extraordinary and such specious arguments are put forward that corresponding volumes are needed on the free trade side to expose their fallacies, and yet were it not for the strength of the special interests fostered by protection at the expense of the community, everyone would readily see that free trade finds its justification in the fact that it is natural trade, the trade which all reasonable men would pursue if they were not forcibly prevented from doing so. The Australian, with a hundred bushels of wheat to sell, naturally desires to exchange that wheat or its price for the greatest amount of boots, clothes, or other necessaries which it will obtain; in other words, to get the best reward for his labors; whereupon the protectionist tells him that he is wrong—that he should take a less reward, by either paying a fine at the Customs House for the offence of buying foreign boots, or by paying a price to a local manufacturer higher than that he would pay to the foreigner. In other words, protectionists tell us that some people should be robbed of a portion of their earnings in order to give that portion to certain other persons offering articles at above the natural market price. Protection, therefore, advocates robbery of the individual for the general good.

When it is asked how the general good can be promoted by robbery the answer is that unless local manufacturers are permitted to extort higher prices than foreigners, we shall have no local manufacturers, and shall have no differentiation of industry. Suppose this were so; if farming, sheep raising and mining paid so much better than manufacturing, that unless protection

were called in to make manufacturing artificially profitable, and the other industries artificially unprofitable, all our people would be farmers, miners or graziers, what injury would be done to any one? Why should protectionist robbery be invoked to upset a state of affairs permitting each man to adopt the calling which pays best? As a matter of fact, however, this cry that free trade forces the inhabitants of a country to remain hewers of wood and drawers of water for protectionist countries is absolute nonsense. Free trade England is the greatest industrial country in the world, and it is agriculture—decried as a poor free trade calling here—which is lauded as a fine one, demanding special protection in the old world. If the argument that free trade rears but farmers and shepherds be limited to young communities we have only to point to New South Wales, which employed 60,000 hands in factories under absolute free trade, and to Victoria in 1866, before protection became operative, when it, nevertheless, employed over 10,000 workers in manufacturing, and exported £166,000 worth of manufactured goods. A community of any size devoted entirely to the primary or extractive industries is, in fact, unthinkable. In the wake of the farmer and the miner follow the blacksmith, the carpenter, the wheelwright, the harness-maker, the carriage-builder, the maker of agricultural implements, and the engineer, not to mention the makers of clothes, and food, and buildings. Some of the things which such men make, and many others more elaborate, will, doubtless at first, perhaps for ever, be imported from abroad, where they can be made more economically, and therefore less labor will be needed from the producer to pay for them; but the desire for prompt delivery, the satisfaction of local needs, the special skill developed by knowledge of them, the saving to be effected by carriage, and the possession of suitable raw material, will cause, and have caused, the immediate development of manufactures in every new community. And as population, capital, and skilled workmen increase, so will increase the volume and range of manufactures. Producers and manufacturers of all kinds being unhampered in their own pursuits, and not impoverished by the obligation of paying high prices for

local manufactures which they do not want, will have money in their pockets to pay for the numerous articles of local make which they do want.

The above is not a fanciful picture. It is the record of what happened in Victoria until protection came more than thirty years ago to divert capital and labor from its natural channels, and what happened in New South Wales until the time immediately prior to federation, when the manufacturers of the free trade colony employed more male workers, paid them higher wages, devoted more capital to their employment, used more horse-power, and turned out products vastly greater in value than the protected manufactures of Victoria.

These are facts utterly destructive of the protectionist theory that the competition of foreign countries will crush the industries of new communities in their infancy, but it can further be proved by reason that these theories are untenable. It is alleged, in the first place, that the cheap labor of older lands—nearly all, by the way, protectionist—gives the foreigner an undue advantage in manufacturing. Now, the two greatest manufacturing countries in the world are the United States and the United Kingdom, which, with the exception of some British colonies, pay the highest wages. The typically low wage countries are China, Russia, India, Portugal, and Spain. They produce practically no manufactured goods which compete with those of Australia, whereas our wheat does compete successfully with theirs.

Low wages do not make cheap goods, and if they did, God help the worker, for his condition could never improve did the cost of the things upon which he spends his wages rise with the rise of the wages themselves. In a few of the simplest pursuits, like tea picking or cotton picking, a cheap product may result from the presence of hordes of servile laborers, but even if their wages were substantially raised methods and machinery would probably be devised which would result in ultimate cheapening of the product. In manufacturing, however, there is no room for doubt. The most expensive and complicated machinery is a necessity of

economic production, and highly paid, intelligent labor is a necessity for the economic use of such machinery. The best paid workmen in the world are found in certain United States factories, and they produce goods which defy the world in cheapness. Next best paid are the workmen in certain English factories, and their products are next to those of the United States in cheapness. The comparatively highly-paid artisans of Germany and France turn out manufactured goods at prices with which the lower-paid artisans of Austria and Italy cannot compete.

This point, that other things being equal, cheap labor does not produce cheap goods, but dear, must be driven home, because on ignorance of this is built the whole superstructure of protection, in so far as the policy is honestly advocated by working men, who fear that without it they cannot compete against the cheap labor of the old world. We hold it as established, then, that the high wages ruling in Australia are no bar to the development of desirable manufactures, and that where goods from low-waged countries are imported, they can have no effect in reducing wages.

It remains to consider the other disabilities under which new countries are said to suffer in their endeavor to establish manufactures. The old world, it is said, contains more skill and greater capital, and this is true. It affords good reason why certain goods can be produced more cheaply there, and why no attempt should be made to divert our labor and capital into these unprofitable fields of competition. We should wait until increasing population and the greater energy and competence induced by higher wages make such fields profitable, as has been the case in New South Wales.

It is further alleged that foreign manufacturers in possession of a new country's markets are so jealous of local competition that they will readily sell at a loss for a time, in order to crush the nascent industry, and afterwards recoup themselves for their loss by charging extortionate prices to the consumer. The first part of this assertion, that foreign capitalists may sell very cheap for a short period in order to crush competing factories, contains a small modicum of truth. Such

tactics have been attempted, but where the foreigner has not possessed a natural advantage, of which it is folly on our part not to reap a part by securing the goods he can produce most economically in return for those which we can, these tactics have nearly always failed. In proof, we point to the numerous unprotected factories of New South Wales; we point to the woollen mills of Victoria, which originated under free trade, and thrived better then than under the high duties afterwards imposed. In the manufacture of woollens we had a natural advantage through possessing the finest raw material at our doors, and had our manufacturers not been enervated by the high protection given to themselves and hampered by protection on machinery and products which they used, we should probably now be exporting woollens to most countries of the world.

But let us suppose that such a determined attack was made by foreign manufacturing capital upon a rising industry here, that it could not continue without help, though natural conditions were favorable to it, even then the help which may conceivably be desirable should not be given by a protective duty. In the first place, when protection is given to one industry, protection is successfully claimed by other industries, and the advantage given to the first is frequently more than nullified by the increased cost of the products used in the factory. In the second place, the public, which we assume is willing to make some sacrifice in order to establish the manufactures in question, never knows how much it is paying to that end, nor how long it will be compelled to pay it. If the people are willing to subscribe something to establish an industry which they believe can make headway if guarded from the deliberate attempts of foreign competitors to destroy it in its infancy, the only sane and rational method is to pay a bonus of a fixed amount for a fixed period. Then the people know exactly what the attempt to add to their manufactures is costing them. If at the end of the bonus period the new manufacture is not firm upon its legs, they can judge whether it is worth while to expend more in trying to strengthen it, or whether it is better to leave it to its fate, and to continue purchasing cheap from abroad.

It will be remembered that protectionists declare this choice is not open to the public. They allege that the foreign manufacturer will not only reduce his prices below paying level in the first instance, but will raise them to extortionate level when local competition is snuffed out. This is an absolute impossibility. Foreign manufacturers, unless they are the possessors of some patent, in which case we cannot manufacture here, or of some natural monopoly, such as oil wells, may lower prices to secure trade, but they cannot raise them again beyond ordinary trade levels in a new country, since they are subject to the competition of the whole world, where are hundreds or thousands of firms all eager to place their goods at the lowest margin of trade profit. There are no world-wide trusts in any article of merchandise which is not the subject of monopoly, and therefore world-wide trade rivalry offers an absolute answer to the silly superstition that home manufactures are necessary to prevent Australian consumers being fleeced by the foreigner.

Free-traders then dispute the cardinal propositions of Protectionists: that high wages hamper the establishment of manufactures; that there cannot be development of manufactures without protection; and that absence of local competition results in high prices for goods imported from abroad; and not only do they dispute these propositions, but they maintain that their contrary is proved.

In this country, strange as it may seem, there are Protectionists who maintain that protection does not increase the price of goods, but reduces them, and at the same time they maintain that protection raises wages. This it will be seen is entirely inconsistent with the contention that cheap goods are the result of low wages, since duties are alleged to make goods cheaper and wages higher. If this be granted it follows that the Protectionist demand for duties to counteract the advantage given to foreign manufacturers by cheap labor is quite absurd, since on the Protectionist's own showing high wages and cheap goods accompany one another.

This, as we have shown already, is true—but very seldom in Protectionist countries. Protection raises prices. Its whole object is to raise them. If it reduced them no manufacturer would be such a fool as to ask for protection. “Oh, but,” it is sometimes argued, “the manufacturer does not want higher prices than his competitors. He merely wants the local market.” The answer is that if he charges lower prices than his competitors he can have the market without protection. It may still be said that he does not want to charge lower prices or higher prices. He wants the whole market at the ordinary rates. If this were so there is no reason why the public should give him the whole market, and thus deprive themselves of the benefit of the fall in prices which is general throughout the world, but as manufacturers are men and not angels it is certain that they will raise their prices to the utmost limit permitted by the duty. Local competition, it is said, will prevent him doing so. But if he suffers competition he has not the market to himself, and if local competition brings prices to a level with that of imported goods then the duty is not required.

The fact is that local competition which cheapens goods continues in protected countries only in the manufacture of such goods as require very little capital or machinery, and thus tempt a number of small men into them. They are tempted to their ruin. It is probably true, as asserted by Protectionists, that certain lines of boots were made in Victoria under a heavy protective duty as cheap as they could have been made or imported under free-trade—perhaps even cheaper. But with what disastrous results! There was cut-throat competition; bankruptcy was rife amongst employers; hopeless sweating amongst the men. Many sought employment in vain; those employed received wages which, according to Mr. Mauger, secretary of the Victorian Protectionist Association, seldom exceeded 15s. per week. Such were the fruits of protection in, perhaps, the solitary instance in which it may have been claimed to reduce prices.

In other cases the results were very different. Manufacturers ceased very soon to compete with one another. They combined, or agreed upon a standard

of prices well above that at which products similar to theirs could be imported under free-trade. These prices were for the protected market. In New South Wales and elsewhere they sold their goods at a very much lower figure. Everyone knows, for instance, that Harper's starch made in Melbourne cost the buyer more in Melbourne than in Sydney. Only two alternative explanations are admissible. Either Mr. Harper made so much out of the protected Victorians that he could afford to sell to New South Wales at a loss, or his sales in free-trade New South Wales returned him a profit, in which case he would have made more profit at the same prices in Victoria, and was well able to sell his goods cheaper and yet compete without protection against the starch makers of the world.

Almost without exception, protection leads to higher prices in the protected market, and is burdensome to the general public. It usually leads to monopoly by the establishment of trusts and combines, which in protected America have attained such power, and used it so unscrupulously and with such disastrous effect upon consumers, working men, and the purity of politics and the judiciary that how to control the protected trusts is the pressing insoluble problem confronting the American people. It is insoluble only because protected interests and protectionist prejudices are strong enough to prevent the abolition of protective duties, which give the trusts their baneful power. That they owe it to the tariff, and nothing else, was practically admitted by our own Protectionist Government when it proposed that duties might be suspended in the Commonwealth upon any article which should be monopolised by a trust.


"Quite true," say some Protectionists, "but this proviso preserves us from danger, and in the meantime we are willing to pay a little more for our purchases in order to maintain manufacturing industries amongst us." This may sound reasonable enough, but when once the trusts gain a footing in Australia they will be strong enough, as they are in America, not only to prevent the alteration of the tariff to their disadvantage, but to bring about increases in their own favor.

As for the claim of the more rational Protectionists for duties which will moderately raise prices and encourage industry, we have already shown that duties are not necessary to encourage industries for which we have natural facilities, while exotic industries are not wanted in the country. Again, to protect one industry is possible, by, perhaps, a small duty. To adequately protect a number of industries, except by imposing intolerable burdens upon all the others, which manifestly can derive no benefit from protection, is quite impossible, for each protected manufacturer is handicapped by the higher prices he is obliged to pay for other protected products which he uses. A striking example of this is found in the coachbuilding trade, heavily protected as it was. Even in the days of our highest Victorian tariff the coachbuilders declared that they would thankfully resign the duties upon carts and carriages if only the Legislature would abolish the duties upon the numerous articles that were required to make them. The coachbuilders were wiser than most protected manufacturers, but with the exception of a few, in which profitable monopolies have been acquired by combination, there is scarcely one of our legitimate industries that would not thrive better under free-trade than protection. That there would be free machinery, building material, and raw material is only half the matter. There would be also millions of Australians in unprotected trades, no longer robbed of portion of their earnings, and consequently better customers for the products of our factories.

Very much more might be said on the economic aspect of protection, and volumes of facts are available proving its disastrous effects, but it creates other evils besides those of raising prices, lowering wages, and checking employment. It creates ill-feeling between nations, and is a direct cause of war and fears of war. When Germany shuts out American bacon an ill-feeling is created between America and Germany. When a Protectionist nation proposes to annex savage or semi-civilised territory in any part of the world all the other nations look on jealously, because they know that their goods will be penalised and their trade injured if the

annexation takes place. Why has England been allowed to annex—to annex in peace as far as European countries are concerned—such huge slices of the earth? Simply because, though England is not loved, it is known that England practises free-trade. Where her flag floats the goods of Europe will be admitted on the same terms as her own. There will be no selfish monopoly. It was only this knowledge that saved England from European interference during the Boer war. She had many enemies in Europe, but the great fact that England's victory and annexation of the South African republics meant not exclusion, but a fair field for the goods of their traders, prevented their jealousy from risking everything in war.

Free-trade is the peace policy. Other nations' exclusive protection has driven England into fighting little wars and acquiring territory she did not want, because she could not afford to have her goods shut out of it, but her own free-trade policy has preserved her from the disaster of having these little wars with African or Asiatic grow into big wars with her neighbors on the European continent. Nothing will kill protection but enlightenment. While the rulers of nations are belligerent, jealous, and narrow-minded, and while their peoples are ignorant and selfish, protection will prevail, as it does in most of the world to-day. When it is once recognised that a country, in injuring the countries which it trades with, does injury also to itself, and when once the people see the folly of believing that they can make themselves rich by making what they buy dear—then, and not till then, will come the reign of free-trade.



## RELIGIOUS TEACHING IN STATE SCHOOLS.—

### PRO.

It seems strange that while it is year by year more clearly recognised how great a part early training plays in affecting the course of after life, that any question at all should arise as to the necessity of imparting religious instruction to the children in our schools. Children need definite ethical teaching in order to guide

them in their conduct. There is no possibility at present of teaching systematic ethics apart from religion, and even if there were, the childish mind cannot be impressed with the necessity of obeying moral law unless it is propounded to him with religious associations.

These things make it clear that religion in the schools is urgently demanded, whatever be the difficulties of providing it in a country which has no State Church, and confines its activities as far as possible to secular affairs. But though we have no State Church, we have nationally declared ourselves to be a Christian country by deliberately deciding to make use of Christian prayers in our Parliament; and thus to profess Christianity, while allowing our youth to grow up without the slightest knowledge of it, is either hypocrisy or utter folly.

There are many different means employed in different countries for publicly providing religious instruction to school children, that which once prevailed here and is still used in Newfoundland and parts of Canada being State assistance to denominational schools. But while we profess to be a Christian people the adherents of various creeds have little love for one another. There is bitter feeling between the adherents of different sects, which is not by any means softened by the existence of denominational schools. When Roman Catholic children and Protestant children are rigorously separated from one another in their years of pupilage there is opportunity for the perpetuation and strengthening of the prejudice and ignorance which rival teachers, perhaps unconsciously, encourage, and which must tend to become weaker and die out when children of the different creeds are brought into intimate daily association with one another at an impressionable age. The State which though Christian knows no sects is particularly unwilling to promote sectarianism, and therefore has good reason for discountenancing, and at any rate refusing to give public help of any kind to, denominational schools. The national advocates of religious instruction in State schools desire that the children of all creeds shall meet on common ground, and the only questions upon which they differ are as to the kind of

instruction which shall be given and the persons who shall give it.

The simplest of all methods, if only agreement upon it could be arrived at between the Roman Catholics and the various Protestant bodies, would be the appointment of the teacher to read and explain portions of Scripture selected for their value in inculcating moral lessons, and for their freedom from anything which would give a reason or excuse for sectarian coloring in enforcing the lessons to be drawn from them. Such passages have been chosen and used with more or less success in various school readers, which might be adopted here with such modifications as seem desirable.

To this end an earnest body has long been working in Victoria, but up to now those opposed to all religious school teaching, reinforced by Catholics and others who fear that no Biblical extracts can be properly explained without the risk of being colored by the teacher with a leaning to some particular one of the Christian Churches, has been too strong for the reformers. Thus the absolutely Godless system of national education remains.

The present system is eminently bad, not only because it deprives the State school children of the training in religion and morality which they need, but because it directly encourages that sectarianism which Parliament is so anxious to discountenance. This arises from the fact that one great section of the community—the Roman Catholic—has such strong views upon the necessity of religion as a factor in education that it taxes itself heavily to maintain its own schools, though it pays, with members of other Churches, for the State schools of which it makes very little use. Thus two great evils are perpetuated—the segregation of Catholic boys and girls from their fellows, and the infliction of what is, at least in their eyes, a gross injustice upon the Roman Catholics. Members of a religion who suffer under a grievance, and whose youth is trained apart from the youth of other creeds, will always tend to a divergence from the political views and aspirations of the majority, and thus the secular system of education which was to kill sectarianism is actually keeping it alive and aggravating it.

Scriptural reading books, however desirable they are, might perhaps fail to get over this difficulty, but if the Roman Catholics are confirmed in their opposition to them, another method which has been suggested might bring the members of all Churches and creeds into line. This is the setting apart of certain times within school hours for religious teaching to the children of different denominations, by their clergymen or other suitable and duly appointed representatives. On such a plan every creed would be fairly treated, for it could teach just what its ministers might think desirable to the children whose parents professed it. It would also remove the somewhat fanciful objection raised to undenominational lessons from the school teachers themselves, that these might have no faith in religion of any kind, and would therefore be asked to do violence to their consciences. This objection receives little weight from the advocates of religion in the schools, because they hold that in a Christian country a non-Christian should not be entrusted with the education of Christian children.

Under the alternative scheme, however, the objection such as it is disappears, and under it Jews and Agnostics, if Parliament so ordered, might be allowed to have religious or moral training given to the children of their persuasion. Those again who deliberately objected to anything in the nature of religion being taught to their children at school could be equally considered—if the country desired it. Either a specific request for his child's instruction in some creed might be required from the parent or guardian, or in the absence of a request to the contrary the child might be allotted to the class in which was taught the religion professed by his parent. It may be objected that in country districts no minister might be available to teach children of a congregation which was not numerous, but in this case a layman could usually be found to undertake the duties if their religion were a thing of reality to its followers, and parents belonging to any Protestant Church would seldom have objections to their children being taught by the minister of another. As regards Roman Catholics no hardship could arise, as under the

present system, unless they are sufficiently numerous in any district to justify the maintenance of a Catholic school, they must go to the State school and receive no religious teaching at all.

As a further objection to this plan it is urged that in small schools with only one class-room privacy would not be possible in the teaching. This, however, is a molehill, in which only imaginations of great magnifying power can see a mountain. The children are divided into classes for secular instruction, and are not allowed to interrupt one another, and by drawing them close around him the religious teacher could talk to his pupils without interfering with, or being overheard by, another teacher similarly engaged. It must also be remembered that small schools with a single class-room have not an attendance which would require the services of many Scriptural teachers. One or two at most would usually meet all their needs.

The great recommendation of this optional denominational teaching in the State school in school hours is that it offers a possibility of relieving the Roman Catholics from the conscientious burden they have imposed on themselves of maintaining separate establishments, thus abolishing at one stroke their grievance and their hurtful aloofness from the rest of the community. If, however, they refuse to be satisfied by this concession it would be well for the advocates of religious teaching to continue their efforts for the introduction of undenominational lessons in the State schools. The smallest handful of pupils need not then go without instruction such as the teacher could give, and there would be an end to the evil anomaly under which a country calling itself Christian maintains an educational system in which there is not the smallest attempt to teach the meaning of Christianity.

#### RELIGIOUS TEACHING IN STATE SCHOOLS.— CON.

For many years the secular system of State education has been at work in Victoria, and the opponents of all designs to interfere with it claim that, judged by its results, it compares favorably with other systems

under which religious teaching is given as part of the school curriculum. It is urged on the other side that children who are not educated in the Christian religion at school cannot grow up good citizens, and that their standard of conduct will be lower than that of men and women who have had Scripture lessons in the school-house. As to conduct and citizenship generally, no evidence worth having can be obtained, but the crime records certainly do not show that the religiously trained produce a smaller proportion of law-breakers than those who have had no such training. Roman Catholics are for the most part taught in Roman Catholic schools under the direction of the priests, and judged by statistics and every other available test, Roman Catholics are not a whit better than their fellow-citizens of other creeds who have had a secular education in the State schools.

In every country where a State Church still exists it is felt to be an unjust and mischievous anachronism by at least a strong minority of the people, and any attempt to make the State an agent for imparting religious instruction is distinctly reactionary.

It is said that this is a Christian country, and that, therefore, the cardinal truths of Christianity, at least, should be taught to our boys and girls; and it is urged that no injustice would be done to teachers who were asked to read and explain certain passages from the Scriptures to their scholars. But though a majority of the population profess some form of Christianity, there are large and increasing numbers who are either agnostics, or who at least absolutely refuse their adherence to several of what are called the cardinal tenets of the religion. The Christian ethics, no doubt, they generally subscribe to because the ethics of all the best religions and philosophies are very much in accord with one another; but Bible lessons cannot be used to teach anything when entirely divorced from dogma of some kind. There are numerous teachers who cannot conscientiously subscribe to this dogma, and hence the introduction of Scripture lessons as part of the State curriculum would impose upon them the necessity of either playing the hypocrite or declaring views which would

incur the hostility of keen religionists, of whom even the best are almost always tyrannical in their treatment of those with whom they disagree and over whom they have power. Many of them in fact declare, as they are conscientiously indeed bound to do, that the non-Christian is not fitted to have the care of Christian youth, and this in spite of the fact that many of the philosophers and teachers whom the world holds in the highest veneration have not believed in the orthodox creed.

And apart from religious prejudice the unorthodox school teacher would necessarily be hampered in the department, because, unless he were untrue to his conscience, he could not take charge of a one-man school when religion was part of the school curriculum.

Thus the proposed Scripture reading books would put a weapon into the hands of the Churches for the aggrandisement of their own power at the cost of injustice to unorthodox teachers, and also at the expense of parents who might not wish their children religiously instructed. It is said that they could refuse to permit it, and so they could, but in so doing they would become marked men in many cases to their injury. It is an essential of real religious freedom that all men and women should have the privilege, not only of expressing what views they please, but also of remaining silent as to their views, and any system of religious teaching in State schools distinctly infringes this freedom, and therefore should not be permitted. The Churches are practically made inquisitors through the agency of the State, and thousands of children at the most impressionable age are imbued with dogma in which their parents may have no belief whatever. At the present time the Churches have their own organisations and their Sunday-schools, and it is not the business of the State to do the work which properly belongs to them and to parents of the different congregations.

It is perhaps unnecessary to argue at great length against the introduction of Scripture lessons given by lay teachers, because the Roman Catholics and some other religious bodies are so convinced, either of their

futility in affecting all that is desired, or of the facilities they offer for imparting views to which one creed or another violently objects, that there is but little probability of their introduction in this country. There, however, remains to be considered an alternative suggestion, that the different religious bodies should be allowed a time in school hours for teaching the children through their appointed representatives. For this system it is claimed, among other things, that it would put an end to the segregation of Roman Catholic children in Roman Catholic schools, where they grow up out of sympathy with their fellow-citizens on many things besides religion. If it would have the effect of putting an end to the Catholic schools, in spite of grave objections something might be said for this plan, but would it have any such effect? The Roman Catholics have shown great self-sacrifice in the expenditure of large sums of money to establish a system under which their children are entirely within their Church's control; and now that the buildings are erected and the machinery in operation, it is quite unlikely that they would be tempted into compromise by the reduction of their annual expenditure. They would be surrendering too much for too little. The priest or Catholic layman might collect his flock in the State school for half an hour so many times per week, but the Church would lose the great power over the young which is given by the priest's constant association with and intimate personal knowledge of them. It is the Catholic atmosphere of the school, quite as much as the mere doctrinal teaching, that makes the child a good Catholic. There is, unfortunately, reason to believe that good Catholicism, as understood by the Roman Church, is not always consistent with good citizenship as understood by non-Catholics. In fact the Roman Catholics desire that aloofness from the rest of the community which is fostered by the separate school system. They desire State support to their own denominational schools, and would not grudge it to similar schools controlled by other denominations; but only in the optimist's dream will they surrender the Catholic school for the right to send the priest so many times a

week to instruct Catholic children in the schools of the State.

Thus in our opinion both the great systems of religious instruction in State schools stand condemned. That of unsectarian Biblical teaching is the more objectionable because it cannot be really unsectarian; because it confers undue power upon the Church, and lays unfair disabilities upon non-orthodox teachers and parents, without any tangible result that can be ascertained from the evidence available.

The other plan, we believe, would fail in the really desirable object of causing Catholic and Protestant children to freely mix with one another and smother their respective religious prejudices in early life. It has little else to recommend it, and though it would relieve many teachers from the unenviable choice between conscience and promotion it has other objections. Priests and clergymen would obtain from the State an opportunity for affecting young minds to an extent which many thoughtful people believe far more injurious than allowing children to obtain their moral training haphazard as best they may. The Churches are all of them, in the majority of cases, reactionary and opposed to the legislation and type of political thought which make for true liberalism and progress. Even as things now are clerical influence stands in the way of many much-needed reforms, and gives a genuine helping hand to scarcely any. If the clergy, therefore, were permitted daily access to the hundreds of thousands of young minds which will one day rule the Commonwealth the march of progress might be seriously retarded.

It is a pity, no doubt, that some of our boys and girls should grow up without moral training and without knowing the rudiments of religion, but the number who do so is probably very small. The Church and Sunday-school are open to all Australian children now; their home influences, where they are not of a kind which would nullify the teaching received in school, mould their moral natures to a very fair shape on the average, and one which we may hope will constantly improve with general education and enlightenment. In all

probability ethical instruction which really commends itself to reasonable men of every creed will eventually be given in State schools, and in the meantime it is better that boys and girls should suffer the evils of the present haphazard want of system than run the danger of having their minds and aspirations moulded to the clerical design.

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### SHOULD WOMEN SMOKE?—PRO.

Most of the allegations upon which narrow-minded people base their arguments against women smoking are untrue, and most of the others are beside the question. It is alleged, for instance, that doctors agree in saying that smoking injures the health and destroys the nerves, whereas many doctors hold exactly the contrary opinion, and it is noticeable that actresses, writing women, professional women, and busy society women, whose work makes a great strain upon the nerves, were the first to take to smoking. The habit is now spreading as part of a much needed revolt against the tyrannous out-of-date "prunes and prism" conception of woman as a pretty toy for man's amusement.

All women should smoke if they like it, and if it agrees with them. The young girls who do it and make themselves sick, because they think it smart or wicked, should be smacked or otherwise dealt with. We say that women should smoke—not that girls should do so, any more than boys.

What are the arguments against it? That the woman who smokes may be mistaken for an actress or a barmaid, or, that from the mere fact of smoking she may come to resemble one. It is true that the woman who has the pluck to smoke does resemble the actress or barmaid in the virtue which many of them possess of contempt for a stupid convention, and, in so far, she is to be congratulated. The talk of her being mistaken for what she is not, merely because she smokes a cigarette is absolute puerility, and if she were so mistaken it would not hurt her.

There is something to be regretted in the undoubted fact that the smoking woman injures her relations with

many dear old-fashioned people, but this must be philosophically borne, as these dear old people, estimable as they are, travel always in ancient ruts and cannot be drawn out of them. If it were true, again, that a woman stained her fingers, discolored her teeth, tainted her breath, and did half a dozen other dreadful things by smoking, she certainly should not smoke. But these evils do not arise from indulgence in the cigarette—only from utterly excessive indulgence or gross carelessness—usually from both. A woman who suffers her fingers or teeth to be stained by tobacco cares nothing for her appearance, and would be a sloven if tobacco had never been invented. It is not quite so easy for an habitual smoker to prevent all suspicion of tobacco lingering in the breath, but by proper means it can be done; and, while granting that the odor is a minor objection to women smoking, we maintain that there is a contra far outweighing it. People who smoke do not notice the smell of tobacco about other people. Most men smoke, and their sisters or wives who follow their example are spared an infliction which must often be odious to wives and sisters who do not. Therefore, unless our opponents are going to condemn smoking in men, they ought to welcome the modern movement which relieves the weaker and gentler sex from one of the minor unpleasantnesses of life.

It is granted by the other side that the association of men and women over a cigarette leads to easier relations between the sexes. They deplore it and say it detracts from old-fashioned formality and courtesy. Perhaps so, but it leads to a new-fashioned refinement and a much more real and true respect for women. Under the old regime the men remained at the dinner table drinking more wine than they needed, and telling stories which had not an elevating tendency. The women clustered in the drawing-room talking babies and scandal. Under the new regime men and women smoke together. There is less wine, less scandal, less constraint, and the men and women, in the effort to please one another, show the best side of themselves, learn from one another, and acquire a lesson in the gospel that men and women can be rational companions.

Other forces are teaching them this gospel, but tobacco is one of its great evangelists. The fact that women are learning to smoke, that they are even learning to drink whiskey—to do many of the things which a mischievous conventionalism tickets as harmless in men and bad in women—is doing much to break down the barbarous idea that women may be divided into two classes, good and bad, and that the man who acts like a cad towards the one class may be a perfect gentleman towards the other.

In conclusion, the advocates for smoking among women say that it is desirable as a step in the direction of freedom, and that when the full grown woman wishes to smoke it is merely useless, stupid and reactionary to attempt to interfere with her.

#### SHOULD WOMEN SMOKE—CON.

Some women do smoke, have always smoked, and will always smoke. With a number of regrettable exceptions they belong either to the commonest, roughest class, or to the classes which may be euphemistically termed "fast." It is a great pity that other women should adopt a habit which induces even a superficial resemblance to women from whom they essentially differ, and there is reason to fear that the habit brings about want of delicacy and refinement in other directions. For instance, women who smoke often drink whisky, they are thrown into the society of people with whom tobacco makes a bond of union, and they incur the dislike or disapproval of old-fashioned people who are usually the best natured and best bred and are far the safest guides and companions for young girls.

Apart from its moral or social effects, smoking is a nasty habit for women. It does not look pretty. Not one woman in a hundred can smoke a cigarette with elegance or look as if she really liked it. Doctors are agreed that cigarette smoking is bad for the health. It discolors the teeth, which should be one of woman's chief beauties, and it destroys the fragrance of her breath, which old-fashioned poets describe as one of her greatest charms. Further, it discolors her fingers, making them a dirty yellow instead of a rosy pink; it

makes her clothes and hair reek of stale nicotine, and altogether the smoking woman loses half the grace and attractiveness that of right belong to womanhood. She deliberately sacrifices daintiness for indulgence in a habit which even its devotees cannot describe as over-clean. Smoking, in fact, is essentially unwomanly. Nevertheless, when woman once takes to smoking she pursues it in a womanly way—that is to say, extravagantly, and without discretion, if bold enough to make no secret of her failing, and under the cloak of deception and a hundred petty but degrading lies, if she has the grace to be ashamed of herself. Smoking may be bad for men, but they are not forced to lie about it, and they are not ashamed to smoke a cheap pipe and cheap tobacco when that is all they can afford.

Feminine smoking should be vigorously denounced, and smoking women should be kindly but firmly repressed now, while their vice is but an affectation and their numbers are comparatively small, for otherwise a craving for the weed will become as strong with them as with men, and most of the grace and refinement of social life will be gone.

We are frequently told that the Queen of England and great ladies smoke. We can only reply that it is a pity—and no argument. Queens and great ladies are subject to peculiar conditions, and there may be excuses for their occasionally indulging in habits which serve to bridge over the gulf necessarily existing between them and many of the people they are forced to meet, whereas no such excuse is available to ordinary members of society.

It is also asserted by the apologists of this pernicious habit that smoking makes association between men and women more jovial, free and easy. This may be true, but at the present day we want more respect and courtesy from men and women, not more free-and-easiness, of which there is already too much. The man who sees a woman smoke, immediately, and perhaps unconsciously, places her on a lower level and acts and speaks accordingly. One of the chief results of women smoking is that they deliberately liken themselves to actresses and barmaids, not to mention inhabitants of

an outer Bohemia, and though actresses and barmaids are very often most estimable people, theirs is not the type upon which we wish our sisters and wives to model themselves. The fruits of female smoking are ragged nerves, pale cheeks, stained fingers, discolored teeth, tainted breath, a lightened purse, coarser manners, and clothes and curtains reeking of tobacco smoke. And, since we desire none of these things, let us do all we can to suppress the woman with the cigarette before she becomes too strong for us.

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### THE SINGLE TAX.—PRO.

The basic argument of the single taxers is correctly stated by their opponents to be that the land belongs of right equally to all the people, and that this precludes the rightful existence of private property in land. Whether we say that this provision is portion of the law of God, of natural law, or of moral law, makes little difference to opponents, who for their own ends deny the existence of any of these things, and sneer at those who regard them as the only basis upon which true civilisation and progress can rest. Yet these very people implicitly assert the existence of this moral law, which they explicitly repudiate, when they attack the single tax, Socialism, or any system whatever, on the ground that it is unjust. They can clearly mean nothing else than that it conflicts with the moral as apart from man-made law, for if justice depends on the latter the people have only to make laws establishing the single tax or Socialism, when they immediately become just. Private property in land can acquire not a shade more title to respect from the laws which established it than common property in land can acquire from laws enacting its establishment.

Both sides in all disputes do always endeavor to rest their case upon morality, and if they did otherwise there would be no appeal possible in legislation to anything but brute force. Therefore Single Taxers advocate their system because they say all men by moral law have equal rights to the land. The reasons for

this claim may be variously stated, but a simple way of putting it will appeal to all but the insignificant few who dispute the equal right of all men to life. The argument stands thus:

If all men have an equal right to life it follows that all men have an equal right to land, for without land (at least as a foothold and a resting place) no man can live; and it is manifestly absurd to say that two men have an equal right to life when one must pay the other for the use of land which is an absolute necessity of his living. It would be as reasonable to say that two men had an equal right to ride a horse when one man could only acquire the right to ride by buying or hiring the horse from the other.

An attempt is sometimes made to invalidate this argument by admitting that all men have rights to life, but denying that these rights are equal. But there can be no such thing as rights to life which are unequal. The right, if it exist at all, is one and absolute. The use which will be made of it depends upon the individual. The good citizen uses it well; the loafer and drunkard uses it badly, but the best citizen in the world cannot be morally permitted so to exercise his right as to interfere one iota with the equal rights of these other people to live and become good citizens, if they have it in them.

Land, as used by the Single Taxers, includes mines, rivers, sheets of waters, and all those natural opportunities which are capable of being made the subject of exclusive ownership. They belong, we say, to all the people of the earth, born and unborn. The generation on the earth at any particular period has only the usufruct of them without the right to deprive the child to be born to-morrow or a hundred years hence of his equal right to use them. "How," it may be asked, "are you going to secure this right, granted that it exists? Will you cut up the lands of a country into equal portions, giving to every man and child a portion? The thing is impracticable, for the division would need readjustment from day to day and from hour to hour." Of course the thing is impracticable, and the Single Taxers propose nothing so senseless.

They would follow the example of three men to whom their father has given equal rights in an estate which they are unwilling to cut up. They secure those rights by letting the land and sharing equally in the rent. One of the sons may become the tenant, in which case the rent is paid into a common fund, in the benefits of which he partakes with the other two. They may follow other occupations, or they may use very small portions of the land, the third occupying the whole or nearly the whole of it, yet in any case the rights of all three are maintained in exact equality.

Just so the Single Taxers would act with regard to the land of Victoria, for instance, preserving the equal rights of all who may be in the country now or be born into it, or come into it to-morrow. They would cause every holder of every portion of the land to pay the annual rental value of it into a common fund—the revenue which is spent for the common benefit of all. The rights of all people to the land would thus be maintained, for all could obtain it on precisely equal terms, and all would share in the consideration paid by each. It is because the rent of land values is sufficient to pay all the calls upon the revenue that no other revenue would be needed when this rent was taken, and consequently became the "Single Tax."

Having shown why private property in land is not permissible and should be taxed out of existence, we can now show why other taxes have no justification. In every civilised community every citizen, whether he owns land or does not own it, enjoys many advantages, such as protection for his life and property, facilities for education, travel, etcetera, while the landowner, who has the benefit of all these things in common with the landless man, derives from the existence of population and Government something in addition to all of them. This something extra is the value of his land.

Land values depend absolutely upon the presence of population with some of the machinery of Government; they grow greater with the increase of population and the increasing complexity of this machinery. Land in the centre of Africa or Australia, whatever may be its fertility, has little or no value—that is it

will sell for practically nothing, because it is outside the limits of all communities. But let a community grow up anywhere on earth, then land values come into existence there. On the other hand, if population leaves a country land values disappear, and were the machinery of Government to be destroyed, law and order to cease, in that case land values would also disappear. They are created and maintained by the community as a whole, while the benefit goes to the landowner. Payment for this benefit will meet all the expenses of governing the community which creates it, and therefore requires no other revenue. If it be said that landless men receive advantages as individuals from their membership of a community, and should pay for them, we repeat that the landowner receives precisely these benefits with something in addition, namely, the value of his land. Landowners and non-landowners both receive something free of charge, because the equitable charge made for the special privilege accorded to landowners enables them to so receive it. A homely illustration of this principle may be found in a restaurant, where a man is given a glass of water for nothing, while another man is charged sixpence for a glass of whisky and water. The water in each case is given free, and if the whisky drinker complains that a charge should be made to the temperance man for his drink he should himself pay for the water, which he also gets for nothing, in addition to the whisky, for which he pays. A fair charge for the land value given to the landowner in the one case and for the whisky given to the whisky drinker in the other pays all the expenses of the State and the hotel respectively, and therefore further taxation or further charges would be unnecessary and exorbitant.

Thus we maintain that the Single Tax is merely the exaction of a fair price for value received—that it is in fact a rent, and not strictly a tax at all. Those who wish to bring it into existence are called confiscators and socialists. The first charge is answered by pointing out that the word confiscation is not correctly applied to a charge by the people for a service by the

people, even though it destroy a form of private property which should never have been allowed to exist; while the statement that Single Taxers are socialists is utterly absurd. The aim of socialism is to abolish private property, not only in land but in all the means of production, and further to extend Government activity in every direction. The aim of the Single Tax is to strengthen private property in everything except land by preventing the confiscation of any portion of property under the name of taxation, and it further aims at restricting Government activity within the narrowest possible limits. Land and other things which are by the nature of the case monopolies, such as the rights of supplying gas, water, and electricity, and of building railways and tramways, are all that the Single Taxers desire to see in Government hands. In all other matters they advocate a far wider scope for private enterprise than obtains anywhere at present. Far from being socialists, they are indeed individualists of an extreme type, who carry their belief in the sacredness of private property much further than men belonging to any other school of thought. Their insistent claim is that only those things can be rightfully private property which are made by the individual, or obtained by gift or purchase from the individual who made them. The value of land, and the value of concessions for railways or water supply are not made by individuals, but by the community generally, and therefore, say Single Taxers, they are rightfully the property of the community.

Returning now to the charge of confiscation, we are asked why not compensate landowners if we deprive them of a legal privilege which they at present enjoy. The answer is that to do so would be both unjust and impossible without creating a state of things as evil as that now prevailing.

It would be unjust, because the burden of taxation to meet interest on the money borrowed would be as heavy as the rents now paid. Further, it is impossible to compensate any but a few, since the small landowners, as taxpayers, must be forced to provide much of their

own compensation, and that of the large landowners as well.

The slave analogy urged to justify compensation is entirely misleading, for the slaves were not asked to pay their own compensation in order to gain freedom, as the men robbed of their rights in the land would be asked to do in order to regain those rights—except in as far as the landowners paid compensation to themselves, which would be a meaningless proceeding.

There may seem to be some reason in the suggestion that the State should at least return the money it has received for land purchase—until it is considered that not only the money so received was spent on increasing the value of the land sold, but that other millions raised in taxation, or of which the interest is paid by taxation, have been spent for the same purpose—and that unless millions were spent annually in maintaining all the paraphernalia of government the value of the land would sink to nothing.

But though Single Taxers would not attempt the raising of an impossible sum of money in order to buy out present landowners, they would make the introduction of their reform so gradual that nobody would feel it a hardship.

In exchange for the first instalment of the land values tax, taxation of other kinds to the same amount would be remitted, and though many landowners would pay more under the new plan than the old they would gain greatly in the increased facilities given them for the employment of the energies and capital of which they are possessors. When land values are taxed one penny in the pound land will be cheaper to use, dearer to keep out of use, and as more land is farmed or built upon there will be more demand for labor of every kind, and more demand for capital to increase its productivity; while enterprise will at the same time be freed from some of the taxation which now hampers it. This process of creating demand for labor and capital will be continuous, and cumulative with every fresh instalment of the tax, and by the time it is sufficient to absorb the whole rental value of the land—which will be many years after its initiation—the descendants

of wealthy landowners of the present day, besides retaining untaxed such other wealth as their ancestors may have bequeathed to them, will have innumerable opportunities opened to them for earning more wealth themselves. Thus the Single Taxers, while denying that there would be any confiscation were the community to take back to-morrow all that belongs to it, propose no such drastic measure but a gradual resumption of rent, which will not inflict the semblance of hardship on anybody.

As to the question of valuation, it is admitted that the tax would so reduce the selling price of land that, even in its beginnings, the rental and not the capital value must soon become the basis of taxation. But this involves no difficulty. Municipal rates are now based on annual value, and when the tax is in full operation there will still be a rental value market for all the lands of the country, just as there is a capital value market to-day. The suggestion that a possessor of land could be dispossessed or forced to pay higher taxation by a rival or a foolish person outbidding him is merely fanciful. The rents paid by adjoining occupiers for adjoining property and not the offer of an individual will guide the assessors in arriving at a valuation. Then the claim that men will not care for and place valuable improvements upon land which is not their own is disproved both by commonsense and experience. The land is a man's own under the Single Tax as long as he pays the rent, and the improvements are absolutely his own, unburdened by taxation of any kind. Even to-day we see some of the most valuable buildings of our cities erected by men who pay a huge rent for the land, who have ultimately to hand over the building also to the landowner, and who, in addition to the rent, are paying large sums to the State in taxation, from which, under the Single Tax, they would be free.

How will the unimproved value of land be arrived at? How will you value such an invisible improvement as clearing on a farm? Such are questions frequently asked, and supposed to be difficult. Where a property consists of land and buildings only, the unimproved value of the land will be arrived at by subtracting

from the value of the whole property the value of the buildings—that is, not the sum which they cost, but the sum which it would now require to erect buildings of the same usefulness. On a farm, where portion of the improvements consists of clearing, there are usually uncleared lands near from which the cost of clearing per acre can be ascertained. Where the land is all cleared, as in or near cities, the removal of the trees, whatever it cost in the past, is no longer an improvement. The clearing does not increase, but decreases, the value of a property, seeing that if there were trees on it now they would cost the owner nothing to remove, but could be sold by him at a profit. Thus the theoretical difficulty of valuing ancient invisible improvements, such as clearing, disappears in practice.

It is argued by some opponents of the Single Tax that if land should be charged for at its full rental value the owners of consols also should no longer receive interest thereon, but this is a manifest non sequitur. The use of consols is not a necessity of life; they are not the subject of a monopoly; they in no way resemble land, except in that the persons who created them imposed a burden on posterity, for which posterity received no return, as the sellers of land imposed a burden on posterity, which must pay rent for it. National debts are usually undesirable—possibly their creation was sometimes inevitable, in order to preserve national existence; but under the Single Tax this would be the case to nothing like the same extent, because of the increase of revenue brought about by increased prosperity, which will also enable existent national debts to be rapidly reduced and ultimately extinguished.

Having shown the abstract justice of the Single Tax and replied to the objections which have a semblance of reason, it remains to indicate the enormous effects it will have in promoting moral advancement and material prosperity. In the first place, far from weakening the regard for private property, upon which depends all real progress, it immensely strengthens it—first, by showing the injustice of individuals appropriating the land values, which are not their own creation,

but the gift of nature and the work of the community, and, secondly, by insisting that all wealth which is the fruit of any man's labor should be regarded as sacred, no portion of it being taken from the creator or purchaser in the name of taxation.

Then the practical effects of this return to justice will show themselves even in its initiation. When land values are taxed, land speculation will become unprofitable—men will be less willing to hold land out of use hoping to sell it hereafter at a price yielding them an income for all its years of idleness, simply because it will not pay them to do so. Land will be forced into use; landowners must necessarily search for purchasers or tenants. Thus the price and the rent of land will fall—land, the raw material of all industry, will be cheapened, to the immense benefit of every worker in the country. Taxes upon property and industry will also fall as revenue is acquired from the land. The people having to spend less on rent and taxes will have more to spend on the products of labor, thus causing work on our farms and in our factories. At the same time the land now idle and forced into use through taxation can only be used by improving it, and improvements of any kind can only be effected by labor. Therefore there will be increased demand for labor; more men will be in receipt of wages, and of higher wages; in spending these wages they must necessarily give increased employment to the manufacturer, the farmer, the tradesman—to every worker in the social hive. Wealth is the result of labor upon land, with assistance from capital. In this country, when there is land, labor, and capital to spare, poverty is a monstrous thing, which can arise only from their idleness, and the Single Tax, which will bring them together for the creation of wealth, must tend to abolish poverty. There are other evils, other injustices, but private monopoly of the land is the greatest, and the parent of most of the others. Until it is abolished there can be no permanent improvement. Single Taxers are often twitted with holding the belief that their reform will cure all social ills. They do not claim this—only that it will enable them to be cured. A doctor called

in to attend a patient, and finding the room full of foul air, the doors and windows closed, will insist upon fresh air for the patient as an essential to his cure. More may be needed, but without that something nothing is of any avail. More than the Single Tax may be necessary to cure social ills, but without the fresh air of justice all other remedies are useless. The Single Tax claims to establish justice in restoring to all men their birthright in the land; to do this without inflicting hardship or disturbing any one who chooses to pay rent to the rightful owners in the possession of a single acre; to accomplish by peaceful and beneficent means a vast revolution in the economic relations of men—a revolution which will give to every man the fruits of his own labor, and sternly prohibit him from taking the fruits of labor done by other men.

#### THE SINGLE TAX.—CON.

The basic argument of the Single Taxer is that the land belongs of right equally to the whole people, and that any laws which fail to recognise this right necessarily involve poverty arising from unjust inequality in the distribution of wealth. To such argument there is a two-fold answer: First, that the State—the organised people—represents all the inhabitants of a country, and that every citizen is morally bound by the contracts which the State has made with individuals. Second, that there is quite unwarranted assumption in the state-men that all men have equal rights in the land. That all men have some right may be true; but where is the justification for saying that the rights are equal of the good citizen, who uses land to the best advantage or otherwise advances the welfare of the community, and the useless loafer who does nothing for himself or anybody else?

The Single Taxer is only one degree less confiscatory, and many degrees less logical, than the Socialist, who maintains that all human beings have a natural and equal right to all things produced by labor as well as to the land; and the Socialists have the further justification that they would try—though they would inevitably fail—to make every one work for the community according to his abilities.

The opponents of the Single Tax insist that it is in fact a Socialistic movement, designed to bring about equality, where equality is not equitable, and that it necessarily involves the confiscation of a form of property which has been bought and paid for under the laws of the community. They deny that assumed natural laws and an arrogated knowledge of the intentions of the Creator can form any just basis for regulating the affairs of society; and however desirable it may be to tax land as well as other forms of property, they consider it a monstrous injustice to tax one form of property out of existence while allowing other forms to go scot free.

Single Taxers themselves do not dispute that this is their intention. The very name, Single Tax, implies that there shall be no other taxation, and as a fact, this one tax is to be so high that it will destroy private property in land. The whole of the rent of the land will go, not to the man who nominally owns the land, but to the State which has robbed him of his real ownership. The Single Tax, in fact, is a subtle proposal for bringing about Land Nationalisation without paying that compensation to land-owners which honest Land Nationalisers admit to be essential. By way of comfort we are told that this process is to be gradual—that the confiscation will not take place all at once, but that a tax of perhaps a penny in the pound on the capital value of land will be substituted for a corresponding sum of existing taxation, and that this work of substitution will go on until the tax reaches a shilling in the pound or whatever figure is necessary to take away from the owners all profit in holding land. But if the thing is robbery, the fact that the robbery is committed stealthily and by degrees does not make it a whit more moral. Even those who admit that the unearned increment attaching to land—and many other things—makes them very fit objects of taxation, are alienated from rational proposals for land reform by what they consider the rapacious injustice of Single Taxers. They are chary of giving a hand to insert the thin end of the Single Tax wedge.

This, then, is the proposal of the Single Taxers: 'To gradually destroy private property in land, on the

ground that by some assumed natural law all men have equal rights in the earth, and they propose to do it by means of a gradually increasing tax which will ultimately absorb the whole rental value.

Here we may pause to ask how will this value be ascertained? The difficulty in the early stages of the revolution has doubtless been exaggerated. There is no insuperable obstacle to valuing a property—land and improvements—as it stands, and subtracting from the total value that of the improvements which are untaxable, levying the tax only on the balance. Most Single Taxers propose a levy of a penny in the pound of capital value as a beginning. This is all very well, but the levying of a penny will immediately reduce the value of land all round, and when a second penny is to be screwed out of the land-owner it will realise much less than the first penny, owing to depreciation of the property. In fact, if the land is re-valued, as in fairness it must be, twopence in the pound will possibly bring in less than a penny on the original valuation, for it must be remembered that there is a vast amount of property not ripe for the purposes of building or intense use of other kinds, on the basis of which it has now a nominal value; and when the first instalment of the tax forces unfortunate owners to either throw up their land or make a desperate attempt to find users for it, there will be a fall in values quite impossible to estimate. Indeed, as the logical object of the tax is to reduce capital values to nothing, it is obvious that when the tax is in operation, if not before, it must be levied, not upon the capital, but upon the rental value of the land. Who is to decide the rental value of the land, for instance, upon which business premises in Collins-street are built, when there is no property market of the present kind to act as a test of value? It may be answered that the State will fix the rental value at the amount of taxation which the highest bidder is willing to pay. But under this system what security of tenure would there be for the property owner who, under the Single Tax theory, has an indefeasible title to land so long as he pays its just value to the State? He would always be in the position of having exorbitant taxation forced

upon him, under penalty of some optimistic speculator offering more than the land was worth in ignorance, or some business rival offering it in order to crush a competitor out of existence. This difficulty of fair valuation will puzzle the Single Taxers sorely, if ever their principle triumphs sufficiently to bring them face to face with it; but apart from difficulties, there are a dozen other arguments against the Single Tax. It fails to satisfy the sentiment of justice which demands the taxation of other property such as stocks and bonds, and much wealth which is practically the proceeds of monopoly, very often of land monopoly itself. A man buys land when it is cheap, and owing to advancing prosperity, to which he may not himself contribute, the land increases in value, and he is said to get an unearned increment. A man buys Government Bonds when they are cheap, and owing to advancing prosperity, with a rise in credit, to which the buyer contributes nothing, the bonds increase in value. Is there not unearned increment here also? And if property to which unearned increment accrues in one instance is a fair subject of taxation, why is it not so in the other? The question is impossible to answer, for the Single Tax theory that land alone increases in value apart from anything its owner may do will not stand examination. There are many forms of property in which the buyer gains by a rise in values as a recompense for taking the risks of a fall.

Again, Single Taxers often urge that the land-owner and other monopolists are the only persons whose income does not arise from services rendered in return for the income. The laborer and professional man, they say, are paid for their exertion; the capitalist for the use of tools or machinery which were made by his labor or bought by him; the land-owner is paid for the use of something which was not made by him, and of which the value does not arise from individual labor at all. This may be true, but the holders of consols also reap incomes from property which renders none any service. The wealth once represented by the bonds was mostly blown away in gunpowder, and the owner of consols has nothing more than a right, such as

the land-owner has, to take a portion of the wealth which other men are creating from day to day without his help. If one form of income should be taxed out of existence, so should the other. But the opponents of the Single Tax maintain that all forms of property should be respected. Owners of land and of bonds have both purchased them with money earned by honest work, and special taxation would simply rob them of its due reward. Two men, for instance, save £1000 each from their earnings; one invests in land; the other in a steamship company's shares. Granted even for the sake of argument that land should not be private property, the law under which both men live has made it so, and there would be rank injustice in taking the income of one man from him and leaving that of the other untouched.

The only excuse the Single Taxers can find for conduct of this kind is the academic one that "Natural Law" not giving anyone a rightful title to land, no one can acquire a good title by purchase, even though he purchase from the State, which means the people. He may suffer hardship, they say, but not injustice, and even the hardship will be reduced to nothing by the gradual method of dispossession. This excuse, needless to say, fails to satisfy anyone who rejects the doctrine of Natural Rights, and even those inclined to accept this doctrine often refuse assent to an application of it which may result in ruin to an innocent man. Natural justice, if there is any such thing, forbids slavery, the ownership of one man in another's flesh and blood, yet the law and prevailing morality having countenanced it, compensation was paid by England to the slave-owners when the West Indian slaves were set free. Justice dictated a refusal to let one set of men suffer for the fault of the community, and if it be a fault of the community to permit private property in land, justice dictates that the land-owners shall receive compensation, and not be made the scapegoat for society. Unable to persuade the people of the justice of their scheme, the Single Taxers declare that compensation is impossible, on the plea that interest on the money borrowed to buy out the landlords would be greater than the rents now

accruing from land. Even if this were so, if the theory of unearned increment be true the advance in land values would soon wipe out the debt; and in a country where universal suffrage prevails, and the State has sold land within the lifetime of the men who make the laws, there would be something specially monstrous in the State resuming the land and retaining the money.

To all these arguments the Single Taxer remains impervious, and he proceeds to draw a beautiful picture of the beneficial results of his pet reform, appealing to the mass of the people who are poor or landless for their help in putting it into operation. Land speculation is to be killed, wages are to rise, unemployment is to vanish. Land speculation would undoubtedly be killed, but several other things would be killed with it. First and foremost would disappear the security which a man feels in land which is his own, and which encourages him to cultivate it, build upon it, and tend it with loving care. "Give a man secure possession of a bleak rock," said the million times quoted Arthur Young, "and he will turn it into a garden. Give him a ninety-nine years' lease of a garden and he will turn it into a desert." The Single Taxers are not touched by this. They even have the courage to quote Arthur Young themselves, pointing out that they offer a lease, not for ninety-nine years, but in perpetuity. So they do—in theory—but at a rent subject to uncertain and entirely arbitrary reappraisements. No man could feel sure that his land was his own, and even the tenant on a fifty years' building lease under present conditions is better off than the tenant on the Single Tax lease in perpetuity, because the former knows exactly what his obligations are, while the latter does not.

In a country where the occupiers of land felt their position insecure the capitalist and the laborer would be insecure also, with the result that both would betake themselves elsewhere when opportunity offered. Even if it be granted that the cheapening of most land, which probably would follow for a time from its heavy taxation, did make it more accessible to the user, and to some extent counteract the uncertain position entailed on him, other evils would nullify this small advantage.

Regard for the sacredness of private property would receive such a blow from the confiscation of property in land that it could never recover. Whatever be the theoretical differences between land and other private possessions, they are not appreciated by the general public, and once we permit land nationalisation in any form the Socialists will become irresistible. Capital will suffer the same fate as land. It will be confiscated without compensation, and all the moral evils of such conduct, together with the economic and political evils of Socialism, will be entailed upon the country. Single Taxers profess a great horror of Socialism, claiming to be immaculate individualists; but this claim is denied by the Socialists on the one hand, and on the other hand by the so-called Conservative individualists, who, if they allow themselves to be misled by subtle differences and play into the hands of Single Taxers, will soon find themselves swallowed up in the maelstrom of Socialism.

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### SOCIALISM.—PRO.

The world-wide movement towards socialism springs partly from the conviction, held by all unprejudiced thinking men, that intolerable injustice marks distribution of wealth, and partly from blind revolt on the part of the working classes against the hideous poverty to which millions of them are subjected. They see the world growing richer every day, though their share of its produce is stationary, or fails to increase in proportion to the share of others, while in the competition for employment it becomes harder every day to find the means of earning a livelihood. Workingmen are socialists because they are determined to improve their own condition; men of leisure and thought are socialists, because they are determined to improve social conditions for humanity.

Socialism proposes to improve these conditions by abolishing competition for wealth, under which the weaker go to the wall, and substituting for it a system under which the State, owning all the land and all the instruments of production in the country, would be-

come the sole employer. No one would be permitted to starve; no one would be permitted to be idle; and when all the available land, all the available labor, and all the available capital of the community are employed in producing wealth and performing necessary social services, socialists maintain that not only will poverty vanish like a bad dream, but that the sum total of wealth produced will immensely exceed anything ever yet experienced.

There are some points on which socialists disagree as to the method of working out their great scheme, and these points are seized on with avidity by their opponents as a proof that the scheme is impracticable. But this fails to trouble the socialists, for it must necessarily be many years before socialism is in full operation, and it is naturally beyond the power of the most able man to accurately forecast all the details of men's social and economic relations to one another in the far distant future, with the result that, when the most clear-sighted enthusiasts attempt it they necessarily arrive at more or less different conclusions. Socialists are satisfied with the knowledge that they agree as to the immediate steps called for to advance their great end, and with the common faith that under socialistic conditions human nature will be so purified of greed and dread of poverty, that it will be quite capable of solving the many problems which would be insuperable were the world, imbued with the capitalistic ideals of to-day, suddenly subjected to a socialist regime.

Reserving discussion of some of these difficulties let us consider the immediate steps towards socialism which are within the sphere of politics. First and foremost is the effort, meeting every day with increased success, towards nationalising or municipalising all undertakings such as railways, tramways, and the supply of gas, water, electricity, etcetera, which demand the grant of some special privilege or monopoly when they are undertaken by private individuals. It is true that the single taxers and some other non-socialist reformers also advocate social control of such undertakings, and that therefore, in beginning with them, the socialists are following the line of least resistance. But it is socialist

influence which has wrested so many of these fat monopolies from the hands of capitalists, for the single taxers and other theoretical individualists would have been far too weak for the task. Another sphere in which socialist activity displays itself is in erecting ever increased control upon capitalists and employers through the medium of Factories Acts and Arbitration Acts. The aim of socialism is everywhere to substitute the will and judgment of organised society for the unfettered unsocial will of individuals. Employers and employees, in the transitory period before the State becomes the only employer, must alike submit to the State authority which fixes rates of wages, hours of labor, and a hundred other details. But the State is going far beyond mere regulation of private enterprise. It is steadily narrowing the field of private enterprise by undertaking one business after another, either as a State monopoly or in competition with individual capitalists. The State, in Victoria, for instance, runs Savings Banks, and conducts a large loan business on the Credit Foncier principle. In New Zealand, the State undertakes insurance. In the Commonwealth, the Labor Party, which represents practical socialism, proposes to nationalise the tobacco industry, the iron industry and the liquor trade as Government monopolies; to establish a State Bank and a State Insurance Office in competition with private institutions, to give Old Age Pensions throughout Australia, and to take numerous other steps tending to make the State a greater employer of labor than it is at present, some of them resulting in the barring out of private capital from certain fields, and all of them reducing the strain of competition for labor, by advancing a scheme under which the State is to give work and wages while the laborer can work—subsistence when he is able to work no longer.

All these measures are well recognised parts of that system which anti-socialists declare to be impracticable because its ultimate developments are veiled in the mists of the future. What the future will bring forth no man can tell with certainty, but the weight of socialistic opinion supports a belief that in the socialist State all workers will receive equal reward for their

labor, whatever may be its nature. There are some who think that reward might be apportioned to services, but the clearest socialist thinkers believe this would be impracticable, since in the absence of competition—and of money which will be no longer needed—there seems no standard by which the relative value of different classes of labor might be measured. Who, for instance, can estimate the relative social value of an hour's work by a great painter, and a day's work by a navvy—the value of an operation by a skilled surgeon, and of an operation by a skilled artisan? It is practically impossible, and, therefore, advanced socialists are prepared to pay all workers equally. Then, say the anti-socialists, all incentive to fine work will be gone; there will be universal idleness and stagnation if the spur of competition is removed. But this shows gross want of imaginative insight; it shows a slavish intellectual subservience to things as they are, and even a blindness to certain existing facts. Much of the best and hardest work, even under our present debasing system, which makes money the all-powerful God, is the result of fine contempt for it, of a sturdy financial atheism. The best poets, the best painters, the noblest preachers, the greatest inventors and scientists, the finest sailors and explorers, think nothing of money—they pursue their art or whatever their life's work may be, giving all their energies to it, often braving hardship and danger, indifferent to material reward. On the lower physical plane, sportsmen and athletes undergo more wearing exertion than the miner or the navvy, from mere pride in their own strength and skill, or for the praise of their fellowmen.

If the anti-socialists realised this they would no longer sneer at the proposal to reward all labor equally. It is only competition in the degrading race for wealth that will be abolished; competition for the applause of one's fellowmen, for the approval of work well done, will extend to fields where it can have no place while manual toil is brutalising and despised. Under the new conditions, when the best in human nature has a chance to assert itself, when idleness is no longer a source of pride, but a crime, when the hours of labor

are short enough to stimulate physical vigor and tax no one beyond his strength, the navy will take a pride in shifting more yards of earth than his neighbor, the axe-man, in dealing sharper blows upon the tree. When each is working for all these things will win praise for the strong and capable; in all the higher branches of industry it will be the same, and sane competition for the best life has to offer will take the place of insane competition for enormous wealth, which is often the very worst. Thus, better conditions for all, and the growth of nobler natures in all, will act and react upon one another, so leading to a far higher standard of labor than can ever be attained in the modern State, in which the fear of starvation drives men to work, and where the members of many unions deliberately do less labor than they would like to do, because, otherwise, there will not be enough work to go round.

This is the cardinal point of socialist faith—that labor will be not only as effectively, but far more effectively applied, under socialism than it is to-day, and believing this, socialists are not in any way affected by the dismal prophecies of those whose sordid views lead them to foretell a universal shirking of work, and a consequent decrease in the production of wealth.

Another argument advanced by anti-Socialists is that the great power necessarily given to officials in the Socialist State, and their necessarily great numbers, must inevitably lead to tyranny and corruption. This, again, is a mere assertion, based on an unwarranted postulation under new and healthier conditions of the worst features of officialdom under the present unhealthy conditions. When all men are in the pay of the State it is clear that they must have direction; but why should we assume that the directors, who must be chosen by the people themselves, will be either inefficient or tyrannical? Analogies drawn from the corrupt and oppressive officialdom of America and other modern States are misleading, because official power is misused there to advance the interests of the millionaire who, under Socialism, can have no existence. The officials now also reap profits for themselves, but in a Socialist State

they could not do this without being immediately discovered, since the mere possession of greater wealth than their fellowmen would in itself be immediate evidence of wrongdoing, visited with instant protest and dismissal. While the chief virtue in a community is to amass wealth, officials are tempted to do it. Unlawful means to do it are many, discovery that the means used are unlawful is difficult, retribution upon those backed up by immense money power is almost impossible of exaction. Under socialism the temptation will be reduced, the means will be few, concealment will be impossible, disgrace inevitable; and added to all this, a better standard of morality will prevail, inducing those to whom power is entrusted to use it as a trust for the benefit of all. But it is urged again, suppose the officials are immaculate in honesty, they will still be inefficient; and even if efficient they would be totally incapable of providing for all the wants of society, now automatically supplied by the medium of competition.

To this Socialists reply, first, that all men will be better educated, and therefore more efficient, and that the people will have no difficulty in choosing, by competitive examination, or other means, the best men for administrative posts. Second, they point out that the difficulties of providing the requisite kinds and quantities of goods is grossly exaggerated. Demand makes supply, and demand always exists. The citizen goes to the communal tailor for a suit, many citizens go to many tailors. The tailors send orders for cloth to the cloth depots; these in turn give their orders to the cloth factories; the cloth factories give orders for wool to the wool stores, which pass them on to the department for sheep farming, and they also state their wants for machinery to the engineering department, which reports again to the department of mines and other departments which control the production of raw material for machinery. So it will be throughout the whole Social organism. Demand will be provided for as soon as manifested. The wants of individual citizens will control and guide all the immediate and mediate processes of production just as they do at present, thus

showing that the immense forethought which it is alleged will be required of Socialist directors of industry is chiefly the product of anti-Socialist imagination.

There are many other melancholy results alleged by its opponents to be inevitable from the adoption of Socialism, and not all of them can be dealt with in the space available. All such allegations, however, depend for speciousness on the statement already combated that the efficiency of labor would deteriorate, and thereby bring about longer hours of labor and smaller production of wealth. On this supposition it is asked, what shall we do for inventors; how will they find the time and means to experiment? The reply is that all men will have ample leisure, considerable means of their own, and that these would often be supplemented by fellow citizens interested in the improvement of machinery, or industrial and other processes for the common benefit.


Then, say the anti-Socialists, family life will be no longer possible, because the State will be so poor every man and every woman will have to work so hard, no kind of domestic service can exist, and parents will therefore be obliged to send their children to State nurseries. But, say the Socialists, the State will not be poor; men and women will not have to work very hard, and there is no reason why domestic service should not exist in some suitable form in the socialist community, and there is therefore no reason why family life should be broken up.

As already said, details may not work out on any plan that can be exactly forecasted now, but Socialists maintain they foresee enough to assure them that the land, the means of production, and the labor power of the community can be directed and employed by the community as a whole, in some manner which will be vastly more conducive to the wealth and well being of the people than the present capitalistic system of production. As to the problem of acquiring all these things for the use of the community, its solution is begun, and it will be further solved with lapse of time. The State will tax the land, thus reducing its value, and at the same time providing means to buy out other

land-owners. It has already undertaken certain enterprises, warning off private individuals. With others it will enter into competition, and doubtless, as this competition reduces the value of private undertakings, the State will buy out their owners and establish a Government monopoly. In the realm of personal exertion, as apart from capital, it will gradually decree that certain classes, beginning very likely with lawyers and doctors, shall pursue their avocations only as paid servants of the community. The process will be slow at first, gradually increasing in celerity as the volume of State industry grows stronger, and absorbs kindred industries with the labor employed by them. Compensation to the dispossessed will be paid as far as possible, in later stages on the road to Socialism in bonds which bear no interest, for interest will have no existence in the Socialist State; but even though full compensation to all be impracticable, the reform must come, and the rich will find the truest compensation for reduced material wealth in membership of a society that satisfies their every rational need, while providing the means of health and happiness for all.

#### SOCIALISM.—CON.

It is often erroneously believed that opponents of Socialism and socialistic legislation are champions of the present economic organisation of society, and on that account Socialism gains many recruits who are earnest but ignorant, aware that things as they are are wrong, and misled into the belief that Socialism is the only great reform which proposes to put them right. For this reason any destructive examination of Socialism is met with the excusable prejudice of thousands who feel themselves wronged, and resent all denunciation of Socialism in the mistaken idea that it is synonymous with saying that they or their class must suffer wrong for all future ages. So far is this from being truth that the only man in Melbourne who has critically denounced Socialism, and met Socialists on the platform, is absolutely at one with his opponents in condemning the present system of wealth distribution, and is the foremost champion of the Single Tax, which would effect



social changes, tending to a state of wealth, liberty and justice which advanced Socialists cannot even hope to bring about.

The Single Tax, for instance, aims at a social state in which every worker would be rewarded exactly according to his deserts; would, in fact, retain for himself all the wealth he creates, whereas Socialism is forced to advocate equal payment to every worker whatever the social value of his services. Bliss, a leading American Socialist, the Fabian Society of England, and all the most thoughtful Socialist writers and parties frankly admit that equal payment to all workers is a necessity of Socialist organisation; but since this is disputed by some uneducated enthusiasts who fancy payment might be made in proportion to services rendered, it is well to show that it is impossible. It is impossible because in a society where competition and money are abolished, and where the State is the only employer, there no longer exists any standard by which the relative value of commodities and services can be measured. It is impossible, for instance, to compare the value of an hour's work by a singer and by a sailor, the relative value of a cow and a newspaper article. There is no exchange in the State between service and service or goods and services, and, therefore, any discrimination in reward would be entirely arbitrary. Suppose even that it were made—that a great surgeon or inventor were given payment equivalent to ten thousand a year where the ordinary worker received only two hundred—what is the surgeon to do with his wealth? Is he to save it and live on the proceeds? Is he to give portion to his son, and thus absolve him from the necessity for work? If these things were permitted, an idle rich class would rapidly grow up, and though the law might decree that rich as well as poor should work, the rich would find means of evading it. There is, therefore, as the wisest of them admit, no alternative for Socialists but equal payment to all; and in this equal payment, if there were no other cause, anti-Socialists say is sufficient cause to reduce Socialist society to wretchedness.

There never yet has been any society in which average human beings have worked hard for any other

purpose than to enjoy the fruits of their work. Here and there among artists, enthusiasts, cranks and adventurers may be found men who employ their energies without thought of wealth accruing to them in return; and the Socialist fondly imagines that under Socialism all men will be of this exceptional type. To think so is the most optimistic folly, for it must be remembered that these men are absolutely free and even uncontrollable. They choose their own tasks, work at them when and where they fancy, and were they harnessed by authority to their labor all enthusiasm for it would depart. Under Socialism no man can choose his work, nor his place nor hours of work; there will be no such thing as freedom, and hence the one existent type of men who fulfil the Socialist ideal of contempt for material reward could have no existence under a Socialist regime.

Slave labor has never been fruitful or efficient labor. In the sense that it will be forced labor done under direction, without reference to desire or individual capacity, and without special reward for special merit, all labor in the Socialist State will be performed under slave conditions, and will, therefore, be the most inefficient labor the world has ever seen. This may seem an exaggerated statement, but consider the circumstances. In the hands of the State will be all the land, and all the instruments of production in the country—that is to say, in the hands of the State's officials—and they must order the production and distribution of everything necessary to life, and allot to every man his share of land for a dwelling place. No man can choose his occupation, for if this were permitted there would be a rush to the occupations which are light and agreeable, while no one would be found for hard and necessary drudgery. No man can choose his place of occupation, since if he could no one would be found to brave rough conditions and disagreeable climate in order to develop the resources of the country. All these things must be ordered by authority, by a bureaucracy which will inevitably have greater power over the persons and destinies of the Socialist citizen than any tyrant has possessed since the dawn of history. In many ways it will be a power even more galling and cramping than that of the slave-owner

over his slaves, for in all slave-owning communities the slave of special abilities was able, by exerting himself, to buy his freedom, or at least to secure for himself specially favorable conditions. But in the Socialist State there is no exceptional reward for exceptional merit—no chance of escape from the ruck—and the Socialist citizen will revenge himself upon this system by refusing to exert his energies or his talents to their full capacity or anything approaching it. He will have an overpowering temptation to reduce his output of brain or muscle to a level with that produced by the most idle and unintelligent co-worker in his branch of industry, and thus talents and strength will become atrophied by want of exercise with disastrous immediate results, and results still more disastrous upon future generations which inherit the qualities of their fathers.

Yet another cause will be operative to reduce the efficiency of labor under Socialism in the difficulty, amounting to impossibility, of assigning men and women to the work for which they are naturally adapted. A man who might make a splendid painter may make a wretched farmer; another with capacity to make an excellent carpenter may be hopelessly inefficient as a clerk. Men seldom find their true vocation until early youth has gone, and even now there are many round pegs jammed awkwardly and ineradicably into square holes; but under Socialism it will be a pure accident if the round peg is ever fitted into a round hole, and the great majority of the people will be assigned to tasks for which they have no aptitude or taste. The discontent, the waste, the slipshod work occasioned by these mistakes would be incalculable even were mistakes honestly made, but while human nature is what it is, there would not even be an honest attempt to choose men well for their work.

We have already pointed out the vast power necessarily assigned to the officials of the bureaucracy. Is it reasonable for one moment, to suppose that the bureaucrats will make navvies or bricklayers of their sons when it is in their power to make them doctors, officials or journalists? There must inevitably be nepotism of the most glaring kind, all tending to establish an official

and privileged caste over which the mass of the population would utterly lose control. On the moral and political effects of this something more will be said later, but what can be the economic results of the system described but a pitiably reduced production of wealth, tending to involve the whole community in hopeless poverty? Government work is always clogged with red tape, wasteful, conservative, inefficient as compared with that of private enterprise, even under present conditions, when the example of private enterprise, free criticism, and means to give the best men high remuneration are available. The Government Tobacco Monopoly of France pays half the wages and charges practically the same price per pound for tobacco as that charged in Australia, and yet makes no greater profit per pound of tobacco than is received in duties here, where tobacco is manufactured under private enterprise. If official management and work were not intolerably wasteful the profits in France should be vastly greater. The management of our own State departments and that of other countries is, in fact, a constant source of ridicule and condemnation. Under Socialism, for reasons given above, it would be intolerably worse. Yet while the work, the forethought and knowledge demanded of Socialist State departments would be ever so much greater than anything required of such departments now, they would be hampered in several directions where they now are free. The whole community depending upon them for their daily bread and every enjoyable thing in life they would be under constant pressure and temptation to increase the immediate output of consumable goods which men desire, at the expense of making provision for the future, even though they were possessed of such inconceivable prophetic gifts as to foresee its needs. They would be tempted beyond possibility of resistance to neglect the national capital, the means of future production, and to fail to replace it or let it fall into disrepair. Labor spent on harbor works, canals, and general development would be bitterly grudged by people who wanted more clothes, more food, more books and furniture. A magnificent example of what would happen on an immense scale is seen in the case of the

Victorian Railway Department, which for years concealed loss of revenue by wasting capital, until the people are suddenly and unexpectedly called on for two millions to put their railway property into tolerable repair.

Again, slow as Government officials are now to disturb red tape methods by adopting new industrial processes and the aid of new inventions, under Socialism this disinclination would not only be exaggerated, but there would be very few new inventions to adopt. All men being employed each day at their appointed tasks they would not have the time and means for inventions in which, as is well known, there are hundreds of failures for one success, while even successful inventions scarcely ever attain to adoption in perfect, or even useful, shape until the brains and money of many men for many years have been expended on them. These men are now spurred on by hope of gain to themselves, and the certain knowledge that other men's hope of gain will secure a trial for the work of their brain if it promises to aid production. Even were the inventor's enthusiasm undamped by the knowledge that he could secure no material gain, it would be effectually quenched by the hopelessness of overcoming official conservatism and stupidity.

It seems, therefore, indisputable that, even after due allowance is made for the employment of hands and lands now idle, the production of wealth under Socialism would be enormously reduced. Consider this prospect in the light of present figures, and see how the Socialist dream of plenty for every citizen vanishes into thin air. Coghlan gives the annual production of wealth in Australia as £29,987,000. A great amount of this goes into the hands of a wealthy minority, but it works out at £24 16s. 10d. per head of population if it were distributed equally. This is no great sum, but imagine the total reduced, say by a half, and still distributed equally, it would mean positive penury, not to some, but to all.

Would the officials who nominally receive no more than other citizens be content with this paltry sum? If so they would be unlike any officials the world has

ever known, while their despotic power would be immensely greater; and there never has yet been a man or class of men upon whose character the possession of unbridled power has not had an effect deteriorating in the extreme. For the officials of Socialism there will be immense temptation and unexampled opportunity. All the material wealth of the country passes through their hands. The chief officials have the choosing of the minor officials, and through them they absolutely order the lives and destinies of every individual. The result will be favoritism, corruption and spoliation to an extent almost inconceivable. But, say the Socialists, in the first place human nature will be immensely better, and in the second place any isolated attempt at dishonesty will be immediately discovered and checked by the people. The answer to this is that Socialism, even honestly directed, means universal poverty, and where poverty is rampant human nature does not improve but deteriorates. A further answer is that the dishonesty of Socialist officials cannot be discovered, and if it were discovered could not be checked. First, as to discovery, it must be remembered that all the newspaper press and all the printing works will be in the hands of the State—that is, of State officials—and that no one can expose official misdoings in print without official permission, which, of course, would never be given. A dissatisfied person, an agitator, cannot even procure a poster or dodger wherewith to circularise his immediate neighbors; he cannot use the post office on a large scale without discovery by the officials; but let us assume that he and his friends have the energy and good fortune to summon a considerable attendance at some public meeting of protest. What is the result? Most probably a discovery that the labor of the agitator and his chairman are required in the Barrier silver mines and the cane-fields of Northern Queensland. Who outside their immediate circle is to know of this banishment? If known, who is able to recognise it as banishment, or to prove that it is unfair? for one of the absolutely essential powers of the Bureaucracy is to transfer labor from

places where it is superfluous to places where it is needed, and of its necessity or superfluity here or there only the officials themselves can judge.

There is no need to multiply instances in order to show the utter hopelessness of revolt by word or deed against organised officialdom under Socialism. The people are gagged, disarmed, bound hand and foot. But in all this, it may be said, you have taken no account of Parliament, which will be elected on the widest suffrage, and will remain the master of the Bureaucracy, the all-powerful guardian of the people's rights. This is an attractive picture of the Socialist Parliament, but it has no correspondence with the reality. Far from controlling the Bureaucracy, Parliament will be the Bureaucracy's most powerful support and engine of oppression. The franchise may be unlimited, but, nevertheless, only the nominees of officialdom will have the remotest chance of election, because only these will be made known to the people through the Press. They will be praised, recommended, forced upon the people; and if any man opposed to the Government did by chance gain recognition among his neighbors, he would be immediately removed to some distant part of the country where he was unknown. That these things are no imaginary dangers is realised by the Socialists themselves, who say that one of the most difficult problems of Socialism will be effective restraint of the Bureaucracy. It is only their incurable optimism which prevents them from seeing that the problem is insoluble, and that corruption and despotism must increase until they culminate in blind revolt and hideous slaughter—probably then in a return to acknowledged individualism with recognised masters and recognised serfs—or with, perhaps, evolution in another direction, through civil war and a struggle for the dictatorship between great rival official robbers.

A dull dead level of poverty and inefficiency for the masses, tyranny and corruption on the part of their masters—these are the fruits which will spring from the seed of socialism should it ever reach maturity. They are so monstrous that it may well be questioned whether the tree will not be lopped away long before

it can ripen such fruits, but there is this danger to consider—that the transition towards socialism steadily weakens the sentiments and the ideals to which the natural outcome of fully developed socialism is so abhorrent.

The socialist Labor Party of to-day are usually contemptuous of such arguments as here set forward, and even the non-socialist often supports their policy without any intention of carrying it to extremes. He says, "Why not a State Bank? Why not nationalise the tobacco industry? Why not impose factory legislation, and pass compulsory Arbitration Acts? They all tend to improve the present condition of things which is bad, and what matters the theory which some people choose to hold concerning them?"

Whether the political proposals of the Socialist Labor Party would have immediately good or bad effects is not here a matter for argument. The anti-socialist believes that most of them would fail in even their direct object, but he could conceivably believe that the Arbitration Bill, for instance, even with preference to Unionists, would confer a boon in checking strikes, raising wages, and giving industrial peace, and yet steadfastly oppose it, because the boon and the peace are bought at too high a price. All these socialistic measures are a denial of liberty; they sap independence; they tend to the belief that what is ordained by law is necessarily right; that man has no rights against the State; they destroy men's horror of tyranny; they blind men's eyes to the glory of the freedom for which their forefathers fought and suffered. As men grow more and more to depend upon the State, as they allow it more and more to encroach upon their liberties, they learn to forget that they have liberties at all. They become slavish themselves—tyrannical towards others not so far developed in slavishness. Fear of the law—that is ultimately of the official who administers the law—becomes more and more the controlling force in conduct, and as fear plays a more important part in guiding a man's life, his character inevitably becomes poorer. Under socialism the chief, almost the only virtues, must

be servile, unquestioning obedience, and willingness to visit with unsparing cruelty any manifestation of disobedience within the organised community.

## SUNDAY OPENING OF LIBRARIES, ETC., ETC. —PRO.

Even dour Glasgow has overthrown the tyranny of so-called religion, and opened its libraries and museums to the public on Sundays. Victoria is practically the only country, and Melbourne the only city, in the world where any shred of hope remains to the clergy who vainly hope to drive people to church, and the publicans who, not so vainly, hope to entice them into hotels. A little walk, a little ride, makes a man a bona fide traveller, whereupon he may take his Sunday drink, to the content of himself and the publican.

The advantages of permitting the masses to cultivate their minds and tastes, to enjoy a little real rest under refining surroundings, on their one day of leisure, are so clear and indisputable that none but tyrannical bigotry can deny them. And it is astonishing that the good people who fight so strenuously to keep the library doors closed, cannot see the illogical futility of standing out against an admittedly great boon to their fellow citizens when Sabbatarianism has been beaten all along the line, when trains and trams are running, 'busses plying, when many shops are open, and much other work, a good deal of it, perhaps, undesirable, is being done throughout Victoria on Sunday. Experience has shown that the opening of picture galleries and like institutions involves a minimum of work in proportion to the happiness and pleasure conferred on the many visitors who flock to them on that day, because they have not the time to spare on others. This is such an obvious fact that one is forced to the conclusion that the "unco guid" are more anxious to prevent happiness—outside the churches—on the Sabbath, than to keep it as far as possible a day of rest.

In the desire to prevent unnecessary work on Sunday, the general feeling of British communities is with

the Sabbatarians, but social arrangements demand some exceptions from universal rest, and none is so well justified as the exception which calls for the services of a few attendants at these public institutions. Indeed, liberal-minded people have offered to undertake these services as volunteers, in order that the regular staff may be released, and as this offer has no effect whatever upon the Churches it seems that they are less bent upon preserving a day of rest for the worker than of dragooning the public to fill their pews under penalty of suffering ennui and idleness. The churches, as a matter of fact, are not successful, and would do well to abandon their stubborn fight against a great educating influence. Probably many of the opponents of Sunday opening do not realise the intense selfishness of their opposition. As a rule, they find their own pleasure in devotional exercises, and in addition they have, as a rule, comfortable homes, with gardens and firesides, where they may take the air or spend the hours spared from worship over books and talk. But beyond this they have leisure at other times to visit galleries and museums if they desire to do so. It is far otherwise with the inhabitants of a hundred crowded streets—a thousand narrow cottages. There is no rest and peace to be found at home. The poor man must take his choice of the pavement, the church, or the public house, unless he has a shilling or two to spare for more attractive methods of Sabbath breaking, or is so devoted to reading that he will pore over a cheap book or newspaper in his little home. He does not go to church, and we repeat it is cruel selfishness to grudge him and his family the chance of spending some profitable and pleasant hours in the institutions which he has to maintain. Since liberalism at last has succeeded it is reasonable to suppose that the Sunday labor now entailed on railway men and tramway men may be actually diminished. For many people are driven to travel from sheer impossibility of finding reasonable recreation near home. But whether this be so or not, whether volunteer attendants can be found or not, whether church-going will be diminished or not, it was scandalous that a small minority of the people were so long permitted to enforce their views on the great majority in a way that deprived thousands of a

great boon which, at worst, involved Sunday labor upon an utterly insignificant number of persons.

It is impossible to argue this subject without some degree of bitterness, because one knows that men of narrow, illiberal views, whose partisan zeal threatens public interest, are striving to have the libraries closed once more. But there are also others who set their faces against reform with regret, in the belief that it must mean an extension of Sunday labor. They do not presume to dictate to their fellow-citizens how they shall employ their own time, provided that its employment is not such as to deprive others of their freedom. On these we would urge that Sunday opening is no thin end of a wedge. Sunday observance is split from top to bottom by many wedges, and to admit this one would perhaps close the cracks elsewhere. Books and pictures are not influences that make against religion of the best kind. If the churches have it, the churches will gain through books and pictures becoming more familiar to the public; and it stands to reason that, when increasing numbers are permitted to enjoy real rest and freedom from sordid cares in elevating surroundings, the spirit will gain strength, which seeks always to find means by which others may rest also. Nothing, in short, will be so conducive to genuine healthful Sunday observance as the opening of libraries and picture galleries on Sunday.

#### SUNDAY OPENING OF LIBRARIES, ETC., ETC. —CON.

It is a cheap and easy form of argument to accuse opponents of tyranny, narrowness and bigotry; but it is usually far from being a convincing one, and, in Victoria a liberal-minded Premier has publicly stated that he was with the churches in their desire to prevent further Sabbath breaking, through the opening of libraries, museums, and picture galleries on Sunday. Religious people, who are not ashamed to confess their belief that there is some meaning in the commandment naturally look at this question from a somewhat different point of view from those who have abjured all respect for the teachings of religion. The former may

claim also that their view is far more logical than that of thousands who profess and practice the opinion that Sunday should be made a day of rest for secular reasons. The latter are guided by no principle; everything becomes a matter of expediency, and it is only the strong religious feeling possessing a majority of our citizens that prevents the introduction of a "Continental Sunday" in British communities, in spite of the feeble protests of the irreligious that Sunday work should be curtailed to a minimum on purely secular grounds. It is true that we have trains and trams running, that shops of certain kinds are allowed to trade with no good reason, and that in England, Scotland and most of Australia, the special institutions we are concerned with here keep their doors open on Sunday. Even Glasgow, we are told, has Sunday opening of museums. All this is regrettable, but what sane argument can be founded upon it? There is a great deal of immorality in Glasgow, and there is much drunkenness. Does anyone hold up Glasgow for imitation in this respect, as well as in the other? We do not claim that Sunday admission to hotels and libraries are precisely cause and effect, but, unless the latter can be justified on better grounds than that it exists elsewhere, it has no claim upon us. On the other hand, the concomitance in the United Kingdom of this allegedly beneficial relaxation of Sunday observance with Sunday work and Sunday drinking on a vastly greater scale than exists here, does suggest that both are manifestations of a laxness which is promoted by every separate departure from principle.

Churchmen are twitted with inconsistency in permitting trains and boats to run for the people's amusement, when they would keep elevating places of amusement closed. But there is no inconsistency. Churchmen did not permit these things. They fought against them with all their strength until they were beaten, and will fight with equal determination against every other breach of Sunday observance. They do this because they believe it right. If more people would come to church, the churches would be pleased, because it would be good for the people whom they

wish to serve. Therefore, to enlarge congregations, or prevent congregations from dwindling, would not be the narrow, selfish aim which is sneered at by anti-churchmen, even were it the object of the churches in opposing Sunday opening. But it is not their aim. They desire that the community shall keep Sunday as a day apart, because it is beneficial to it spiritually and materially. Some necessary work must doubtless be done on the Sabbath, though infinitely less than is imagined, and every addition to it, however small, leads inevitably to other additions. It is suggested that work might be decreased through the diversion to libraries or galleries of those who now use trains and trams to take them to the seaside. But this is pure nonsense. If the numbers who sought public institutions on Sunday were really considerable, it is far more likely that we should have a demand for more trains and trams to give means of access to them.

Arguments of such a kind are mere quibbles. The fight is really between those who desire to see Sunday made like other days and those who wish to differentiate it. The latter must oppose Sunday opening without compromise. It not only entails work upon the attendants at public institutions, but it imbues visitors to them with the idea that Sunday is a day of secular amusement, and fosters an appetite for such amusement which would be soon gratified. The services of volunteer attendants, often talked of, would remove no objections, since, in the first place, these attendants would have to work on the Sabbath; in the second place, the effect on the general public would not be altered in the least; and in the third place, these volunteers, if they were not missing when asked for, would soon tire of their self-imposed task, and in any case would prove incompetent.

The taunt that religious people are in alliance with the hotel keepers, or with any providers of secular amusement, is utterly unjustified, seeing the hotels get relaxations in the very countries where Sunday opening exists, and it is in them that general laxity prevails.

Pitiful pictures are drawn of the poor man in the small cottage, without desirable means of employing his

Sunday leisure. In the belief of church people, who would close the galleries, such men and their families have entirely free to them the one healthful means of employing their leisure in the church and Sunday school. It is, of course, admitted that there are much worse ways of spending Sunday than going to a picture gallery or library, but the churches unsparingly condemn them, and will not consent to do evil on the chance that some slight good might come.

Opening public institutions on Sunday is the thin end of the wedge that would split the observance of the Sabbath as a day of prayer, and a day of rest, from top to bottom. The opponents of Sunday opening include many who disclaim all idea of assisting religion, but have humanitarian enthusiasm for the preservation of one day in the seven as a day of rest. The churches are very grateful for their help in the struggle, which they will maintain with every hope of eventual success in spite of present discouragement.



### THE TOTALISATOR—PRO.

While it is true that bookmakers and rigid moralists may be quite logical and sincere in both opposing the introduction of the totalisator for very different reasons, it is nevertheless true that an alliance of the kind always arouses some suspicion—a suspicion in this case not quite ungrounded, for at least it seems that the clergy are more willing to keep bookmakers alive as a “shocking example” to those whom they may lecture, but can never control, than to suffer an honest experiment in regulating and restricting a tendency which everyone admits has most injurious results. But, granted for one moment that the introduction of the totalisator would not reduce the numbers of people who bet, should not the clergy, if they are as sincere in wishing to improve moral conditions as they are in determination to assert their own authority, welcome any measure which promises to abolish a useless class, and a class which, though it contains a number of worthy individuals, corporately does much to corrupt sport and manhood by

introducing into the one many bad practices, and familiarising the other with many nastinesses which are not inherent in either sport, or even in pure gambling? Almost all swindles and scandals connected with the turf have a bookmaker concerned in them, while both jockey-boys and young men addicted to sport suffer in morals and manners through their association with members of the ring. Therefore, say advocates of the totalisator, let us abolish the ring, even if we cannot reduce the volume of betting—let it at least be conducted in a cleanly, honest, respectable manner, which will purge it of much of its deleterious effect.

Let us not forget that the totalisator has the virtue, among others, of tending to lessen a very common temptation to ruin and even embezzlement on the part of poor men who are led to back a "sure thing" on credit. In nine cases out of ten the horse to which they have pinned their faith does not win, and the result is frequently "borrowing" from shop or office till, followed by another plunge in the hope of getting means for repayment. Since all transactions with the totalisator are on a strictly cash basis, though a weak man may be tempted, he at least cannot be driven to gamble upon it with money other than his own. All these reasons go far to justify legalisation of the totalisator, even if it would do nothing to diminish betting or would even increase it; but this is an effect which its advocates by no means admit.

Comparative figures of countries where the machine is used and where it is not are very hard to obtain. In 1897 it is said that £850,000 went through the totalisator in New Zealand. In Victoria there were 223 bookmakers licensed by the V.R.C., and from them the club derived a revenue of £22,575. Since these bookmakers probably made incomes of not less than £500 a year each, we find that they and the club between them drew over £130,000 in profits from the betting losses of the public. If this represents 10 per cent. on all money wagered we have at once £1,300,000 bet on horse-racing with these men.

It may be that their profit is much more than ten per cent., but it is also probable that their average

incomes greatly exceeded £500 a year. The whole thing is guess work, but when we remember that throughout the State there is a vast amount of betting not done with V.R.C. bookmakers, we see that the £850,000 invested in the New Zealand totalisator is probably much exceeded by the money wagered in Victoria, even when due allowance is made for Victoria's greater population.

There is at any rate no evidence that the totalisator increases the volume of gambling. Let it be granted that there are a number of people who would occasionally invest on the totalisator when they would be deterred from entering the betting paddock by their nervousness, or by its unsavory characteristics. Against these we have to reckon the great number of youths under twenty-one years of age, who would be, and in South Australia are, refused tickets in the totalisator. The law can forbid betting with the machine by persons under age; the bookmaker will make a cash bet with a baby.

This is all very well, it is argued, but commissioners will take money for investment on the totalisator from minors and persons who do not visit the racecourse. No doubt they will, if they can get it; but when the law gives sanction to one form of betting, it will be in a vastly stronger position for sternly suppressing all other forms than it is at present, when betting is theoretically illegal, and petty bookmakers flourish in scores of innocent-looking shops throughout Melbourne city and suburbs.

The law cannot crush out the gambling instinct, but it has the power to regulate it and keep it within bounds. Commissioners who collected money, who acted as panders for the totalisator, would soon be recognised and watched, and in any case, necessarily plying their trade in secret, they would be far less approachable by boys than the small cash bookmakers who now yell the odds and accost passers by on every racecourse. Clean, open betting on the totalisator would undoubtedly allow many to personally invest a few shillings, who now either entrust the money to someone else or restrain their gambling inclination; but on the other

hand it would put effective restraint on a probably greater number whose gambling is of the most hurtful kind.

These remarks apply to the great Melbourne race-courses to which the use of the totalisator would probably be limited, but its opponents declare it would eventually find its way to the smaller meetings and inevitably cause a great increase of betting there, because reputable bookmakers now either absent themselves or offer such illiberal odds that few backers are tempted to do business. There is a certain amount of truth in this, but everyone who has visited a country race meeting is aware that local bookmakers, who know the horses, do business there, and that further, there is a great amount of betting on improvised illegal totes, wherein the public makes its own odds. Therefore, if expense and the law permitted the establishment of regulated totalisators in the country, as a set-off against slightly increased betting would be the removal of the local bookmaker as a gambling centre in the district, some revenue to the club and to charities, instead of a heavy commission to unauthorised private tote runners, and more security to the public. The argument that charities would be degraded in the receipt of funds from the totalisator is a fine example of hypocrisy, in face of the fact that they willingly accept donations from bookmakers, not to mention people who acquire their wealth far less respectably, and that they are further subsidised from the licensing fund, from which undoubtedly arises harm to morals and character infinitely greater than all the betting upon horseracing in Australia can inflict.

There are, however, a number of other arguments advanced by the ingenious Mr. Madden, who takes upon himself to protect Victorian horse-breeding and Victorian sport from the insidious effects of the totalisator. Incidentally it may be mentioned that when he strenuously opposed the Totalisator Bill in 1898, he was one of twelve members of the V.R.C. Committee, while the other eleven, whose united knowledge of and zeal for horseracing presumably equalled that of Mr. Madden, were all strongly in favor of the Bill. Mr. Madden maintains that the totalisator encourages the breeding

of weedy animals, good for nothing but a short flutter, instead of genuine racehorses, because racing clubs, getting a percentage of totalisator receipts, and desiring receipts to be as great as possible, put a number of short handicap races on their programmes and unduly limit the number of weight-for-age events. The short handicaps are good for betting, since the piling on or reducing of weight will give equal chances to a horse and a weed in a five furlong spin, and where there is most uncertainty there will be most gambling, whereas weight-for-age races demand breeding and staying power for success, and when the public is in more or less agreement as to the best horse and probable winner there will be comparatively little betting.

There is some weight in this argument if racing club committees are dead to the interests of true sport, and think only of encouraging gambling to the club's profit, but there is no proof or likelihood of honorable men being influenced by these sordid motives; and if the breed of horses is deteriorated by the totalisator, how comes it that Carbine, the greatest of Australasian horses, was bred in New Zealand, where the totalisator has been at work for many years?

When Mr. Madden goes to another branch of the subject and says that owners will no longer go to the expense of breeding and racing the best horses, because they will be unable to obtain big wagers against them, his argument is so jesuitical and apparently unsportsmanlike that it deserves close examination. The owner must bet, he says, because stakes are small, and only by successful wagering can he afford to race. Now, as a matter of fact, many of the most renowned racing men, here as well as abroad, have either never betted, or have never retained a penny of their winnings, but have given them to the charities which Mr. Madden says would scorn to receive the proceeds of gambling.

An owner of racehorses can never be a strength or ornament to the turf if he relies on betting to keep his colors there, and Mr. Madden himself professes the greatest disapproval of gambling as morally hurtful and an excrescence upon sport. But if he insists that betting is a good thing, as well as a bad one, then comes

the question, why should not a needy owner bet upon the totalisator? Because, says Mr. Madden, he would then give away his judgment of his horse's chance for the benefit of the public, which would immediately rush it and reduce the dividend to his disadvantage in the event of a win. This objection goes perilously near to suggesting that an owner wishes to deceive the public as to his horse's form and chances, a species of deception which, when committed in several other directions, meets with the severest censure from sportsmen and heavy penalties on discovery. But let us allow that the owner is not obliged to take the public into his confidence, why should he not bet with an individual and receive good odds from him? The answer that betting is forbidden of course, means nothing, for no law can prevent bets being made; but the fact is that no bookmakers can be found to give long odds for this reason—they are not making the huge profits out of ignorant "punters," which now enable them to offer better terms to those who know.

If Mr. Madden cannot see that the bookmaking system enables owners to book pleasing wagers at the expense of the public—that the bookmaker is, in fact, the owner's agent to deceive and exploit the thousands of fools who think they can pick winners, he is very blind indeed. If the bookmaker is abolished by the totalisator there will be less money ignorantly thrown away, and undoubtedly when the betting owner thinks his horse can win the public will have a better chance of knowing it; but will Mr. Madden or anyone else deliberately maintain that this is against the interests of clean and honest sport? On the contrary, such sport can only be promoted by anything that enables the public to know what candidates in a race are really triers and fancied by their stables.

The curious argument of Mr. Madden casts serious doubt on his sincerity in asserting that the totalisator increases gambling among the general public, upon whose follies betting owners now rely for profit, and when Mr. Madden further urges that gambling is such a monstrous evil that we cannot afford to part with the bookmaker as an "awful example" of it, one is inclined

to shrug one's shoulders and look elsewhere for opposition to the totalisator on the grounds of true sport and morality.

Among racing men Victorian opponents of the machine on racing grounds are not easy to find. We have endeavored to deal with the arguments of the moralists who would maintain the worst features of gambling, rather than abolish them to the risk of weakening their argument, and finally it is worth notice that South Australia and New Zealand, where the totalisator is at work, can show a much better record in freedom from immorality and crime than those States of Australia which are piously determined to preserve themselves from the totalisator's demoralising influence.

#### THE TOTALISATOR—CON.

Advocates of the totalisator are accustomed to make merry over the agreement between the ring and the Church in offering opposition to it. The Churches in this matter are representative of a very large class, including many who differ from the Churches in other matters, but agree with them that no law should be passed which gives sanction and encouragement to gambling, as they maintain a law permitting the use of the totalisator would do. The bookmakers oppose the totalisator for quite another reason. They have no objection whatever to the encouragement of gambling, but they have a very strong objection to the stream of profit from it being diverted from their own pockets into those of racing clubs or charities. Bookmakers gain nothing if the people spend two millions a year on betting, instead of one million, provided their profits on the money wagered are reduced to nothing, or even to anything less than half the percentage which they secure for themselves now. Thus this so-called unholy alliance between moralists and bookmakers is perfectly intelligible and justifiable. It involves no inconsistency whatever on the part of those who condemn gambling.

Betting is a habit which it is very likely impossible to suppress, but there is a great difference between tol-

eration by the law of something undesirable, and the deliberate provision of means for indulging in it under legal safeguards. And advocates of the totalisator propose to do even more than provide these means; they urge that a percentage of all money passing through the betting machine shall be devoted to purposes of charity, thus encouraging people to bet in defiance of uneasy scruples by giving them the excuse that their wagers help a deserving cause.

This is one manner in which the totalisator will minister to the gambling spirit. It will do so even more by relieving the inexperienced man or woman or child of all fear of being cheated, for the betting machine is at least absolutely fair. You put your shilling or sovereign on a horse, and the veriest tyro obtains the same odds, and is as sure of receiving his money in the case of a win as the oldest hand at betting in the country. If few others have backed the winner, the individuals who chose it receive a large dividend. They divide the money put upon the unsuccessful horses, less the percentage to the racing clubs and the charities. If many people have backed the winner there are necessarily smaller proceeds to be shared; but in either case the dividend is decided with mathematical precision. There is no difficulty whatever in betting upon the totalisator, and it has a fascination for many people who would never go near a bookmaker, since they are tempted, according to individual temperament, either to put their money on the most heavily backed horse, believing the judgment of the crowd is right and will give them some small return, or else to stake something on an outsider, knowing that good luck will bring them a sensational dividend.

For these reasons thousands of people on a racecourse—people who are shy, ignorant, reserved, without trust in their own judgment, and who would not therefore face the risks and the rough and tumble of the betting ring—flock round the enticing, silent, respectable machine in countries where the totalisator is legalised.

The machine, in addition, attracts those to race courses who otherwise would avoid them, because of the more or less objectionable incidents of the gambling to

which they are inclined, and still further it induces many others to bet without going near the race course.

It is true the law proposes to permit the use of the totalisator on race courses only, but this does not prevent gambling upon it, since in New Zealand, where this rule prevails, commissioners in the cities make it their business to collect money for investment upon any horses their clients may fancy, and they are honest because it pay them to be so. Thus it is possible to bet upon the totalisator without going to see the race, while once the taste for using the machine is acquired there is practical impossibility in preventing totalisators being illicitly run in all corners of the towns. Experience everywhere shows that the number of gamblers is increased by the totalisator, even though the total amount wagered on horses be no greater, and in England, where it was at one time permitted, such a mania for small betting was promoted that the law soon stepped in and forbade its use. In France, the home of the totalisator, which is there called the "Pari Mutuel," the poorest people save their sous in order to take a franc ticket in it, and numbers of them are thoroughly demoralised by the gambling spirit.

Those who condemn this betting machine are often taunted with making no effort to suppress betting with bookmakers and other forms of gambling. To this, most opponents of the totalisator can reply that they constantly take such opportunities as are open to them for the discouragement of gambling, while there are others who very logically declare that they are not prepared to interfere with the gambling pursuits of grown men under existing conditions, but that they strongly object to any legal recognition of gambling, especially in a form which will make it a popular pursuit with women and children, and will moreover dry up the springs of private benevolence and degrade charitable causes by applying ill-gotten money to their support.

To all these reasons, which can be conscientiously urged by one who likes to put something on a horse himself, racing men add other very strong objections to the

use of the totalisator. It tends, they say, to encourage horseracing of a bad class, and to deter owners from undergoing the expense of breeding and running animals of a type that is useful to the country. As to the first point, the racing clubs, no longer licensing bookmakers, but deriving a large part of their incomes from a percentage on "tote" investments, are tempted to compile programmes of handicap races in which the result is as uncertain as possible. By means of heavy handicaps and short flutters they succeed in inducing numerous entries, and in giving a good chance of winning to the most miserable weed which can gallop a few furlongs. Every horse in the race has a chance, therefore betting is very brisk; the club gets large receipts out of the totalisator, but the owner of an animal which is a real racehorse of speed and staying power is not encouraged to run him, and when such animals are superfluous for racing purposes they will cease to be bred. A large proportion of weight-for-age events, which alone can test the relative merits of racers and give his due reward to the successful breeder and trainer, is essential to the maintenance of a high standard of horseflesh through the sport of racing, and it is a remarkable fact pointed out by a Victorian authority, Mr. Madden, that in South Australia, where the totalisator flourishes, long distance weight-for-age races are far less in proportion to short handicaps than in Victoria, where the totalisator is forbidden.

The second effect of the machine in discouraging the breeding of first-class stock, is, according to Mr. Madden, the difficulty imposed on owners of backing their horses for large sums at reasonable odds. Stakes are so small, and the expenses of breeding and training so great, that owners must wager or cease to be worthily represented on the turf. If they invest any heavy sum upon the totalisator the public immediately knows it. There is a rush to back that horse, other participants in the race are comparatively unfavored, and the owner finds he is risking his own money for the privilege of getting it back again with some trumpery addition if he is fortunate enough to win. He is practically forced to put his own judgment of his horse's

chances at the disposal of the whole betting community, in order that they may rob him of its fruits. Under the Victorian system he can bet with a bookmaker in secret and get legitimate odds, and even though the totalisator failed to abolish bookmakers entirely, they would be unable to give anything like the same terms as they can give when a large business enables them to take big risks. It is this fact—that the horse-owner is prevented from making large, and what may be called comparatively legitimate wagers—which explains why the area of betting may be widely and disastrously extended by the totalisator, while its volume is not increased, and is even possibly diminished. Figures, even where obtainable, are utterly misleading on this subject, but there is no doubt that far more harm is done to the community when a thousand men and women bet one pound each than when a single individual bets two thousand pounds.

It is, however, only in the case of most rigid restrictions on the use of the totalisator that betting can be reduced in amount apart from area, for, if the machine were licensed on all the racecourses of Victoria, the sums passing through it would be immense. There are dozens and scores of small race meetings throughout the State to which numbers of men go, ready and willing to bet, and who yet refrain because there are no bookmakers present who will give them sufficiently tempting odds, or who can even be trusted to pay up when they lose. Reputable bookmakers will not risk doing business on a liberal scale at little gatherings where they know nothing about the respective performances of the local horses engaged. The local men, however, have strong opinions and fancies—only give them the totalisator, by means of which they can bet with one another, and ten pounds will change hands for every one pound that changes hands to-day. It is true that advocates of the totalisator declare they would not allow its operation under such conditions, but this is merely the expression of a pious wish—and is founded on no particular canon of justice. This is a democratic country, and a sporting, gambling country, where, if once the totalisator is admitted to give an edge to the gambling

appetite, no monopoly in its employment is likely to be long tolerated.

Thus, from every point of view, quite apart from that of the bookmakers, which is obvious and demands no consideration, there is a very strong case against the admission of the totalisator to Victoria. The rigid anti-betting man condemns it because it gives facilities for betting and puts upon it a gloss of respectability; the moralist repudiates the degrading help which it promises to charity; the racing man fears its evil effects upon racehorses and racing, and sees injustice to owners in the difficulty it creates of making a fair wager; the average citizen leaves men to go their own way, but dislikes an instrument which tempts young people to gamble, and he is not prepared to give a monopoly in the use of this instrument to wealthy clubs, in order to prevent evils which even its champions admit would follow upon its unfettered operation.



### THE TRANS-AUSTRALIAN RAILWAY.—PRO.

Even if it were provable, or reasonably certain, that construction of the Trans-Continental Railway would involve the Commonwealth in an annual loss for twenty-five years to come, there would still rest upon Australia a national obligation to lose no time in beginning the work. In the first place a refusal to build it would be little short of a breach of faith with Western Australia, who entered the Commonwealth in the firm belief that she was to receive this boon, and to whom, without it, Federation is a mere meaningless word. In the second place, putting aside all pledges, express or implied, which have been given to the Western State, Federation demands unbroken communication between all the States to make it a reality—a reality which is worth some national sacrifice. In the third place an effective scheme of defence urgently demands the railway, as otherwise, with hostile cruisers off our coasts, it would be impossible to reinforce garrisons in Western Australia, or to draw men and money thence, if they were wanted in the Eastern provinces.

All these arguments would have great weight if the line were to be a financial burden; but that it will be so for any length of time is utterly unlikely. It is true that along the route for 1100 miles from Kalgoorlie to Port Augusta little water can be found, but it gives a wrong impression to speak of the land as desert. There are huge plains covered with salt bush, which thrives on the small rainfall of nine inches per year, and which gives excellent feed for sheep and cattle. Once let the land be pierced by a railway, and in this great tract hundreds of thousands of acres now idle will be used for depasturing stock; the rock holes that now contain scanty water supplies will be developed and dams will be built for the needs of flocks and herds. Further, it is more than likely that considerable cities will spring up in regions where the foot of man has scarcely trod, for geologists believe it certain that metals and minerals abound in these regions, and common sense tells us it is entirely improbable that Kalgoorlie and Coolgardie have no counterparts in South-Central Australia. It may not be that the surveyed route will cut through enormously rich goldfields, but it must be remembered that within fifty miles either side of it, over a hundred thousand square miles now practically inaccessible will be brought within easy prospecting distance, and in this hundred thousand square miles it will be passing strange if rich auriferous country be not found.

It is easy to assert that the experts who have carefully estimated the cost of the line, which they put at £5,100,000, are wrong, and that they are wrong also in estimating a profit, after ten years, of £23,000 per annum above traffic and working expenses; but it is absurd to question their opinion without adequate reasons. It is true that provision of water is the one great difficulty in constructing the railway, but the experts have taken this difficulty into account in investigating the cost. They have also fully regarded the fact that there will be steamer competition in estimating passenger and traffic receipts upon the line when completed. These are not matters discovered by ignorant opponents of the railway, as such opponents seem to imagine; and

on the other hand, those responsible for the estimates have not attempted to put into figures the value of the traffic which they know, and everyone else knows, must come into existence with new discoveries and settlement along the route. The £23,000 per annum is not likely to be the exact profit realised; but there is every reason to believe there will be some profit, and to hope it will be very much more than £23,000.

The railway at first will derive its chief receipts from carriage of passengers, mails, and light and perishable goods. Of the last named such wealthy communities as those of the West Australian gold cities will obtain quantities from the East. Cost of carriage is little to them when time can be saved and wants satisfied; cost will scarcely weigh with the mining man whose time is money when the trans-continental line will take him to Sydney or Melbourne in a third of the time occupied by railing to Fremantle and making the tedious sea journey thence. Between the goldfields and the East there will be an immediately large and constantly increasing passenger traffic. Many passengers will also leave the mailboats and hasten overland to their destinations. That comparatively few take rail from Adelaide proves nothing, for they obtain no reduction on their fares by so doing, and the saving of time is small.

It is nonsense to talk of the discomforts of the overland journey. The line contemplated is a first-class one, securely laid with rails weighing eighty pounds to the yard, and on it the passenger will doubtless enjoy the comforts of library cars, drawing-room cars, and dining cars, not found elsewhere in Australia. To travel by the trans-continental line, far from being an experience shunned by the traveller, will be one desired by nine people out of ten who wish to get a glimpse of the country. In complaining that construction of this line will injure Eastern ports by driving shipping from them, and possibly preventing some of the great liners from sailing our coasts at all, opponents of the enterprise flagrantly contradict their other argument that the passenger traffic will be but small. If the mailboats stop at Fremantle the railway must carry forward all their

passengers; if they go on but skip Adelaide, still a number of South Australian passengers will travel overland from Fremantle to the advantage of the line. It is not likely that the mail steamers will resign their share of Australian coast traffic, unless it be forbidden to them by the new Navigation Bill; but any arguments founded on surmises of this kind are utterly provincial. It would be contemptible to oppose the linking together of Eastern and Western States because certain cities enjoy certain commercial advantages at the expense of all the Commonwealth through the isolation of one of our federated peoples.

To the preservation of these advantages Australia is further asked to sacrifice an essential of national defence. When the line is built troops can be concentrated at any one of the great cities, whereas now Western Australia might be as completely cut off from Eastern Australia as if it were in the moon. The statements that an enemy might seize the railway or destroy its water supply are extremely fanciful. To do so he would first have to land in such force as to capture Kalgoorlie, over three hundred miles inland, and to do all this within two or three days, which, even if he carried out the impossible feat of landing ten thousand men as a complete surprise, would still be quite impossible. There is not the slightest chance of a foreign enemy, no matter in what force he might land in Western Australia, preventing the Commonwealth from pouring in Eastern troops to oppose him, when once the Trans-Australian line is completed. While it remains unbuilt a few raiding cruisers, with a handful of troops on board, might work tremendous damage in Western Australia almost unchecked.

The suggestion that the Commonwealth should spend some of the money that would go to build the line in maintaining a West Australian force equal to all emergencies, is a suggestion to divert money from productive to unproductive channels for an end which would not be accomplished. Not only would Western Australia be injured by isolation, but its forces would not be available in any other part of the Commonwealth which might be attacked. In the cause of

national defence, in order to make the Commonwealth a reality, in order to keep faith with one of its members, and because, as experts and common sense tell us, within a very short period it will pay as a commercial undertaking, we believe in early construction of the Trans-Australian Railway.

### THE TRANS-AUSTRALIAN RAILWAY.—CON.

Australia has no money at present to fling away upon a "Desert Railway," and that the proposed trans-continental line deserves this name can scarcely be denied, seeing that along 1100 miles of new line which must be built to connect Kalgoorlie in Western Australia with Port Augusta in South Australia, all the country is uninhabited, most of it waterless, utterly barren and uninhabitable. Even friendly estimates of cost, which are certain to be exceeded, put the outlay down at £5,100,000, including interest payable on money borrowed before completion of the line. Optimistic estimates of revenue are £206,000 a year for the first ten years, with a loss, after paying working expenses, of nearly £87,000 annually. After ten years, it is true, these estimates promise a profit of £23,000 a year, but experience of railways in even accessible fertile country teaches us that the expenditure is almost always greater and that receipts are less than calculated.

In this case it is almost sure to be so, since a great proportion of the revenue is expected from passenger traffic, which, it is assumed, will choose the land route in preference to that by sea.

This expectation, however, will probably be disappointed. The sea service, both by ocean and coasting boats, is continuous by improving. As soon as there is competition from the railway, fares will be much reduced, and the attractions of land travel, with slight extra speed and freedom from sea-sickness, will be largely counterbalanced by the dreary monotony and fatigue of desert travel at a very much higher cost. Even as it is, a very small proportion of passengers from England leave the mailboats at Adelaide to proceed by rail to Melbourne, though considerable time can be saved by doing so, and the discomforts of the journey

do not approach those which must be suffered in the heat and dust of the Australian wilderness.

As for goods traffic, it must always be extremely limited. That agricultural produce should ever come from the country to be "developed" is impossible. New mines may be discovered, and there will be a limited traffic to and from them, but their supplies will be chiefly obtained either from Fremantle or from the Port of Esperance in Western Australia, which is certain, before long, to be linked by railway with the West Australian goldfields. That mining machinery or food supplies will ever be transported in paying quantity from Port Augusta for 1100 miles, or half that distance, to existing or future fields is utterly unlikely.

Five million pounds is a fairly large price to pay for a railway through a thousand miles of useless country; but it is very doubtful, in spite of the opinions of experts, whether it can be built for five millions. The difficulties of water supply for the men and animals engaged in making the line, and for the locomotives traversing it, are so enormous that it has been seriously proposed, as the cheapest expedient, to carry water from some unfailing source by pipes at the cost of £1500 per mile. Another proposal is to obtain water by sinking, but trial borings which have been put down to the depth of 900 feet give nothing but water either intensely salt or otherwise unfit for drinking. There only remain the plans of storing water in catchment basins, which engineers say is not possible, since the soil is intensely porous and the rainfall only nine inches per annum; or of obtaining salt water by expensive boring and pumping, and condensing it with expensive machinery. Water condensed under the most favorable and cheapest conditions at Coolgardie cost nearly £1 10s. per thousand gallons. Along the route of the proposed line the cost would be very much more.

For these reasons it seems the line must involve a very heavy annual loss, if, indeed, it can be built at all; but we are sometimes asked to suffer this gladly because it will provide transport for troops in case of need, and because it will make Federation a reality by bringing Western Australia into closer touch with the

eastern States. These are certainly desirable objects, but the price may, nevertheless, be too high, and there is danger of greatly over-valuing the railway as a means of rapid troop transport. An object lesson is afforded by the Trans-Siberian line, which fell miserably short of expectations in Russia's time of need, though there were large towns at intervals all along the route, which for the most part traverses settled and fertile country where there is no such thing as lack of water for the troops and locomotives. It would be cheaper, and, from a military point of view, far more efficacious, to increase our forces and maintain an adequate number of them in Western Australia, than to spend five millions on this line, and trust to rushing troops across it to a threatened point in time of emergency. If an enemy were to seize the line for even a small portion of the route, to destroy the water-pipes, or blow up the condensers, and rip up a section of the line, they could put between them and Eastern Australia a stretch of waterless desert which would absolutely cripple the railway for troop-carrying purposes, and cut off Western Australia from her sister States as effectually as if the railway had never existed.

For promoting peaceful intercourse between East and West, the railway would be, doubtless, a useful though costly instrument; but why should the East bear most of the burden when the West reaps nearly all the benefit? We should, it is true, get our mails a little quicker, but if we choose to spend money on subsidising fast mail steamers we can shorten the time of transport even more than by this railway. To Fremantle it would be, of course, a great boon. Mails would be landed there. If the Commonwealth could be persuaded to carry passengers at a heavy loss—as Western Australia would use all its endeavors to persuade it, and otherwise they might not be carried at all—it is quite possible that the mail steamers and great passenger lines might make Fremantle their terminus, no longer touching at the ports of Eastern Australia. The resulting loss to Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney would be a poor return for a burden on their respective States, and in any case, while South Australia must pay for portion of the line if built, Adelaide is almost certain to

be passed unvisited by the mailboats, for the accommodation of which she has spent so much on harbor works.

It is, in fact, for Western Australia, as regards the other States, a case of "Heads I win; tails you lose." However little the traffic and great the loss upon the line, she must gain by its construction, which will develop her ports and prospect territory perhaps rich in gold. The other States will probably have to meet portion of a heavy annual loss; and in any case must see trade and shipping taken from their ports to benefit Fremantle. From the Australian point of view, generally, there are very great objections to borrowing £5,000,000 for such an enterprise. The individual States have hampered themselves with enormous debts, of which too great a proportion has been spent on unproductive works. There is now a healthy reaction against borrowing, and though it be too much to hope that the Commonwealth will not create for itself a national debt, every endeavor should be made to prevent this huge plunge upon the money market which, on the showing even of its advocates, will involve an interest charge above the interest earned for many years to come.

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### A WHITE AUSTRALIA.—PRO.

It is a noticeable fact that none are so loud-voiced in claiming right of entry to Australia for colored peoples—always on the ground of humanity and Christian brotherhood—as the wealthier classes, who will be free from personal contact with colored people, and who hope to exploit the low-waged labor of aliens to their own profit. But this is not their only hope. They know that the presence of a servile population and the opportunity of recruiting from it give them a strong weapon for reducing the wages of white laborers by threat of colored competition. Thus, the well-to-do sneer at the workman's dread of race contamination from which they do not suffer themselves, and denounce his unbrotherly dislike of cheap labor from which they reap a direct profit.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the policy of a White Australia has many enemies. Undoubtedly there is something wrong in exclusion — something not in accord with ideal justice. But there is something wrong with the state of society, and, therefore, the admission of a colored population, which must lower the economic standard of the Australian worker, thus reducing his power to attain a better standard, and which will at the same time inflict upon the community the evils of race mixture, and of the presence of a lower alien code of manners and morals, must be fought against for the present with unsparing vigor.

The fact that Australia contains wide tropical areas which capitalists have set their hearts upon exploiting with colored labor, makes total exclusion a practical necessity, unless we are to repeat the disastrous experience of America, where the presence of whites and negroes side by side inflames the worst passions of both races, degrades the European and subjects the black to tyranny. There is nothing between total exclusion or something practically amounting to it, and the over-running of Northern Australia with a mixed colored horde, exploited by capitalists and overseers white and yellow, forming a plague spot from which the poison will creep gradually southwards. A White Australia is necessary to Australian preservation.

In the case of the Kanakas, who worked in Queensland cane fields and died at the rate of 38 per thousand, while the Australian white adult death rate was barely ten per thousand, there was gross inhumanity to the islanders as well as injustice and evil to the white workers who were forced into contact with them. The Kanakas were, perhaps, the chief sufferers, while the Australian capitalist found their presence an undiluted gain. From the Chinese and Japanese invasion, against which we are now forced to protect ourselves, very different results would flow. The Australian workman would suffer as before; the colored workman would be sweated as before; but the Australian capitalist would by no means have the monopoly of sweating for Chinese and Japanese capitalists, merchants

and shop-keepers are quite as good at that game as many of our most accomplished exploiters, and if the Australian employers who cast greedy eyes on cheap Asiatic labor were successful in throwing down the barriers they would find the ground largely cut from under their feet. Unless we maintain the White Australia policy Northern Australia will become a polyglot province of Asia, from which all European civilisation must ultimately disappear. That this is no exaggeration may be learned from the travellers who know that Port Darwin and Thursday Island are virtually Asiatic towns.

On ethical and national grounds, putting all cant aside, there is no doubt that the White Australia policy is justified. The question remains "Are we strong enough to maintain it?" Croakers answer this question emphatically in the negative, but the wish is almost always father to the thought. It is true that England does not like us excluding Indians from Australia, though she would deeply resent their intrusion in appreciable numbers into England, and it is further true that our exclusion of the Japanese must be embarrassing to a power in alliance with Japan, but while we remain a self-governing portion of the British Empire England cannot coerce us, since we are self-governing, and cannot desert us, since we are portion of the Empire. If England supports Australia there is not the slightest chance of Japan endeavouring to force her people upon us, and it is almost impossible to conceive that England will prefer the good will of a yellow ally to that of a white community of her own flesh and blood. There is no kind of desire to be unfriendly or insulting to the Japanese, but the fact is that their choice of Australia as an outlet for surplus population would prevent our national development on the lines we desire, and bring about economic conditions against which the Australian democracy is carrying on a strenuous fight. Some day, when our political and social progress has reached a stage at which every man has equal access to the opportunities for making wealth, and wages are no longer fixed by the competition of workers for the favor of employment, the

admission of races satisfied with a low rate of wages will not be so economically harmful to the race which demands high wages. By that time, also, the difference between Eastern and Western civilisation may have dwindled so much, that Japanese and Australians can intermingle without harm to either. For the present, however, national, social, and economic considerations force us politely, but firmly, to refuse admittance to Asiatics. Should it ever come to a fight with Japan for maintenance of our right to direct the course of our development—which can only be if England desert us—there is little doubt that Australia will know how to resist aggression, in doing which she would have the sympathy of the great American Republic and the British self-governing communities throughout the world. But there is little need to consider such a contingency, provided that Australia acts with tact courtesy and reason in her relations with the one Asiatic power which can involve us in trouble. If Japan feels constrained to exclude Australians from her territory, as a protest against our policy, we should submit to such protest with good grace, not asking other portions of the Empire to make our business theirs. A White Australia is worth sacrifices if we are compelled to make them—the possible sacrifice of our freedom to enter Japan, and even the most improbable sacrifice of war. As for the sordid view that the community should hasten to exploit the resources of tropical Australia with cheap colored labor in order to employ a few overseers, and enrich a few land owners, it is scarcely worth consideration. It is probably untrue that even under present conditions the cane fields of Queensland cannot be profitably worked by a self-respecting white population. If it be true for the present in some exceptional districts, it is far better for the country and civilisation generally that those exceptional districts should remain forest and jungle until invention comes to the aid of man with machinery for subduing them, than that Northern Queensland should become a community of mixed blood and mean whites, where yellow and half-caste labor is sweated to enrich the capitalists of Australia, China and Japan.

## A WHITE AUSTRALIA.—CON.

The proposal to exclude all black races from Australia is as impracticable as it is unjust; it is condemned alike by commonsense and Christian charity. Even the most bigoted white Australians do not go so far as to advocate deportation or destruction of the sixty thousand aborigines from whose ancestors we forcibly took the country, and, therefore, unless they believe that we shall kill the blacks in time with civilisation, they cannot look forward to the complete realisation of their ideal. Neither do they propose to deport the Asiatics and Africans who now inhabit the Commonwealth, so that the cry for a White Australia means no more than a demand that colored people shall in future be debarred from landing on our shores. What right have they to demand any such thing? This is a huge country, and a new country, in which the present handful of inhabitants have no greater claim than that of usurpation; they have no ancient title; to most of the continent they have not even the claim of present use; and it is a well-established fact that many of the tropical regions of it never can be used and worked by Europeans. Only the Asiatic, Polynesian or African laborer can stand the burning sun and the moist atmosphere of Northern Australia. To insist on white labor here means that great resources will remain undeveloped, and that white men, who might be employed in directing the labor of colored men, and who would derive subsidiary employment in handling tropical products in the temperate portions of the Commonwealth, must remain for ever unemployed. An attempt may be made to cut sugar cane and grow cotton by means of white labor, but it is bound to fail, unless there be evolved an undesirable race of white Australians who will be content with the low wages which alone can be given to men attempting labor for which they are constitutionally unfitted. Nature has decreed that the dark skinned man shall prevail throughout the tropical world, and four millions of Australians are simply flying in the face of nature when they decree that all this continent shall be reserved for the white races.

They are further flying in the face of the civilised world, giving particular offence to two of its greatest nations—the United Kingdom and Japan. The former country spends millions of pounds annually in securing naval defence to its great dependency and is, naturally displeased at the narrow spirit of provincialism which excludes from a portion of the British empire the natives of India, who, as British subjects, look to the mother country to secure them rights of entry to British dominions whose climate and conditions are congenial to them. England has so far made no attempt to coerce Australia, but her patience may be soon exhausted, and she may well be driven into telling us that if we persist in our policy of exclusion we must trust to our own resources and resign all claims upon the navy for help in our quarrels.

If this became England's attitude how should we answer a demand from Japan for treatment on the same footing as the white nations of the world? Japan is proving herself in war and civilisation the equal, and more than the equal, of one of the greatest European powers. She will undoubtedly suffer from "swelled head" at the conclusion of the war, and will be in no temper to suffer the indignity of exclusion from Australia. We cannot hope to resist Japan without England's help. England looks already with no friendly eye upon our exclusive policy, and the difficulty is aggravated by England's being the ally of Japan. If Japan insists upon admission to Australia it is inconceivable that England will go to war in defence of what she already considers our mistaken dog-in-the-manger policy. Therefore, if we are wise we will give in while we can do so with grace, and not under the threats of a Japanese fleet.

There is no need for us to permit the flooding of Northern Australia by Japanese coolies. To reasonable restrictions the great new nation would make no objection provided we withdrew our insistence upon the insulting color line, which is but thinly disguised under the pretence of an education test. A real education test might still be maintained without offence to the

amour propre of India or Japan, and without starving Northern Australia of the only labor which is competent to develop it under European direction with the help of European capital.

To this the sentimentalist objects that the least admixture of Asiatic races lowers the standard of civilisation, and the Labor Party objects that the admission of Asiatics lowers the standard of wages. To the first we reply that their argument is largely pharisaical, and that under proper conditions we can raise our Asiatic colonists in the scale of civilisation. In some respects their ways will never be our ways, but Asiatic manners and customs will prevail only in those parts of Australia which would be otherwise uninhabited. To the Labor Party we reply that white men cannot compete in the occupations which colored men will follow in Tropical Australia, and that, therefore, no standard of wages exists to be lowered. On the other hand, numerous overseers and skilled workers will find well-paid occupations which are now denied to them. As for the few Japanese and Indians who may find their way into the Southern States where they will follow the occupations of white laborers, they can be subjected to precisely the same Factory or Arbitration laws as are deemed necessary and effective, to prevent wages today from sinking to starvation level.

A departure from the rigid White Australia policy does not mean unrestricted immigration of Asiatic undesirables, but merely a due regard for the rights and feelings of other peoples, quite compatible with all due preservation of our own. In an ideal world men from any portion of the earth will be free to visit and settle in whatsoever other portions of the earth they may choose. In this world conditions are not yet ideal, and we, therefore, would not throw down all the barriers, but we maintain that liberalism requires their modification, and that the voice of liberalism is reinforced by that of prudence, warning us of disaster from armed Japanese invasion if we continue to insult peaceful Japanese by turning them indiscriminately from our shores.

## WOMEN'S FRANCHISE.—PRO .

The opposition to Women's Franchise, though occasionally a sane and serious base be sought for it, is for the most part the result of stupid Conservative belief that woman is a creature essentially inferior to man, and of the desire to keep her at all costs in an essentially inferior position. The one argument going to the root of the matter and graced with at least a specious appearance of justice and common sense, is that which affirms the constitution and existence of all societies to rest in the last resort upon physical force. Physical demands upon the strength of the community, it is argued, are made and regulated by its administration and laws, and since women cannot supply the strength which is needed, they should have no share in saying how it shall be employed.

This reasoning would doubtless have some force if only the police, the soldiers, and the physically strong men generally were given the privilege of voting; but when we see decrepit old men, and men who, though not decrepit, have never done and will never do a hand's turn for the community, taking an active part in law-making—perhaps in plunging the country into war—we ask by what right which does not equally pertain to women they are allowed to do these things. It may be answered that men as a sex do the fighting, and that, therefore, men as a sex should do the law-making; but for two reasons the answer is unsatisfactory. In the first place there is nothing scientific or just in making sex the line of demarcation between the strong and the feeble, the fighter and the non-fighter, when it does not correspond with the actual facts of life. In the struggle against disease, hospital nurses bear as noble and physically a more arduous part than the doctors. In war time army nurses play as heroic and necessary a role as that of any soldier in the field. They are defenders of the country just as much as the military, and are just as much entitled to a vote. But the hollowness of this objection to women voting is shown by the fact that in almost all civilised countries the class specially deprived of any right in ruling the country through their voices are the soldiers, who may be

called upon to defend it with their lives! Thus the argument that obligation to defend the community gives a moral right to assist in directing its affairs breaks down when brought to the test of facts. A second reason for rejecting the claim under discussion is that it deals with only one side of the question of force. Men may be called upon more than women to put forth their strength in any struggle, but women are called upon, even more than men, to undergo the suffering that a struggle involves, and therefore they should surely be entitled equally with men to a voice in public affairs, when such momentous matters as peace and war hang in the balance. At other times the legislation of the country is seldom directly concerned with alternatives calling for a greater or less demand upon the physical force of its inhabitants. There may have been a time when only those who could fight had claim to a part in law-making, and certainly no other claim was allowed by the rude kings and barons of olden days, who disfranchised women and the great masses of men with fine impartiality, but under the rule of comparative peace and higher civilisation another and a truer touchstone is required to test the worth in justice of any claim to the franchise.

Unless it is just for women to vote they should not vote, whatever expediency may seem to counsel; if it is just no seeming expediency should debar them from doing so. We affirm that it is just, resting our contention for women's suffrage, and for universal suffrage, on the ground that since every person has to obey the country's laws, every person, male or female, should have a voice in the making of those laws. This seems to us but simple justice, and the rule is liable to no exceptions beyond those which limit the voting power to adults free from taint of crime and other obvious disqualifications.

Confident that every man's reason must assent to the inherent justice of this proposition, let us now consider some of the practical objections urged against doing justice to our womankind. First of all we are told that the woman's franchise has had disastrous effects in the Commonwealth, and those States where it has been

granted. We absolutely dispute the evidence for any such statement, and say, further, that even if women did make political blunders in the early days of their enfranchisement this would not prove their incapacity, but only inexperience which men have forced upon them and for which time is the remedy. Mistakes will be made under universal suffrage, as they have been made under manhood suffrage, but, nevertheless, it is worth notice that Parliaments elected on a wider basis have always found much of their time occupied in undoing the folly and injustice of Parliaments elected under the old regime, which confined the franchise to a narrow privileged class. This, in fact, is the work of reform.

A great point made by anti-suffragists is that women, by which they mean the majority of women, do not desire the right to vote. First of all this is not proved; no referendum of women has been taken on the question, and suffragists believe that most women in Victoria do desire the franchise. But whether this be so or not they maintain that those who want it have a right to it. There is no compulsion put upon the others to exercise an undesired privilege. If it be said that they feel bound to go to the poll if the more intelligent and ambitious are permitted to do so, it only shows that even the non-suffragists are not totally devoid of ideas, which it may be hoped will be developed and enlarged by taking a share in the affairs of their country.

In many ways opponents of the suffrage are driven into a contradictory position, for almost in the same breath they assert that women are constitutionally and mentally unfit to exercise any power in politics, and point, with apparent pleasure, to the admittedly great influence wielded by the late Queen and many other women who have no official position, in the political life of England. If justice does not permit their exercising political power because they cannot be soldiers, it would seem that, logically, they should be restrained as far as possible from exerting influence, and should not merely be disqualified from casting a vote. And, in fact, to do them justice, there was logic to this extent in the old frank conservatives, who would hound

a woman off the platform, and refuse her a voice in the press—a logic wanting in the heirs of their superstition, which has dwindled away to an anæmic apologetic denial of access to the ballot box.

The remainder of the arguments against giving a vote to women consist of trivial or far-fetched objections which it is impossible to reply to in detail. Stress is laid upon the fact that prostitutes go to the poll, and that their votes are bought by bribes or threats. This may be true, and it is regrettable, but how many men, with less excuse than prostitutes, sell their votes for a glass of beer? No one denies that a wide franchise for men and women has its drawbacks; the liberal merely claims that the widest franchise has advantages which far out-weigh them. One of the most popular objections to women's franchise is the old bogey of domestic quarrel over the merits of rival candidates. Like all bogies, it is difficult to attack, because it is not real, and it is somewhat remarkable that the very same people who shudder at it also attack women's franchise, because it will give such undue political weight to the family man. For the purposes of this argument it is assumed that no domestic difficulties will arise, but that wife and daughters will obediently follow pater-familias to the poll, and vote his ticket when they get there. Sometimes they will do so; in other cases there will be discussion, and thereby the political knowledge of the whole family will be increased, but where the vote has been given the predicted family strife has failed to appear.

Women, it is said, will be wanting in political intelligence, because they are not in touch with real life. As a matter of fact they meet it on the average at quite as many points as men. They keep the purse and do the marketing in most of the poorer families; thousands of them unfortunately have to earn their own living; women are, on the whole, more practical and prudent in money matters than are men, and will not be deceived, for instance, by nonsense about duties failing to raise prices. No taxation, without representation is an old principle of British justice, and one very much lauded by anti-suffragists, who apparently

fail to see that in denying a vote to women taxpayers they are making their favorite principle a dead letter.

It is not only in the conduct of public affairs that the benefits of women's suffrage will soon make themselves manifest. Man will find woman a broader-minded, more intelligent and more helpful friend when she is no longer ignorant of half the important affairs of life, and woman always, in the mass, will be ignorant of public matters until she has some control over them, for it is not in human nature to seek knowledge and maintain interest when they must be accompanied by powerlessness. Woman, like man, is a political, striving, scheming, constructive animal, and where she is debarred from politics she wastes her energies in the Church, as the organiser of bazaars, of guilds, and in other more or less useless trifling under the smiling patronage of the parson or the curate. It is not the least of its virtues that women's suffrage will greatly reduce the influence of the clergy in Australia, for once woman feels that she can play a part among real men in the real world, her interest in the parson's world will fade away. Such a conclusion is justified by the analogy of France, and Italy, where the priests wielded enormous influence until Frenchmen and Italians gained political liberty, after which clerical power began to wane, and is waning still.

There is no need to further detail the benefits which woman's franchise must eventually effect. It is just, and justice will eventually rule, even where its coming is delayed, and though no startling changes in political action have followed, or will follow, upon its adoption, there must inevitably arise from it a gradual, but steady, improvement in the knowledge and intelligence of men and women, which will react upon the public life of the community.

#### WOMEN'S FRANCHISE.—CON.

As far as the Commonwealth and most of the Australian States are concerned, it is useless to argue against Women's Franchise, since it is an accomplished fact, and all experience goes to show that however mis-

chievous any step may be, the democratic superstition is sufficient to prevent its ever being retraced. But in the State of Victoria women are still forbidden, in their own interests and in those of the country, to meddle with political affairs, and it is therefore still worth while to set out the many reasons which exist for keeping them in their proper sphere.

Our opponents point with triumph to New Zealand, South Australia, New South Wales, Western Australia and the Commonwealth, asking how long we are going to neglect their liberal example. In reply we say, "Point to one single benefit traceable in those States or communities to the bestowal of votes upon women? Is their legislation any better? Are their politics any purer? Is there a higher level of intelligence prevailing there than in Victoria?" The answer must be "No." While on the other hand the socialistic legislation of the Commonwealth and New Zealand is largely the result of women going to the poll. The wives and sisters of the working classes, the most uneducated of an uneducated sex, vote solidly with the Labor organisations, and help to increase the political weight of an already over-represented section of the community. Further than this, in New Zealand such fads as total prohibition of the drink traffic and proposals for quite unreasonable severity towards moral offenders practically owe their existence to feminine political hysteria. The woman's vote under existing conditions is bound to bring upon us the evils of Socialism, and of mischievous endeavors to make men moral by Act of Parliament.

So much for the proved effects of Women's Franchise. There are, doubtless, other mischievous results on the body politic not yet apparent, which we shall recognise in time, while in addition there are the other and perhaps even more serious evils entailed upon men and women in their domestic and social relations. Opponents of the franchise may go so far as to grant that there are certain, perhaps many, exceptional women upon whom the conferring of a vote would work no evil either to themselves, to their relatives, or to the community—intelligent women not occupied with household cares, and with time, energy and thought to devote to public questions. Having gone this far, they

may be triumphantly asked by the other side, "Then why not grant the franchise to all women or large classes of them since you admit that many women are capable of exercising a useful vote without harm to anybody?" The answer is that the admitted facts give no sufficient reason for this course. The franchise must be given to classes, not to individuals, since there is no rational and trustworthy method of picking out the suitable from the unsuitable. Among the mass of the male electors there are thousands, besides those debarred by crime or lunacy, who are unfit to exercise the privilege of voting, and yet the evil of attempting to discover and disfranchise these individuals would be greater than the evil of permitting them to take part in the ruling of the country.

The fact is that the majority of men are fitted to exercise a vote, and the majority of women are unfitted to do so, therefore the rational and practicable procedure is to give the franchise to one sex and deny it to the other, taking no account in either case of the regrettable exceptions to the justice of this plan. In neither case, however, is the injustice or the evil so great as at first blush it might seem. The useless men, the ne'er-dowells, the "wasters," and hopelessly ignorant are not a force in politics, in spite of their possessing the franchise, since, for glasses of beer and various reasons, they give their votes on opposite sides and thus nullify their influence. The intelligent woman, on the other hand, though not possessed of a vote, is a force in politics. She has influence with members and electors, an influence in many cases very much greater than that of a man of equal knowledge and attainments, for to these she adds the quality of feminine charm. Therefore it is no more reasonable to say that intelligent womanhood has no voice in framing the laws than it would be to say that these laws are made by enfranchised loafers and drunkards. In England, where Woman's Franchise is not seriously asked for, women are a far more potent influence in politics than in Australia, and the late Queen, as an exceptional woman, had the tremendous influence that exceptional ability and character deserve. Birth gave her exalted station, but intellect,

industry, and a sense of duty account for the splendid use she made of it.

Having thus justified the apparent anomaly of denying the franchise to some women, who we admit are in every way more fitted to poll their votes than many men whom we would not deprive of the privilege, it remains to point out why women, as a class, should not be allowed to vote.

The main reason from which all the others may be deduced is the different physical structure and the different physical functions of men and women. Woman is the weaker animal; her natural duty is to produce the race and care for it in infancy. Man is the stronger animal; his natural duty is to work for the race and to guard it from starvation and aggression. It is true that the motherhood of women implies the fatherhood of men; but the fatherhood of man is an incident; the motherhood of woman is, or ought to be, a career.

From these fundamental differences in the functions of male and female arises naturally and logically the conviction that men as a class, and not women as a class, should have the making of a community's laws and direct its communal life. The very existence of any State or community rests in the last resort upon the exercise of force—force to withstand the power of beasts or the elements, the resistance of domestic offenders to law, and the attacks of foreign aggressors upon the nation's rights or independence. The essentials of a community's existence are the hunter, the ploughman, the sailor, the fireman, the policeman, and the soldier. What they shall do and what they shall undergo are matters intimately dependent on the direction given to the life of the community, and it is surely reasonable that only the class which works and suffers in the struggle with human or other forces should regulate the community's affairs, seeing that on their regulation depends the less or greater need for exercise of fighting energies.

The common sense of this rule is recognised even among the lower animals. In a herd of buffalo on the American prairies the bulls were the sentinels and the protectors, and so also were they law-givers to the rest.

If a pack of wolves swooped down on them they gave the signal for flight, and where flight for all was impossible, they fought the foe with all their strength, leaving the females and young to flee. But the bulls which did the fighting also chose the pasturage, and would not suffer headstrong young cows to lead the herd into unnecessary danger of which they were less fitted to bear the brunt. Not to multiply instances, we may point to a parallel case where, for instance, the sentiment of women voters leads a nation into a war, and men are sent to do the fighting. Individual women have before now shown sufficient aptitude for provoking strife to warn us against giving them legislative power in that direction. Again, can it be doubted that the proved effect of Women's Franchise is to multiply legal offences and thus force more men into the ranks of the police? All privileges should carry with them duties; the privilege of directing the community and making the laws involves the natural duty of protecting the community and safeguarding the laws, of which duty women are by their very nature incapable. From the differing duties and capacities of men and women arise other minor objections to women having the franchise. Its proper use, even if the justice of its possession were granted, would involve an amount of time and study which few women are able to give without interfering with the fulfilment of home duties and the proper culture of their minds. A woman can educate herself, no doubt, in books, and she can occasionally attend public meetings with advantage and without harm of any kind, but she cannot gain the education of experience through engaging in the rough and tumble of life, which is as essential as any book-learning for the proper choice of men to make our laws. Sometimes, no doubt, she is forced into this rough and tumble, but is injured more than educated thereby, and sometimes she deliberately enters it to the destruction of all comfort in family life. To give her inducements to do so is sheer madness.

As is well known to all Australians, there are dozens of stock arguments against the granting of the franchise; some of them foolish, most of them contain-

ing much reason, but all of them subsidiary to the great truth that human beings should not in justice make laws they cannot guard. It is this feeling that gives point to the claim that the enfranchisement of women will mean quarrelling in the home between man and wife. It often does, and why? Not because there are not other subjects upon which differences of opinion just as acute are amicably settled but because the man's instinct tells him that there is an injustice amounting to insolence in the other sex exercising an equal right without submitting to an equal duty.

There is no need here to sneer at the "shrieking sisterhood," who are creatures for the most part of imagination, or to object to women through the Press and platform exercising such powers of persuasion as they may possess. They might conceivably be better employed, but how they shall employ themselves is eminently their own business. Opposition to the granting of a legislative privilege does not imply opposition to the free use of her talents by any woman in any sphere where she can put no compulsion upon others.

If women asked for the vote there would be good reasons for refusing it, but when the majority of them ask nothing of the kind there is injustice as well as folly in conferring it. "Oh, but," we are told, "those who do not want it need not exercise it." This is a specious fallacy, for the domestic woman with no desire to enter the turmoil of politics is forced to vote in order to counteract the influence of her more aggressive sisters.

And some of these sisters who will always vote are the abandoned women of our cities. In Melbourne at the last Commonwealth elections it is alleged, on good authority, that numbers of these unfortunates were taken to the poll and made by threats or bribes to vote at the dictation of unscrupulous election agents. This is one of the first fruits of Women's Franchise in the Commonwealth. Another result, not of a shameful but, nevertheless, of an undesirable kind, was the candidature of several women for the Federal Parliament. None of them were successful, but their success is only a matter of time, and though all the practical objections to women voting apply with added force to women sitting in Par-

liament, it is not logically possible to admit their claim to the franchise and deny their admission to the legislature.

From the fact that women ratepayers vote at municipal elections without doing any particular harm, it is illogically argued that they should be allowed to vote for Parliament; but there is an essential difference between municipal and national politics. The latter are concerned with burning questions of every kind, where prejudice, ignorance and sentimentalism may do immense harm; they order the relations of people to the State and one another, and though they touch property also, it is not what he has but what he is that qualifies the elector. In municipal affairs, on the other hand, representation is given not to men but to property, and the woman who owns property votes, without any sentimentalism either, on its behalf.

We have already admitted that some women, though they have no claim to it in justice, would probably exercise a vote with discretion; but neither in experience nor in reason do we find any grounds for believing that the best interests of the country can ever be served by conferring the franchise upon either women generally or upon selected individuals. The mass of women are disqualified by lack of training and education; the selection of those not so disqualified would be invidious, if not impossible; and even they are devoid of the great qualification for a part in the country's guidance—the ability to take a part in the country's defence.



## PROS & CONS IN BRIEF.

### “ALL WHITE” MAIL STEAMERS.

PRO: Mail-boats do a coasting trade, and if they employ black labour compete unfairly with white-manned Australian vessels, thus tending to lower Australian wages. (2) White-manned mail ships would increase the Empire's sea strength, by providing more men who could be called upon in war time. (3) No dictation to shipping companies and no claim to establish “a white ocean” is involved. Australia merely refuses to pay public money in the form of subsidy to companies which refuse to forward desirable public ends. (4) The declaration of the Orient Company, that the white labour clause did not materially affect the amount of its mail tender, shows that the allegation of the clause disorganising the mail service is unfounded. (5) The claim that white stokers cannot work in the tropics is disproved by the fact that they do so in warships and on the vessels of several mercantile lines, while officers of the P. and O. Company themselves say that their steamers gain a knot or two in speed when coaled by white men. (6) Australia is not bound to consider England's obligations to her Indian subjects. It is an offensive fallacy to speak of them as our “fellow-subjects.” They are subjects of the United Kingdom; we are citizens of the Empire. (7) The mail steamers carry an immense number of passengers whose lives would be much safer, in case of shipwreck or disaster, if the vessels were manned by British sailors instead of by Lascars. (8) If England supported Australia in her policy, and went further by refusing to subsidise any ships which did not carry all British crews, the naval strength of the Empire would be greatly increased.

CON: (1) An Act is in contemplation which would shut out the mail-boats from the coasting trade, and it is absurd to object to cheap Lascars when we suffer competition from cheap Frenchmen and Germans on highly subsidised boats. (2) It is not our business to legislate for the Empire, and our policy, even if successful, would have an infinitesimal effect in adding to the number of white seamen available in time of war. (3) We pay public money to British ships employing black labour in the form of poundage, and might just as well pay it in the form of subsidy. (4) The Orient Company would have certainly asked something less than



it did for carrying the mails if black labour had been permitted. If white labour is really as cheap as black, as alleged, then it is mere nonsense to object to the competition of black labour in the coasting trade, since it is not really cheap. (5) To insist upon white stokers in vessels visiting Australian ports is the height of folly. Only the lowest class of white men will consent to fire vessels in the tropics, and they will desert their ships in Australia to our sorrow. The conditions on warships are entirely different from those on mail steamers, which must steam full speed for weeks at a time in the most oppressive heat. (6) It is the duty of Australia not to create bitter feeling within the Empire by discriminating against the inhabitants of India, who are fellow-subjects with us of the King. (7) Lascar seamen have shown themselves brave and amenable to discipline in disasters at sea, and on the score of safety to passengers, the records of the companies employing them give not the slightest justification for ceasing to do so. (8) An Imperial agreement to subsidise only ships employing Britishers might be useful in increasing our naval strength, but Australia has made no such suggestion, and in any case England could probably not consider it, since it would conflict with her obligations to the natives of India.

### BIMETALLISM.

PRO: (1) There is not enough gold in the world to do the necessary work of coin, and therefore, unless some other metal be used in addition, great trouble must occur. The amount of gold used in the arts is constantly increasing, and some time ago Sir Robert Giffen put it at nearly the whole of the annual production. (2) There is good reason for believing that on the whole there is less fluctuation in the value of silver than of gold. (3) Even if this be not so, two metals are not so liable to fluctuate as one, for, as Jevens puts it, "at any one time the standard of value is doubtless one metal or the other, and not both; yet the fact that there is an alternative tends to make each vary much less than it otherwise would do." (4) Silver has been depreciated in value by its demonetisation, causing thereby great financial suffering and a check to the world's commerce, which only the remonetisation of silver can remove, while the appreciation of gold, which means a reduction in the price of everything else, falls with terrible severity on debtors, who require more and more labour to discharge debts which are payable in gold. (5) With the remonetisation of silver prices would rise, and times of rising prices are always times of great commercial activity. (6) Silver producing countries would become larger purchasers of goods from manufacturing countries, and States which have a depreciated paper currency would have greatly increased

facilities for putting their coinage on a proper basis. (7) Debtors who are loaded with heavy mortgages and liabilities, to such an extent that they have abandoned hope, would be encouraged to new exertions, when the price of all products of the land rose and gave them a chance of discharging their liabilities. (8) The argument that increased currency is not required, because most of the world's business is carried on by credits, does not touch the case of the vast majority of the poorer classes who do all their trading on a cash basis.

CON: (1) There has lately been an immense increase in the world's output of gold, and there is not the slightest reason to fear that there will be any difficulty in providing sufficient for the world's currency. (2) The idea that silver fluctuates less in value than gold is quite fallacious. The greater quantity of silver would give greater scope for yearly fluctuations in output, if it were used as money. (3) There cannot be two metals used as a standard of value at the same time, for only the poorer and cheaper will be used, thus driving the other out of use. Silver would become the sole standard, and great increases in its production would lead to a depreciated and depreciating currency. (4) The monetisation of silver would be a practical fraud on creditors, and it would be suddenly coined in such enormous quantities as to utterly disorganise business and cause financial ruin. The fall in prices which has taken place of late years arises less from the appreciation of gold than from a cheapening of other articles, owing to more efficient methods of production. (5) The rise in prices which would follow the coinage of silver would not benefit those receiving wages, even if their money wages were raised equivalently, and in many cases they would not be, for we know that at the present time prices often go up considerably while wages remain stationary. Commercial activity would be checked rather than promoted by deluging the market with silver coin and disorganising business. (6) Silver producing countries would not benefit to an appreciable extent, because with a depreciated silver coinage the price of everything they purchased with their silver would rise enormously. Countries with a depreciated paper currency would gain little by substitution of a depreciated silver currency. (7) Any gain which accrued to debtors would be at the expense of those who had trusted them. They are under an obligation to pay in gold, and legal permission to pay in silver would be simply permission to partly repudiate their debts. (8) Most of the business of the world, about 93 per cent. of it, is at present carried on by credits. Thus the amount of gold in the world is too small for any increase or decrease of the output to very seriously affect prices, whereas the amount of silver is so much greater that its use as coin in greatly varying amounts would cause intolerable uncertainty, injuring most of all the poor and the ignorant.

## CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.

PRO: (1) The objects of scientific punishment are primarily to protect society from future aggression by the criminal, and to deter others from imitating his crime. In both these particulars capital punishment is more effective than any other. (2) Punishment should be adequate to the offence, and satisfy the public conscience that justice has been done, and, for murder, at least, no punishment but death fulfils these requirements. (3) The only alternative is perpetual imprisonment, which is more cruel to the offender, and yet not so effective as an example and deterrent, because it does not appeal in the same way to the imagination. (4) It is justified, morally, by the needs of society and by Biblical authority. (5) To the argument that it sends men into eternity with grievous sins upon their heads, the Christian answer is that sins repented of are forgiven, and that the approach of certain death and the exhortation of ministers usually bring about true repentance among condemned criminals, whereas life-long imprisonment might cause only fretting and rebellious longing for freedom. (6) Capital punishment causes the law to be respected, for society generally, and at least the friends and relatives of a person murdered have a natural longing for retribution. If the law did not satisfy this, private revenge and Lynch law would usurp the functions of justice. (7) Capital punishment causes jurors to feel the full weight of their responsibility, because it is irrevocable, and therefore it often saves innocent men from unjust conviction. (8) To abolish capital punishment would be pandering to the mawkish sentiment, everywhere prevalent, which shrinks from severity and pain in every sphere of life, and tends to make the race effeminate. (9) Experience justifies capital punishment, for in England and the British colonies, where it exists, life is held more sacred than elsewhere. (10) The experience of England in the decrease of crime, when the list of capital crimes was reduced, proves nothing against the efficiency of the death penalty, for, in the first place, crime diminished with general moral improvement, and, in the second place, the reluctance of judges and juries to hang for trivial offences often caused acquittals in the face of clear guilt, and made the law uncertain and contemptible.

CON: (1) The statement that capital punishment is a more efficient deterrent from crime than any other is an assumption not borne out by reason or fact. And it is not even the most effective means of preventing a criminal from repeating his crime, for juries will often set a prisoner free when morally certain of his guilt, because they dare not, on the evidence available, take the responsibility of putting him to death. (2) Adequacy of punishment does not involve similarity between punishment and crime. A man can be adequately punished for arson without having his house burnt. To speak of society's moral sense being unsatisfied

in certain cases with anything less than death is another way of saying that society's immoral sense craves for revenge, which should form no element of moral and scientific punishment. (3) Objection to the cruelty of perpetual imprisonment from advocates of capital punishment is mere cant which need not be regarded. As against its terror-striking example, must be set its bad effect on morbid minds, in which it seems often to implant an insane impulse towards murder, and the fact that in murders of premeditation the criminal would be deterred by no prospect of punishment since he means to avoid it, while in murders of passion he gives consequences no thought. (4) A thing immoral can be justified by no supposed advantages, and if Biblical authority be considered, the words, "thou shalt not kill," are not modified by any exception in favor of the State. (5) Scaffold repentances fail to satisfy the rational man's conscience, that he is not doing a hateful thing in depriving his brother man of the opportunity to make such real atonement for his crime as his moral capacity and a life of useful labor in imprisonment would afford to him. (6) The duty of organised society is stern refusal to pander to the desire for revenge, which, in the individual, is natural and excusable. Human life can never be accorded the sacredness due to it while society takes life itself for whatever reason. There is something grimly ludicrous in hearing a judge say in effect to the convicted wretch, "You have committed the horrible crime of taking away a fellow-creature's life, therefore I am going to do precisely the same thing." (7) Under capital punishment many guilty people escape, because the fearful responsibility of inflicting irreparable punishment is often shirked, and at the same time innocent people sometimes suffer, so that the law is doubly wronged. (8) There is enough pain and misery in life to save mortals all necessity of artificially increasing the supply. Every great social reform, such as the abolition of torture, of burning for witchcraft, and of slavery, has been denounced as mawkish and effeminate. (9) No valid argument as to the effect of punishment can be founded on the crime statistics of countries where punishments differ, because the peoples and the conditions which lead to crime differ more widely. But the statistics as to homicide certainly show nothing in favor of capital punishment, for in certain States of America, where the law provides for a death penalty, murder, lynching, and violence of all kinds are a scandal to civilisation. (10) The experience of England when hundreds of offences were capital and crime rampant, showed that, however it be explained away, capital punishment was not an efficient deterrent. For the particular crime of murder there will be no deterrent so efficient as the declaration of society that

life is such a sacred thing that under no circumstances will society be a party to extinguishing it.

### CREMATION.

PRO: (1) Fire destroys the germs of all diseases, and by reducing a corpse immediately to gases and a handful of ash prevents the danger to the health of the living, which arises from the putrefaction of the dead. (2) Cemeteries in Melbourne, as well as elsewhere, emit unpleasant odours, which must necessarily be bad for health, and there are numerous cases on record of disease being spread through the opening of graves, and the release of disease germs which have lain dormant or breeding in the ground. Burial, in fact, is always and everywhere a source of danger to health. (3) Sentimentally cremation is preferable to burial. There is no corruption of the body. In a few minutes its elements are restored to earth and air to enter into other forms of life. The urn which contains the ashes of the departed is not a thing of horror, like the coffin containing a decomposing corpse. As a memorial of a loved one, it cannot only be contemplated without repulsion, but it is far more lasting than any grave. The Greeks and Romans, and other ancient peoples, who all paid the greatest possible reverence to the dead, considered it compatible with cremation. (4) On religious grounds there can be no valid objection to cremation, for even those who believe in the resurrection of the body do not dispute that it must suffer decomposition. There is reason, indeed, to believe that the true ground of such so-called religious opposition as there is to cremation arises from the fact that it lessens the horror of death, and, pro tanto, the influence of the clergy, who gain authority from standing by its portals. (5) Cremation is more economical than burial, since it does not require the reservation of large tracts of land, either in closely settled districts where land is dear, or at a distance from the city, where much must be spent on transport. And, were cremation general, the actual cost of burning a body would be less than that of burying it. It is the small use to which modern crematoria are put that makes cremation comparatively dear. (6) It is alleged that certain murders would go undiscovered were bodies burned, whereas now they are sometimes discovered by exhumation revealing traces of poison or marks of violence. This danger could be met by stricter legal requirements as to death certificates, and with such requirements many cases of poisoning, such as never come to light in spite of occasional exhumations, would be detected. Cremation would thus eventually lead to prevention of crime by making it more dangerous.

CON: (1) The use of lime and other disinfectants in graves can effectually destroy disease germs in corpses. If bodies are buried in the living soil their decomposition is a natural process not involving putrefaction and not injurious to

the health of the living. If it were otherwise cremation would have very little effect, unless the bodies of animals and the immense masses of other decomposing organic matter were also burnt. (2) No odour arises from properly managed cemeteries, and there is no need to permit the opening of graves, except in extraordinary circumstances. It is easy to say that the health of the living is endangered by burial, but proofs of it are not forthcoming, unless where there has been gross carelessness. (3) The sentiment of the great majority is shocked by cremation. The process is hideous to the imagination, even though hidden from sight in modern crematoria—and it is unnatural. The gradual decay of the body in mother earth, on the other hand, is natural. So far from the graves of loved ones exciting any feeling of horror or repulsion in the healthy mind, they are, and always have been, objects of tender care, visited and wept over, planted with flowers. They are regarded as the resting places of the departed, and to the European mind they symbolise the peace and dignity of death, as a handful of ashes in an urn can never do. The sentiment which centres round a grave is strikingly shown by the dislike which is generally felt to burial at sea. (4) The religious objection to cremation is well warranted in its necessitating a change in the splendid burial service, which is a comfort and an aid to the faith of so many. Without believing that resurrection will be affected by cremation, religious people are justified in opposing a change which so radically alters its symbolisation. (5) Cremation is more expensive than burial, if effected in a proper crematorium, and effected otherwise it is a ghastly practice which should not be permitted. (6) If bodies were destroyed by fire, numerous crimes which have been discovered through exhumation revealing traces of poison or marks of violence would never have been brought to light. The claim that stricter requirements as to death certificates would make cremation a safe means of disposing of the dead, from the point of view of justice, is not conclusive, since it often happens that absolutely no cause for suspicion arises until long after a death. It would be impossible to hold post mortem examinations in all cases, and practically nothing short of this would prevent great danger of an increase in poisoning, if all traces of the crime were destroyed by fire.

#### COMPULSORY VACCINATION.

PRO: (1) At the beginning of last century, when vaccination was introduced, small-pox was the scourge of the world. Deaths in the 18th century in the United Kingdom from small-pox were about 3000 per million, after 1871 about 156 per million. It is utterly unreasonable to suppose that vaccination has not played the greatest part in this wonderful change. (2) If it has, it is a fair inference that, were vaccination made compulsory and universal, small-pox might

be practically stamped out of existence. (3) Individual facts and figures may be disputed, but the overwhelming preponderance of statistical evidence and medical opinion supports the efficacy of vaccination. (4) The answer to the claim that sanitation accounts for comparative freedom from small-pox is that other diseases have not decreased in anything like the same manner. Sir Lyon Playfair, in the House of Commons, on June 19th, 1893, quoted the Registrar-General's statement that under compulsory vaccination small-pox mortality of children under five years of age had decreased by 80 per cent., and mortality from other diseases only 6 per cent. (5) Only experts can say whether vaccination prevents small-pox, and since they say it does, it becomes the right of the majority to protect themselves and their children from the obstinacy of the minority, who will not adopt vaccination except under compulsion. (6) We enforce isolation and quarantine in many diseases for the public good, disregarding the whims and the convenience of individuals, and we should therefore enforce vaccination, in spite of so-called conscientious objections. A man has no right to indulge his conscience at the risk of a neighbour's life. (7) The danger of transmitting disease by vaccination, which might constitute a valid objection to making it compulsory, has been practically eliminated by the use of pure lymph, and by modern care and cleanliness. (8) Even if it be true that vaccination must be repeated at intervals to be thoroughly efficacious, that is no reason for neglecting the immense step towards safety which can be gained by insisting upon it once in infancy. Universal infantile vaccination, for one thing, tends to remove prejudice and to induce adults to be freely vaccinated when need arises. (9) The argument that inoculation for plague should be made compulsory, if vaccination be insisted upon, has no weight, because plague is a comparatively rare disease, it can be otherwise guarded against, and the effects of inoculation last but a short time. By analogy, however, the discovery of the virtues of inoculation for plague strengthens the case for the efficacy of vaccination.

CON: (1) At the beginning of last century cholera, typhus fever, and other diseases were rampant as well as small-pox, and have been reduced in their frequency and virulence without the agency of vaccination. Therefore the figures quoted with regard to small-pox prove nothing. (2) Since it is not proved that vaccination has been the principal factor in reducing mortality from small-pox, the reduction in mortality from other diseases suggests that the common cause is better sanitation and increased medical knowledge. (3) It may be admitted that the preponderance of medical opinion regards vaccination as desirable, but medical opinion when once formed is extraordinarily conservative, and many of the most advanced authorities dispute the value of vaccination. A very striking fact is that New South Wales, where

vaccination is optional, has suffered no more from small-pox than Victoria, where it is compulsory. (4) There is no sufficient authority for saying that other filth diseases have not decreased as much as small-pox. The figures quoted by Sir Lyon Playfair as to infantile mortality are quite misleading, for, while better sanitation and more effective isolation would greatly decrease mortality from small-pox, there are a number of infantile complaints upon which it can have nothing like the same effect—especially among underfed children, like many of those in England. (5) If it be granted that vaccination is a protection against small-pox, it does not follow that it should be forced on people against their will, especially as, if it has the virtues alleged, it can be adopted by those who believe in it to protect themselves and their children. Compulsory vaccination is an unwarrantable interference with individual liberty. (6) Enforced quarantine and isolation stand on an entirely different footing to compulsory vaccination. We lock up a man who is drunken and offensive until he becomes sober; we do not force him to sign the pledge of total abstinence, in case he should become drunken and offensive. Recognition of the so-called conscientious objection to vaccination is merely recognition of a man's right to prevent an injury being done to his child, though he is told good may follow from it. (7) No one can dispute that some injury is done to a child by vaccination. The most that can be urged is that the illness caused is temporary and trifling, but many people are convinced, and have high medical authority to support them, that weakened constitutions, vile diseases, and even death, frequently result from vaccination, in spite of all precautions. (8) The generally admitted fact that any immunity which may result from vaccination is temporary, deprives compulsion, in the case of children, of all reason. They are subjected to risks in infancy, all to no purpose, since nine-tenths of the population may be still unvaccinated for all practical purposes. Prejudice against adult vaccination is not decreased by compulsion, but people are induced, in time of danger, to neglect a possible safeguard through fancied security. (9) It is a fair argument that if vaccination is compulsory, so should be inoculation with other varieties of filth, which are supposed to give immunity from other diseases. The Indian Government tried to enforce inoculation for plague with disastrous results, since numbers of deaths were caused by impurities in the serum, and more by rioting in resistance to the attempt at compulsion.

#### DEFENDING A PRISONER KNOWN TO BE GUILTY.

PRO: (1) Guilty and not guilty, when criminal trials are concerned, are legal, and not moral, terms. No prisoner is legally guilty until found so by a jury, and therefore no counsel can be rightly said to know of his client's guilt when he defends him. (2) Defence of a prisoner involves no statement of fact on the part of counsel. It consists in

putting the facts brought out in evidence in the best light for the client. (3) Even a prisoner who has pleaded guilty is allowed to withdrawn his plea and plead not guilty. When the court tries a man after admitting guilt, surely counsel may defend him with propriety. (4) A barrister is not concerned with what a prisoner has done, but with what the evidence before the court shows that he has done. It is his duty to his client to show that the evidence is inconclusive, if he can do so. (5) A confession to him by the prisoner could not be used as evidence without breach of the faith which counsel is bound to observe, and for a barrister to throw up a case he has undertaken would often prejudice the prisoner as much as going into court and giving evidence of the confession. (6) The system which permits a barrister to defend a man, whatever be his private knowledge obtained as counsel, is a moral system, since it secures the ends of justice, which are better served by the acquittal of a person who has, in fact, committed a crime, than by his conviction on insufficient evidence, or evidence obtained through breach of faith.

CON: (1) To say that counsel cannot know whether a prisoner is guilty or not is a quibble. He may know that he has committed a crime, and, knowing that, should not endeavour to prevent his just punishment. (2) The claim that counsel states no facts in his defence of a prisoner may be technically true, but he acts a lie, even if he speaks none, when he appears for a client of whose guilt he is aware. (3) The plea of guilty which a prisoner may withdraw is a different thing from a confession of having committed the crime, and the barrister is not legally bound to defend a man, though the court is legally bound to formally try him. (5) If a prisoner confesses to counsel it is the prisoner's own fault, and the counsel's moral duty to truth and society cannot be evaded, even by a confidence forced upon him. He need not, indeed, betray the confidence, but he is morally bound to retire from the case. (4) As a counsel, a barrister should take care to know nothing. If he learns as a fact that his client is a criminal his duty as a man, to protect society, takes precedence of his duty, as counsel, to protect the prisoner. (6) No system can be moral or serve the ends of justice which permits a barrister to deliberately endeavour to mislead a jury, with the object of setting at liberty a man whom he knows with absolute certainty deserves hanging or imprisonment. It may best serve the ends of justice that a guilty man should escape when his guilt is in reasonable doubt, but not when the guilty man's escape is contrived by counsel, who can have no doubt whatever.

### FLOGGING IN PRISONS.

PRO: (1) It is impossible to make brutal types of men feel any punishment except through their hides. (2) Such men must be adequately punished for the protection of

society. (3) When garotting became prevalent in England imprisonment had no effect, but the crime was stamped out by flogging. (4) Experience shows that men once flogged do not come within the law's meshes again. (5) The main objection to flogging is a sickly sentimentality which shows itself in more tenderness for the brute who commits a crime of violence than for his victim. (6) The argument that the abolition of flogging in the Army and Navy has been accompanied with no evil results is nothing to the point, because there it was administered haphazard, and had a degrading effect on men who often suffered terrible and shameful punishment for trivial offences. (7) Flogging children is admittedly beneficial. Their moral sentiments are not fully developed, and they learn best through pain. Criminals of some types have no moral feeling at all, and can be taught respect for the law only through pain correspondingly severe. (8) To say that society is degraded by protecting itself is absurd. The judge who orders a flogging loses no one's respect, and if the flagellator is not highly esteemed, neither are other individuals who perform many useful but disagreeable and menial offices. (9) The judges who sentence men to flogging have years of experience, and declare it sometimes to be absolutely necessary. (10) The only possible alternative would be practically life long imprisonment—both expensive and infinitely more cruel. (11) The preventive efficacy of flogging is immense, because the thought of the cat appeals to the imagination of rough men, who can not realise the meaning of imprisonment. (12) The system is justified by years of experience in England and in Australia. (13) In the outcry against it humanitarians make themselves the allies of the disreputable and lawless classes against the law-abiding and respectable.

CON: (1) The object of punishment is to prevent crime—not to inflict the maximum of physical or mental pain on the criminal. (2) Society must be protected, but it is endangered by treating human beings more cruelly than brutes—making brutes out of men, and turning them loose to prey upon society. (3) The English garotters have been proved to be a small band of hardened criminals, who were all captured before the flogging law actually came into effect, and yet the story that flogging stamped out garotting is constantly repeated. (4) On several occasions men have been arrested for crime after undergoing flogging. In Victoria one man was twice flogged, for two separate offences, and finally hanged for a third. And though these cases are rare, it is certain that released prisoners who have been flogged, perhaps fearful of taking revenge themselves, urge others on to crime. (5) The opponent of flogging has no sickly sentimentality for the criminal, but objects to society lowering itself to his level of brutality. (6) Flogging in the Army and Navy degraded the men who inflicted it almost

as much as those who suffered it. It made criminals of innocent men. Flogging in prisons makes devils of criminals. (7) The wisdom of flogging children is disputable, and in any case the pain inflicted on them is not comparable to that suffered under the cat, while the child is not contemptuously likened to a brute. Children who are brutally flogged are often morally ruined. (8) The judge who orders flogging helps to degrade himself and society, which unfairly makes a despised outcast of the flagellator. Is not a law necessarily wrong which no decent man is expected to execute? It is a quibble to compare the office of the flagellator or the hangman with offices which, however menial, are not tainted with disgrace. (9) The judges are practically without experience. They do not watch the career of criminals after they leave the dock, and there is probably not a judge in Australia who has made any real study of penology. (10) Long sentences would protect society by keeping the criminal out of mischief. The present practice of flogging, with short sentences, merely turns a man out of gaol full of burning hatred of the law to corrupt his associates and plot crimes of revenge. The argument of expense in long sentences is contemptible, and that of their cruelty mere cant. (11) The argument that the prospect of flogging appeals to the imagination applies equally to any other form of torture which our civilisation has discarded. (12) Crimes of violence are less rife in Scotland, where there is little flogging, than in England; and in Ireland, where flogging is practically unknown, so are brutal crimes which are common in England. (13) Humanitarians believe that organised society should set a higher standard than the criminals it execrates, and should not outdo the cruelty of the worst of them by inflicting horrible pain and injury in cold blood—several times for the same offence—and by keeping the victim between his appointed days of torture in pitiable dread.

#### THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE.

PRO: (1) The objects of punishment are to protect society from further offence by the individual punished, and from imitators of his crime, and at the same time to reform the criminal, in all of which present methods are signally unsuccessful. (2) Under the indeterminate sentence a criminal would be condemned to imprisonment until such time as he had given evidence of his fitness to be released, and would, therefore, have the strongest incentive to good conduct and reform in prison. (3) He might be put to useful work, in order to maintain his family or dependents, or to compensate those injured by his offence, as far as money would do it, and thus a spirit of self-respect would be encouraged, and an incentive to industry provided. At the same time the harm which crime inflicts on the innocent would be minimised. (4) The man who refused to work under these circumstances would show himself unfit for liberty, and his

indefinite confinement would be a protection to society. (5) Under this system the scandalous uncertainty as to punishment which arises from the idiosyncracies of different judges would be removed. The punishment would be made to fit the criminal, the impossible attempt to make it fit the crime being abandoned. (6) The responsibility of deciding when a prisoner should be released would be exercised by properly appointed, well paid persons of high character and ability, who would have actual experience of the man to guide them, instead of the, perhaps, conflicting evidence concerning a single episode which is placed before the judge. (7) The barbarous flogging and solitary confinement, which now form part of our criminal code, could be struck out of it with perfect safety to the community, which would rest assured that incorrigible offenders, once apprehended, would spend the rest of their days under restraint, whereas, they are now frequently released after short sentences, merely to plunge again into crime. (8) A considerable proportion of crime is now believed to result from mental disease, which, if curable, would have a chance of cure under the indeterminate sentence, and, if incurable, would secure the sufferer all consideration consistent with necessary restraint. (9) Prison reform in the direction of separating hardened criminals from minor offenders, of making prisoners serve the community, instead of being a useless burden upon it, and of abolishing all useless severity, would naturally follow from the indeterminate sentence.

CON: (1) Punishment admittedly needs reform, but is already too uncertain, and a criminal code, rigorously fixing the penalty for every offence, would be far better than making the penalty even more uncertain than it now is. (2) Under the indeterminate sentence the cunning criminal—the man of brains and education, who is far more blameworthy than the uneducated rough, would gain his release much sooner, since he would be able to simulate repentance and to curry favour with the authorities. (3) If a criminal felt that in prison he could earn money for his family, one of the great restraints upon crime, fear of leaving dependents unprovided for, would be taken away. And if a man knew he could rapidly work himself out of gaol he would succumb to temptation which he resists when he knows the consequences of breaking the law to be irrevocable. (4) Some men are mentally and physically incapable of hard work, and these are often the most excusable, therefore any system which tended to keep them imprisoned longer than the strong and capable, who have less excuse for crime, would be unjust. (5) The indeterminate sentence would practically abrogate the functions of the judge, which consist in determining within certain limits—which should be more strictly defined—what punishment the crime and criminal deserve in all the circumstances of each case. (6) To throw this responsibility on inferior officials, who would necessarily, in their daily contact with prisoners, become

affected by personal prejudices and feeling, from which judges are free, would lead to far greater injustice than may occasionally arise under the system of sentence at trial by an impartial man of high character and trained mind. (7) If flogging and solitary confinement should be proved undesirable they could be abolished without resort to the indeterminate sentence, since judges could now, if they chose, shut up prisoners whom they consider incorrigible for very long periods. The chief use of the other forms of punishment is to appeal to the imagination of possible offenders, and for this purpose the indeterminate sentence would be singularly inefficient. (8) When more gentle treatment of prisoners is expedient it can be given without upsetting the foundations of our criminal law. Should it be discovered after sentence that a prisoner is rather the victim of disease than a deliberate wrongdoer, there is nothing to prevent him being treated as such. (9) Prison reform in all directions is possible under fixed sentences, and the man who knows he must spend a certain time in gaol—with a reasonable remission for good conduct—is far more likely to settle down and improve his character than the man who feels he can better his lot by fawning upon warders and officials. As to useful work in gaol, it is possible under any system of sentencing, but is hampered by the objection of law-abiding men to suffer competition from prison labour.

#### THE LABOUR PARTY'S POLITICAL METHODS.

PRO: (1) The Labour Party, recognising that modern politics are war between the masses and the privileged, and that discipline is necessary for success in war, is justified in adopting all reasonable means to secure it. (2) The Parliamentary party exists to carry out the policy which will promote the welfare of the majority. The majority must be the judges of what will do this, and rightly exact a pledge from their chosen instruments to aim at its attainment. (3) Within the limits of the discretion of Labour members of Parliament, there arise questions on which a divided vote would weaken the strength of the party, and a solid vote in accordance with the decision of a Caucus meeting is the only means of preventing this. (4) A Labour Ministry is just as much bound as are private members to serve the interests of the majority, and it can best serve these by consulting the members of their party on all important matters of policy. (5) The accusation that the position of a Labour Government is unconstitutional, or undignified, has no justification. All Ministries must fulfil generally the wishes of their supporters, or lose support and office. A Labour Ministry simply takes measures by means of the Caucus to learn what those wishes are, with more preciseness and method than Ministries of other parties. If the Caucus asks anything of the Government which it cannot do with a good conscience, it is free to resign. (6) While Party Government exists, it is absurd to stigmatise a Labour Ministry

as the organ of a class. It is so no more, and no less, than a Conservative or Liberal Ministry, which claims a wider outlook, and is nevertheless maintained in power, only so long as it serves the class which its supporters represent in Parliament. (7) There are, in point of fact, only two real parties, the working classes, whose interests lie in high wages, low rents, and cheap land—the non-working class, whose interests lie in low wages, high rents, and dear land. The only real cause of complaint against the Labour Party, which politically represents the former class, is that it is well organised, strictly disciplined, and undivided; whereas the other class is divided into a number of political sections, whose mutual jealousies make concerted action impossible, with the result that it rails at the Labour Party as narrow and tyrannical. (8) Whether the Labour Party be right or wrong, in its socialistic aims, it is just as much entitled to enforce them by organisation as the anti-socialists are to enforce other aims, and Labour Ministers have justified the political methods which placed them in office by showing administrative ability and fairness, quite equal to those of their political opponents. (9) The conduct of the Labour Party in offering itself for sale to the highest bidder—that is, in supporting the Government which will give it most when it is not strong enough to take office itself—is quite justifiable, because the party puts measures before men, and has no aim but to advance the political aims of the majority of its electors, who are a majority of the people. The fact the members of organised Labour bodies may be comparatively few counts for nothing, since it is well known and proved by experience that tens of thousands who do not belong to them approve and take advantage of their work.

CON: (1) The idea of politics being war between classes is a wrongful one, and the main cause of the tyrannical and cramping methods of the Labour Party. (2) The pledge exacted from Labour members excludes from their ranks the best and broadest-minded men, who will not surrender their judgment to the dictation of an ignorant crowd, and who conceive that a member of Parliament should be a free representative, not a fettered delegate. (3) Insistence upon a member obeying the majority at a Caucus meeting, in all matters on which he is not specifically pledged, is a further and blighting restriction upon a Labour member's right to use his own judgment for the benefit of the community. (4) A Ministry are constitutionally the advisers of the Crown, chosen for their special ability and knowledge, and they have no right to practically abdicate their office by receiving orders from a Caucus meeting. (5) While all Ministries must generally carry out the wishes of their supporters, they should constitutionally be leaders of their party and responsible to Parliament, whereas Labour Ministries are servants of their party, tied hand and foot, and are further responsible to a section outside Parliament.

This arises from the control of the extra-Parliamentary Labour bodies exerted upon members, and through them upon the Ministry by means of the Caucus. Labour Governments thus occupy an undignified position, contrary to the spirit of the constitution. (6) Political parties, other than the Labour Party, are recruited from all classes, and Ministries kept in power by them govern on behalf of the people; while Labour Ministries govern at the dictation of a small organised section of a single class. (7) It is not true that the interests of the so-called working classes are contrary to the interests of the great majority of the people, who all have to work, but are, nevertheless, arbitrarily excluded from the so-called Labour Party. Its narrowness and tyranny are exemplified in the fact that by means of preference to unionists under the Arbitration Act it endeavours to forbid workmen to earn their living, unless they consent to join the Labour Unions. In this endeavour the Labour Party has shown that its political methods are subversive of freedom. (8) The Socialistic aim and the political organisation of the Australian Labour Party are alike fatal to the liberty of the individual, and the fact that Labour Ministers have proved fairly efficient administrators in office does not in the least justify the political methods and tactics which placed them there. (9) The cynical statement of Labour leaders that their party is for sale to the highest bidder is, while in accordance with their party's plan of using any means to gain their ends, fatal to the rule of high principle in Parliament. Methods which enjoin upon a number of thinking men the necessity of voting like a machine in support of a Government, which numbers of them may consider thoroughly bad, stand self-condemned. And this sacrifice of self-respect is not even exacted in the interests of the labouring classes as a whole, but is made at the bidding of the small minority of them included in the political Labour organisations to which the members stand pledged.

#### LESS FACILITY FOR DIVORCE.

PRO: (1) Divorces have become immensely more numerous since the passing of the Shiels Act in Victoria and a similar one in New South Wales. (2) In Australia divorces now bear a higher proportion to marriages than most countries of the world, and we are approaching the state of things in America, where the marriage tie counts for almost nothing. (3) The Bible recognises only one ground for divorce. (4) When divorce is easy unsuitable couples rush into matrimony, and great unhappiness results. (4) The discipline which married people undergo, in making the best of each other's failings when they know marriage to be lifelong, is good for them and for the nation. (5) The children of divorced couples can never be properly cared for. (6) The feeling of insecurity in marriage tends to make women unwilling to bear children. (7) Laxity in Divorce

laws has always been a prelude to the decay of national strength, as in the Roman Empire before its fall. (8) The passing of a Federal Divorce law offers an opportunity of retracing the steps some of the States have taken, and promoting a moral standard like that of Canada, where divorce is almost unknown. (9) Contempt for the marriage contract is accompanied by corruption of morals in all spheres of conduct, as in the United States. (10) Ireland, where divorce is extremely rare, is sexually one of the most moral countries in the world.

CON: (1) Many of the divorces, obtained since the passing of the Shiels Act, are for causes arising in unhappy marriages contracted before the Act. (2) If the number of divorces is increasing then much unhappiness is being terminated. The marriage tie is worthless in the case of people so unsuited to one another that one of them will face publicity in the Divorce Court. (3) The Bible standard in many things cannot be applied to modern conditions, as is admitted by those who believe it forbids divorce altogether, but still would allow it for one cause. (4) With easy divorce unsuitable couples are less likely to rush into marriage, each knowing that a high standard of conduct is demanded under penalty of the marriage being dissolved. (4) The so-called discipline of a cat and dog life ruins the happiness and the character of thousands of men and women. (5) The law can enforce the care of children of divorced couples on one parent or the other. As a matter of fact the innocent party is usually anxious to claim it, and children cannot possibly be well cared for by parents who are tied unwillingly together. (6) The unwillingness of women to bear children is unconnected with the Divorce law, but is increasing from other causes all over the world. The birth rate is falling as much in Australian States, where divorce is difficult as in those where it is easy. (7) No argument can be drawn from the Roman Empire, for in the days of the Republic's greatest vigour the law permitted the man to divorce his wife on the widest grounds. (8) Any attempt by the Commonwealth to enforce illiberal divorce legislation will not be tolerated by Victoria and New South Wales, and it is being promoted principally by the Churches in their desire to gain more power. (9) Where morals are corrupt the only result of obstacles to divorce is immorality, and in America the older Eastern States, which offer the least facilities for divorce, are those most tainted with political and commercial corruption. (10) Ireland, though moral sexually, has a bad record in other ways, and some of the other Catholic countries where divorce is most difficult are the most immoral.

#### A MINIMUM WAGE.

PRO: (1) Workmen and work-women require protection against the capitalist employer. (2) The advance in wages which took place in England since the repeal of the Corn

Laws is partly due to that repeal, partly to industrial expansion, and partly to Trades Unions and Factory law, but it is now at an end, and wages in England are declining. (3) In Victoria wages fell on the whole for a number of years until a minimum wage was instituted by the Factories Acts. (4) At the adoption of Federation they were, and have since been, higher than wages in New South Wales where no minimum wage was enforced. (5) Arbitrary enactments as to wages are no more arbitrary than the choice of the employers who reduce wages to increase profits, though on a higher wage they get an ample return. Since the introduction of the minimum wage law in Victoria employment in factories has largely increased. (6) Victoria has shown itself able to compete in the Federal market with New South Wales, in which no such law exists. (7) The alleged injustice to old and inferior workers is either fanciful or grossly exaggerated, and permits can be obtained to meet all real cases of hardship. Though a small proportion of employes may be thrown out of work, the large majority have their condition greatly bettered. (8) The minimum wage is a special boon to women workers in the clothing trade, etc., who are unable to organise, and have the greatest need of protection. (9) In some respects dishonest employers will always have an advantage over honest ones, but if there were no minimum wage the sweater would simply be in a better position than he is now to undersell the fair man who is willing to pay a living wage. The Act inflicts no hardship on him, and at least restrains the sweating of his rival. (10) It is clear that the work-people appreciate the Act, because more and more trades ask to be brought under its provisions. (11) The severity of the minimum wage provision upon the medium worker is theoretical only, because it is fixed with relation to his capacity, and there is no evidence of employes under the Act being broken up by excessively hard work. The specially skilled or rapid worker can earn a wage proportionate to his greater capacity just as well under the Act as outside it. (12) It is worthy of a fair and extended trial, as at least a hopeful experiment in helping the workers to better their condition.

CON: (1) Work people can protect themselves through their unions better than any law can do it. (2) The experience of the past has been a steady increase in wages and decrease of hours without legislative interference. (3) In so far as wages have been raised since the Factories Act, the improvement is due to better general conditions and not to legislation. We have recovered from the boom disaster and the effects of the drought. (4) The compulsory minimum wage of Victoria was equalled, in most cases, by the wages given without compulsion in New South Wales. (5) The arbitrary enactments as to wages hamper employers

and restrict the investment of capital in industry, thus reducing employment and reacting hurtfully upon the workmen. (6) New South Wales is hampered by the Arbitration Act, which affects its capacity to compete with Victoria, and is, perhaps, more hurtful even than the minimum wage. (7) It is cruel to old and inferior workers who cannot earn the minimum wage, and are thus deprived of their chance to earn anything. The granting of permits to pay less to inferior workers in certain special cases merely modifies this injustice in a slight degree. (8) In the case of women workers the Act is constantly evaded, and for fear of losing their employment the women dare not say anything. (9) By evasion of the Act dishonest employers gain an unfair advantage over honest ones. (10) The fact that the workers in many trades ask to be brought under the minimum wage provision proves nothing, for those who ask this have not experienced it. There have been many complaints from men driven out of work in trades under the Act. (11) While the minimum wage prevails employers drive their men hard in order that it may be earned, and the strain upon a man of medium qualifications quickly wears him out. On the other hand, the quick worker is injured, because the minimum wage tends to become the maximum. (12) It is a dangerous experiment, because it teaches the workers to rely on legislation, instead of on themselves, to improve their condition, and evils arising from it are usually assigned to some other cause by prejudiced advocates, so that there is no experiment in the proper sense of the term at all.

#### MUNICIPAL LIGHT SUPPLY.

PRO: (1) Those who supply a city with light by gas or electricity must necessarily be granted a monopoly of the right to take wires or pipes through the streets. (2) This monopoly right is valuable, and belongs to the ratepayers generally, who never get full value for it from private grantees, and very often get nothing at all. (3) If the municipality itself supplies light to the citizens it keeps its property in its own hands, to the benefit both of the ratepayers generally and of the light users in particular. (4) Apart from the light used by private people, much is required for street lamps and public buildings, which the municipalities can thus obtain at cost price. (5) Private light companies invariably make use of their monopoly to charge the consumer high prices, and have sufficient influence to prevent all attempts to restrain them in the interests of the community. (6) The supply of gas is a simple matter, which can well be undertaken by a community, and the experience of English cities has shown that it can provide electricity also to the satisfaction of light users, and to the profit of the ratepayers. (7) Municipal councils will be more ready than private companies to adopt the latest and most economical lighting methods, because upon them the

pressure of public opinion is effective, while it has no effect on companies which are free from competition. (8) If it be said that gas companies and electric lighting companies might compete with one another, and thus give cheap light, the answer is that they would not be foolish enough to compete when they might combine and pool profits.

CON: (1) The Act conferring monopoly rights on lighting companies can impose proper conditions on the companies in return for them. (2) The municipality, by proper management, can sell or lease its rights to the use of the streets, so as to secure far more profit from them than by carrying on a business for which it is unfitted. (3) There has not yet been sufficient experience of municipal enterprise to show that it is as well conducted as that of private companies. (4) When a company is given a franchise to provide light there is nothing to prevent an arrangement being made for the supply of public light for street lamps, etc., at special rates. (5) If lighting companies have been given their franchise on too easy terms in the past the remedy is not for the municipality to rush into a risky business, in the hope of improving the supply, or reducing prices, but to stringently enforce all proper conditions imposed on the company for the protection of the public. (6) Though the supply of gas is a comparatively simple matter, the supply of electricity is quite the reverse, and requires an energy and initiative in order to keep abreast of the times, which is not to be found in municipal councils. The experience of British cities covers too short a period to be of any guidance. (7) The desire of the individual shareholder to obtain the best dividends is a far more effective spur to directors and managers of companies, in adopting the best appliances and methods, than the conflicting and comparatively uninterested views of a host of ratepayers. (8) Lighting companies are as a matter of fact always open to competition. Electricity competes with gas—new methods of using oil compete with both—and consequently, if charges are excessive or the supply of light poor, the consumers are not, as often alleged, without a remedy.

### MUNICIPAL TRAMWAYS.

PRO: (1) When a municipality hands over to a company the sole right to run trams in any of its streets it creates a private monopoly, and deprives the public of rights in the street which belong to it. (2) The payment received from companies for this franchise is usually grossly inadequate, and in any case it is practically impossible to fix a fair sum for the franchise, since it is conferred for a number of years, and no one can forecast the future. (3) Experience shows that tramway companies invariably make use of their monopoly franchise to enrich themselves at the expense of the public, and that checks upon them, designed to limit fares and secure adequate service are never satisfactory—which is

natural, since the companies do not enter on such speculations unless they secure conditions which offer a prospect of exorbitant interest. (4) Tramway concessions are often—in America almost invariably—the subject of bribery and corruption, by which councillors are enriched and the rate-payers robbed, and, even where this is not the case, the shareholders and directors of a powerful company, like the Melbourne Tramway Company, secure an undesirable influence in the municipal councils and Parliament, which prevents the company being properly controlled. (5) Since competition with, and effective control of, a monopolistic company are impossible, public rights can be preserved only by the council retaining full ownership of the tram lines. (6) There are an immense number of instances of municipalities successfully working their tramways and making large profits, which go to reduce rates. Nearly all the large cities of the United Kingdom are, therefore, taking steps to work their trams. (7) The proved advantages to the public counter-balance the admitted, but somewhat theoretical, objection, that municipally worked trams create a class of municipal voters who may try to unduly influence councils to their own advantage. (8) Municipal ownership of the tramway line does not necessarily involve municipal working. There is no reason why the municipalities should not freely permit companies or individuals to run competing cars on the line, trains over sections of the same line, and the regulation of the present time, several railway companies run competing provided they observe the traffic regulations. In England, at competing trams would be very much simpler. This plan has been suggested by an expert commission in America, and it would abolish private monopoly, and give the public all the advantages of private competition, without adding to the number of municipal employes. In the meantime municipal monopoly is infinitely preferable to capitalist monopoly.

CON: (1) Though a tramway company requires a monopoly for a limited number of years, it has to acquire it in competition with other men, who could form companies, and would bid higher for the charter if it were going too cheap. (2) The tramway franchise can be sold either for cash, or with provision for receipt of a certain percentage of profits or takings, on such terms as to secure the public a revenue from its roads, without the risk and trouble of entering upon a business for which it is not fitted. If tramway companies sometimes make great profits it is only because they run great risks in giving the town traffic facilities, which increase rateable value and add to the revenue of the municipality. (3) If a tramway company makes exorbitant profits this only shows that the franchise has been granted to it on too easy terms — not that it should never have been granted. And the municipality which has such poor knowledge of business as to make a very bad bargain, would probably muddle the working of the trams and lose money on them where private enterprise secures a profit. (4) Tramway concessions are

jealously watched by the ratepayers, and, in a country free from corruption, are usually arranged on a strictly fair business basis. Nothing can be deduced from the case of America, where bribery has demoralised every department of public action. No impropriety has ever been alleged against the Melbourne Tramway Company, which gave the city a better tramway service than the municipality would have thought of doing when the lines were built. (5) Municipal tramways are as much a monopoly as private ones, and liable to the slackness inseparable from public conduct of business, in addition to that induced by absence of competition. (6) Though there is just now a craze for municipal tramways and municipal trading in England, it has many severe critics, and the privately owned trams of London compare very favorably with those run by the County Council. The figures showing great alleged profits by some city tramways are questioned by competent critics. (7) The danger of municipal business passing into the control of its servants through their great increase in numbers is very serious, and the exorbitant wages and absurdly short hours, which they will demand in tramway and other enterprises, will lead not only to unprofitable business, but to bad municipal government. (8) The suggestion that tramway lines might be owned municipally and worked privately on competitive lines is fanciful, and quite unlikely of adoption. The difficulties of regulation would be too great, and there would be scope for bribery and corruption by a powerful company desirous of securing advantages over its rivals.

#### NATIONALISATION OF MINES.

PRO: (1) It is already recognised by Australian legislation that metals and minerals belong to the Crown—that is to say, the people—and this ownership is inconsistent with the leasing system, at any rate in the case of gold and silver, for leases give practical ownership to the lessee. (2) Private control of mining lands, which are limited in quantity, creates a hurtful monopoly, which enriches a few, enabling them to close avenues of employment and to raise the price of coal and other minerals to the public. The labor conditions which nominally compel companies effectively to work the land which they lease have always proved ineffective, and in any case the rent which lessees pay is nothing like fair value for the public property which is handed over to them. (3) It is possible that coal and iron lands might be valued with some accuracy, and worked by private persons or companies paying a fair rent, but it is impossible to value a gold mine, and therefore the gold can only be secured to its rightful owners—the people—by State working. (4) State control of coal mines is also perhaps necessary to prevent combinations of mining companies to raise prices, since competition is difficult, owing to the great capital required to enter into the business, and in New Zealand the State worked coal mine has had considerable effect in reducing the

price of coal. (5) State mines need not in any way interfere with private enterprise in prospecting, since the prospector who discovers a new payable gold field might be adequately rewarded, either by a money grant, or by the grant of a special reward lease for a certain number of years. (6) The State need run no risk of working unpayable gold or silver, since geologists can now tell with a fair amount of precision the trend of a reef or lode, and only ground practically certain to give a good return need be mined. If three-quarters of the gold mines now in operation were abandoned, it would be a gain, and not a loss, to the community. (7) The difficulties and disadvantages of State mining would be far more than set off by the abolition of stock exchange gambling in mining shares and the diversion of much useful labor to futile gold seeking. (8) The acquisition of mining lands by the State could be gradually brought about by not renewing present leases on their termination, and by ceasing to grant new ones.

CON: (1) The reservation of metals and minerals by the Crown is useful to prevent unenterprising land-owners stopping the development of natural resources, and public rights are fully asserted by charging a fair rent to the individual or company to whom mining lands are leased. (2) The limit to lands containing metals and minerals has not yet been discovered in Australia; therefore, it is absurd to speak of monopoly. Where payable mines are found, private enterprise is always ready to develop them—over-anxious, indeed, for it is asserted that gold on the average costs more to win than it is worth—and labor conditions, enforcing the employment of a certain number of men upon a lease, prevent its being shepherded. Considering all the risks of a speculative business, the rents now paid are very fair. If they are too low, there is no reason why they should not be raised. (3) Coal and gold, in the ground, are useless to the State, and when won they are rightfully the property of the people who have won them. Statements that rents paid are too low, on the average, are disproved by heavy losses in mining, and where the State insists on further profit from gold mines, it can obtain it most fairly and economically by a dividend tax, such as that in Western Australia, or by an Income Tax, like that of Victoria or New South Wales. (4) State worked mines of any kind would be mismanaged, like all other State enterprises, and in such a dangerous pursuit as coal mining there would probably be great loss of life as well as of money. The New Zealand experiment has not yet shown any practical results, and the low prices of coal and keen competition in Newcastle show that the danger of combination to exploit the consumer is merely fanciful. (5) State mines would prevent new discoveries, unless the State went to vast expense in sending out prospecting parties. If leases or grants were made to private prospectors, it would be in defiance of the alleged principle that all

metals and minerals belong to the public. (6) In attempting to mine gold or silver, the State would suffer disastrous loss, for it conducts no business enterprise well, and no other is so hazardous or requires so much skill and energy for success as does gold mining. There is no certainty of finding gold even in the neighborhood of the richest mine, for the course of a reef can be guessed only, and not determined, without experiment. (7) In addition to the muddling, dishonesty and loss, inseparable from State mines, would be the evil of checking private enterprise, which takes men and capital into the wilds in the hope of gaining profit, and results in other useful discoveries and the establishment of other industries. The State would never have made Kalgoorlie, and Victoria was peopled through the freedom of every man to use his pick and shovel. (8) To buy out present individual mining rights would cost an enormous sum, and for the State to venture upon opening new ground, which private enterprise has not been tempted to exploit, would be simply courting financial disaster.

#### OLD AGE PENSIONS.

PRO: (1) Under present social conditions the workman requires the whole of his wages to keep himself and family in decent comfort, and humanity demands that he should not be poverty stricken when age incapacitates him for work. (2) The interests of the community are better served by paying pensions than by allowing impoverished old people to subsist on State or private charity. (3) There should be no taint of charity in the reception of a pension. It should be regarded as the right of every citizen who might fulfil the prescribed conditions, and the apparent great cost of providing pensions for all would be apparent only, since nothing would be taken from the community as a whole. Wealth would be merely more equitably distributed. (4) Taxation of the land values would provide an adequate, and the truly just, fund for the payment of pensions, because, in addition to doing work for which he is paid in his working days, every man helps to make the value of the land which arises from human demand for land, and he is thus entitled to some share in it. (5) No doubt he is entitled to a share in land values all his life, but it is better that his claim should be partially recognised by payment of a pension in old age, than not recognised at all. (6) Even in countries like New Zealand and Victoria, where the pension is on an unscientific basis and comes from no special fund, its benefits in relieving old people to some degree from the burden of undeserved poverty, and the stigma of begging their bread, far outweigh its evils. (7) The local difficulty incident to provincial schemes, such as the difficulty of deciding whether an applicant has been long enough in the State to qualify him, would be practically non-existent were the pensions given by the Commonwealth. (8) To those who say the pension should be limited to the sober and

absolutely destitute, the answer is that not character but manhood—the fact of being a unit in the population which creates land value—constitutes the true claim to a pension, and thrift would not be discouraged, but induced, if every man knew that to his savings would be added a pension, making it worth while to save. To deprive the man who has saved a trifle of his pension rights merely encourages thriftlessness. (9) To limit the receipt of pensions to individuals who paid into a special fund would simply be to destroy its usefulness, for those people who have the means and the forethought to take advantage of any of the schemes suggested are seldom in absolute need of support in their old age. Those who made no such provision would be forced to starve or live on charity.

CON: (1) The prudent workman can save enough in his working days to provide for his wants in age, and the truest humanity would urge thrift upon him, instead of tempting him to thriftlessness by relieving him of its consequences. (2) Where old age pensions do not exist, the number of impoverished old people is comparatively small, and they can be maintained by private or public charity much cheaper than they can maintain themselves on pensions, which are often wasted on drink or otherwise. (3) No statement to the contrary can disguise the fact that pensions are a form—and a bad form—of public charity. The argument that the expenditure of huge sums on pensions to all citizens over a certain age would make the community no poorer could be used with equal reason to justify any and every form of extravagance, provided the money were spent in the country. (4) Land values are not specially taxed to provide pensions, and the suggestion that they should be is mere theorising. In any case the man who works adds more to the value of land than an idler, and therefore would be entitled to a larger pension if this visionary plan were adopted. (5) If it should be ever admitted that all people are entitled to share in the land values of the country then there would be such a change in social conditions that no pensions would be needed. Society would be turned upside down, and speculation concerning details is fruitless. (6) New Zealand and Victoria find their pension law a heavy strain on their revenues, and Victoria has already been forced to modify hers. Fraud is rampant, and well-to-do children are induced to shift responsibilities for aged parents on to the State. (7) The Commonwealth, if it provided old age pensions, would attract old people from the rest of the Empire, many of whom would successfully impose on the community, and to pay pensions even to those considered fairly eligible is estimated to cost over £1,000,000 a year, which the Commonwealth cannot afford. (8) Pensions, if paid at all, should be strictly confined to those in absolute need, and those who live sober, respectable lives. Otherwise the State would be encouraging drunkenness and expending money

—which is urgently required to develop the country—on those who have absolutely no claim to it. No manipulation of the pension law can be such an incentive to thrift as a self-respecting desire to be independent of State aid. (9) For a pension law which established some fund, supported wholly or in part by workmen in their younger days, there is much to be said. Such funds exist in many private concerns and State departments, and might perhaps be devised on such a wide basis as to meet the needs of all classes of the population. If the State voted something to this fund it would derive value for its money in the added thrift and sobriety of the citizens who established claims upon it.

### THE REFERENDUM.

PRO: (1) Government of the people, by the people, for the people is the aim which we profess, and it is impossible to attain it unless the people is freely permitted to express its will and give effect to it. (2) The theory that the people can express its will through its representatives breaks down, for members of Parliament often fail to represent it on certain points, and a party majority in the Legislature frequently defies the opinion of a majority in the country. (3) The claim that at the next election the people can dismiss such a majority and give effect to its will breaks down, because local interests cloud the main issue, and no single issue can be really a test question throughout the country. (4) Even if the majority succeed in obtaining an Assembly willing to give effect to its wishes, it may be defied by an Upper House, as the people of Victoria have been defied by the Legislative Council on the question of Women's Suffrage. (5) The representative who is most desirable in all other respects may be out of touch with the electors on some one great issue, and if this were submitted to a referendum he could be returned to Parliament and do good service without doing violence to his conscience. (6) By submission to a referendum, causes of quarrel between the two Houses of the Legislature could be quickly settled. (7) Its adoption would lead to a greatly increased interest in politics on the part of the masses, and prevent the servants of the people becoming their masters, as they invariably do when exercising delegated authority. (8) Capitalistic cliques, which are all powerful in Parliaments, would be helpless in the face of a true popular vote. (9) In Switzerland the referendum, initiative as well as deliberative, is at work, and works well, thus showing that the dangers predicted as the result of its adoption in British communities are imaginary.

CON: (1) The Referendum means mob rule, whereas in British self-governing communities the people governs itself through representatives, who give effect to its wishes when they are settled on any point, and at the same time help to guide the people in forming a correct judgment. (2) Under the party system, any reform which the majority of the

people earnestly desire has effect given to it by Parliament, which is chosen by the people. Where feeling on any great matter is strong the party willing to give effect to it always win the day. (3) Though a Parliamentary party majority may defy the electors for a little while, a day of reckoning comes with the general election, and local interests count for nothing against any big issue on which the people has made up its mind. It is true that fads which might obtain a majority on a referendum, because electors are too unthinking or careless to resist organised enthusiasts, can make no headway under Parliamentary rule, and this is one of the great objections to the Referendum. (4) The usefulness of an Upper House in often resisting popular clamour, and giving the country time to think, would be nullified if the mob could give direct effect to their prejudices and passions of the moment. (5) The most desirable representative is the man generally in accord with the opinions of his electors, but who possesses determination enough to exercise his own opinion in opposition to them when he believes himself right. Under the Referendum, which would relieve the representative of responsibility on all burning questions, his character and usefulness would inevitably deteriorate. (6) Disputes between the two Houses educate the people, and the House which represents its deliberate opinion invariably wins in the end. Under the Referendum, not the deliberate, but the hasty, unformed opinion of the people would find expression. (7) When the people thinks Parliament must always be its servant, and can never become its master, for its thought is represented. While it does not think, it is well for it to suffer such restraint as Parliament exerts upon its whims and fancies. (8) In times of political excitement property would be unsafe if the mob, led by demagogues, possessed legislative power. (9) The fact that the Referendum produces no striking evil results in Switzerland argues nothing for its suitability to British communities, and most of even those who recommend its adoption would not give the people an initiative in legislation. Swiss politics are practically village politics, as compared with ours, and the Referendum in Switzerland has grown up naturally with the development of the constitution, whereas it is foreign to the whole of our practice of Representative Government, and could not be used, except in extraordinary circumstances, without utterly disorganising it.

#### STATE CONTROL OF LIQUOR TRAFFIC.

PRO: The moral evils arising from the present system are enormous, and State control of the industry is therefore demanded on moral grounds. (2) Under State management no individual would have an interest in pushing the sale of drink, and one great cause of drunkenness would thus be removed. (3) Private drinking shops of a low class are the hot-beds of other crimes besides drunkenness.

In State hotels criminals and abandoned women could not congregate. (4) Private profits in the drink trade are enormous, and while the people insist on drinking alcohol, these profits should go to the State in reduction of taxation. (5) In Sweden, under the Gothenburg system, which is an approach towards State management of the liquor business, drunkenness has been decreased and revenue increased. (6) There is nothing necessarily socialistic in the State conduct of hotels. The reasons for undertaking it are social, not economic, and it is recognised by all parties that the liquor business must be the subject of special regulation. (7) The manufacture of alcohol is not necessarily involved in its distribution and sale. It could be brought from breweries and distillers either here or abroad, and, in any case, Governments are quite as well able to manufacture liquors as to build warships and make guns and ammunition, which they do as a matter of public policy. (8) Government control of the liquor traffic would put an end to or modify the clamour of bigoted temperance reformers, who are attempting to force on absolute prohibition.

CON: (1) The moral evils of the drink traffic arise, not from the system, but from the desire for drink. (2) Under private management good hotels do not push the sale of drink, and those which do should have their licences taken away. (3) The suppression of private hotels would simply lead to the congregation of criminals and profligates in secret drinking dens, and private bars now are as freely open to police inspection as State bars could be. (4) The profits of the liquor trade are already shared by the State in import and excise duties and licence fees. If it attempted to get more it would probably get less, through the waste and muddling incidental to all State conducted businesses. Profits would also fall off of necessity if drinking decreased, and there would be a temptation on the part of the community to encourage drinking in order to decrease taxation. (5) Under the Gothenburg system the State does not directly manage the drink business, but even under that system it is a matter of grave doubt whether drunkenness is not on the increase again. (6) The State conduct of hotels is a step towards Socialism, whatever reasons be used to justify it, and, in carrying it out, all the evils of Government management would appear in an aggravated form. (7) If the State is to conduct hotels it should also make the liquor, which would involve more Socialism, and the State, having no competitors, would almost certainly give us bad liquor at an extravagant cost. (8) The truest temperance reformers do not wish to see Government become a purveyor of alcohol, while the bigoted among them regard Government management as a step towards total prohibition.

## SUICIDE.

PRO: (1) A man's life is his own to use as he wills, and in circumstances when it becomes burdensome to himself and others the best use he can make of it is to end it. (2) The highest morality consists in helping others, who, in many cases, can be helped only by suicide. Sydney Carton saved the life of Darnay by adopting his likeness and going to the guillotine in his stead. The man who releases his hold on a life-buoy which will not support his shipwrecked companion and himself deliberately commits suicide by drowning, and we applaud the act—also that of the woman who suffers death before dishonor—of the soldier who blows up the magazine and himself rather than surrender it to the enemy—of the captain who sinks with his ship, even when no material advantage to anyone occurs from it—and many other acts of self-destruction. (3) Christianity nowhere forbids suicide. Christ's own death may be described as suicide, since it is alleged that he could have saved himself. The greatest Roman moralists praised suicide when the alternative was uselessness or disgrace. (4) It is a fallacy, because some suicides are selfish and cowardly, to describe all as such, for every one knows in his heart that many of them are brave and unselfish. (5) The argument that we are placed here by God and must not desert our post is founded on an unwarranted assumption. It is unreasonable to suppose that the Deity desires us to remain in the world merely to suffer pain, to the benefit of neither ourselves or our neighbors. And if the fallacious analogy of soldiership be applied to life it may be answered that death at his post is often the duty of a soldier. (6) The justification of suicide in some cases is quite consistent with general social condemnation of it, as very frequently it brings misery to the suicide's friends and family, and there was something really effective in the old barbarous law, by which the body of the individual who killed himself was dishonoured, while his goods were forfeited. The modern half and half law, which imposes slight penalties on the would-be suicide, is ridiculous, and the solitary example of punishment for attempting crime, with immunity as the reward of accomplishment.

CON: (1) A man has the power to use his life as he will, but we condemn him if he does not use it well, and therefore condemn suicide, which makes it absolutely impossible for him to do so. (2) It is arguable that cases like those of Sydney Carton cannot fairly be called suicide, which in general use means death absolutely by one's own hand, self-sought, with the deliberate wish of ending existence. But granted that self-sacrifice is suicide, and that its generosity excites our admiration, this is no proof that the higher morality does not lie in preserving one's life by all honourable means. The man who has a true desire to sacrifice himself for another, and restrains it from a sense of duty, is a strong man who dares face misrepresentation, and whose life

must have influence for good in the world. As for the captain who sinks with his ship to no human being's benefit, he throws away his life, either in fear of shame or from mere bravado, and in either case deserves blame. The case of the woman who can avoid dishonor only by death, is hard—if it ever really existed—but it is natural pagan sentiment, and not Christian morality, which bids her die rather than suffer all things. (3) The whole spirit of Christianity forbids suicide, and it is merely blasphemous to speak of Christ's death as such. The pagan philosophers, doubtless, applauded it, but the duty of suffering did not enter into their conception of morality. (4) Bravery and unselfishness may seem to characterise some suicides, but the highest form of bravery is suffering in the cause of duty, and the majority of suicides are contemptible cowards who flee from suffering and inflict it on others. (5) The man who leaves the post in which a higher power has placed him is a deserter in the battle of life. To commit suicide for fear of pain of wounds, figurative or physical, is equally bad soldiership. (7) Social condemnation of suicide in general would be weakened to uselessness if special cases of justification, however plausible, were admitted. It is good that even those who kill themselves in order to end painful and apparently useless lives should be condemned, though we may pity them. The old harsh law against suicide has become obsolete, only because under it innocent survivors suffered more than the guilty dead. The modern proceedings against would-be suicides, though lending themselves to ridicule, serve a good purpose in keeping the law's disapproval of self-destruction continually in the public mind.

#### TRIAL BY JURY.

PRO: (1) It is an old institution which has survived centuries of practical experience, and is regarded as a bulwark of liberty by the people. (2) It secures to every person put upon his trial the certainty that matters of fact will be decided by men of a type he knows, and men accustomed to deal with the facts of life—not soaked in the theories of the lawyer or the student. (3) It eliminates as far as possible the effect of personal prejudices which affect all men, since it plays off prejudices in one direction against those in another, and regards only the consensus of opinion arrived at after argument. (4) It relieves judges in capital cases from an intolerable responsibility, and prisoners in all cases—but capital cases especially—from the grave danger of preconception to which the trained mind is as susceptible as the untrained. (5) In cases of repeated disagreement it secures to prisoners the benefit of the doubt, for when a jury has disagreed more than twice prosecutions are commonly abandoned, whereas a judge, having to find one way or the other, would often convict on insufficient evidence. (6) By relieving the judge of responsibility as to fact it enables him better to expound the law, and to impartially

sum up the evidence for the guidance of the jury. (7) The numerous mistakes which juries admittedly make should not discredit the system. To err is human, and the records of civil cases, in which judges decide matters of fact, show that they fall into errors just as astonishing as those made by juries. (8) The dangers of bribery to which juries are said to be liable are at least mitigated by the fact that twelve men must be approached, and in British communities bribery is seldom attempted. In America, where justice is frequently corrupted by money, judges have their price as well as juries, and one judge is no more expensive than twelve jurymen.

CON: (1) Trial by jury, which was useful once in protecting the citizen from injustice and tyranny by submission of his case to the verdict of his peers, has outlived its usefulness, and sentimental regard for its age and origin should not blind us to its defects. (2) It submits complicated questions of fact to the judgment of men who may never have formed a clear judgment on the most simple fact in their lives, and are often incapable of doing so, since juries in practice are drawn from the most uneducated classes. (3) It fails to really eliminate personal prejudice, since one or two men of strong opinion and character can usually sway the rest of the jury in any direction they please. (4) In capital cases, and all important cases, it throws upon untrained minds a load of responsibility which they are unfit to bear, and relieves the judge, whose training fits him to truly weigh the value of evidence, from the task which he could efficiently perform. Preconceptions arise chiefly from ignorance, and the trained legal mind is as free from them as it is humanly possible to be. (5) The numerous cases in which juries disagree are a scandal to justice. Under the system which demands unanimity, one corrupt or obstinate jurymen can nullify the will of the other eleven, and flagrantly disregard overwhelming proof with absolute impunity. (6) Trial by jury offers dangerous loopholes of escape to the guilty, in the technical difficulties of distinguishing between matters of law and fact, and in the chance of unimportant misdirections on the part of the judge, which clever lawyers seize upon in order to quash convictions or secure new trials. (7) The mistakes, honest or deliberate, of juries are notoriously frequent and grave. Litigants are becoming more and more ready to submit the most important questions of fact to judges sitting alone in civil cases, and since their verdicts in these cases are far more seldom questioned than those of juries, it is reasonable to infer that the same good results would follow from judges deciding questions of fact in criminal trials. (8) The danger of juries being bribed is well known, and bribery in the case of British judges would not even be attempted.

## VEGETARIANISM.

PRO: (1) On grounds of humanity we should refrain from the unnecessary slaughter of animals, and there is no doubt that life and strength can be maintained without the use of animal food. (2) Since the world is morally ordered, the presumption is that humane conduct in the matter of procuring food, as in all other departments, will be beneficial. (3) This presumption is strengthened by the fact that the digestive organs and teeth of human beings are fitted for the use of vegetable foods. The so-called carnivorous teeth, alleged by anti-vegetarians to show that men were intended to be meat eating animals, are found also in vegetarian monkeys, and were probably given to them and to mankind for the purpose of cracking nuts. (4) Every nourishing constituent of meat is to be found in vegetable foods, and modern methods of preparing and concentrating them render the use of meat quite unnecessary. (5) In addition to food which is the produce of plants, rational vegetarianism permits the use of eggs, milk, cheese, and butter, since it does not involve the slaughter of animals. (6) There is no doubt that many of the worst diseases which afflict mankind are contracted through eating meat, while even non-vegetarians admit that meat is used to excess and injures health in countries where meat is cheap and abundant. (7) Many races of the world are practically vegetarian, and, since the Japanese have shown themselves so powerful in war and progressive in peace, it cannot be alleged that they are in any way the inferior races. In physical strength, few meat eating people are the equals of some of the Arabs, whose diet consists almost solely of rice and dates, and among the hardiest and most progressive peoples were the Scotch who seldom tasted meat, and lived chiefly upon porridge. (8) In meat eating countries there are thousands of individuals who never touch flesh food, and who are equal to the average in physical strength, and far above it intellectually. (9) Vegetarianism is a factor in promoting a higher standard of health and morals, and advances hand in hand with science, which shows how all the necessary constituents of food can be obtained in available and palatable form without resort to flesh. And thus the excuses which might once have been urged for meat eating grow less with advancing civilisation.

CON: (1) Animals are killed by men in self-defence, and to provide leather, etc., and, while this is so, it is absurd to protest on the grounds of humanity against their use as food. (2) It is an unwarranted assumption that the moral law forbids the killing of animals, and Biblical law distinctly enjoins it. (3) If anything can be learnt from the physiological constitution of man, it is that nature intended him to be an omnivorous animal, and gave him the teeth and digestive organs suited for the use of meat

as well as other foods. (4) While vegetable products contain the chemical constituents which are to be found in meat, they do not contain them in the form and proportions necessary to give anything like the same amount of nourishment in an equivalent weight of food. It may be alleged that the new so-called health foods are free from this defect, but the mere fact that they are not so palatable as meat makes them less digestible and beneficial, even if it be true that, weight for weight, they contain the same food value. (5) A vegetarian diet is, of course, less hurtful if animal food such as eggs and milk be added to it, but the use of eggs destroys potential life, and apart from this it would seem to necessitate the slaughter of superfluous male birds, while bull calves must still be killed if cattle are bred for milking, unless they are to be allowed to uselessly overrun the pastures. (6) While certain diseases result from eating meat in excess, or diseased meat, consumption—the worst disease of all—is largely due to the use of milk, which is claimed as part of a vegetarian diet. It may be granted that meat eaten in excess is injurious, but this is no argument against its use in moderation. (7) No races of the world are absolutely vegetarians, and those which are almost so, such as the Hindoos, are not the equals in virility and strength of Europeans, nor even of the meat eating peoples of India. The Japanese eat fish, and the fact that they, the Scotch, the Arabs, and others, often grow strong with comparatively small use of flesh food proves nothing in favour of a purely vegetarian diet. It is well known that the very poor classes of England and Europe, who seldom taste meat, are weaker physically and intellectually than the wealthier classes who eat it regularly. (8) Vegetarians in meat eating countries are scarcely ever as strong and healthy as non-vegetarians. (9) As civilisation advances the tendency is towards the use of more, and not less, meat among the classes whose standard of morals—and especially humanity—grows steadily higher. Among the men and women who have done anything great to improve the condition of the world scarcely one can be found who was a vegetarian.

#### VIVISECTION.

PRO: We kill wild animals for sport or in defence of life and property; we kill domestic animals for food and clothing. Why should we not, therefore, kill animals by vivisection to increase our knowledge, and to thereby improve the health and prolong the life of human beings? (2) Vivisection can usually be conducted painlessly, and where it is necessary to inflict pain, it is justified by its enormously important results. (3) It must be remembered that, in new operations, human beings are experimented upon and practically vivisected, to the advancement of scientific knowledge, without any outcry from those who hysterically pro-

test against the vivisection of animals. (4) The names of the eminent scientists and men of high repute who favour vivisection is sufficient answer to the libellous and absurd statement, that belief in vivisection implies callous disregard of the sufferings of animals when they minister to selfish scientific enjoyment. (5) High medical and scientific authority declares that vivisection has, in fact, led to discoveries of immense value to humanity. (6) The practice of vivisection is generally misunderstood, and its opponents ignore the fact that the animal operated on is always under chloroform, except in cases for which a special permit must be obtained under British law. (7) The cry against vivisection is part of the new maudlin sentimental revolt against the infliction or suffering of all pain—as by flogging of boys and criminals, capital punishment, field sports, etc.—a movement which tends to develop a feeble emasculated race.

CON: (1) We kill domestic and wild animals often needlessly—but nevertheless always with the definite object of making use of the animal killed, protecting ourselves against it, or gaining pleasure in its death—not with the alleged object of some gain unconnected with the death of the individual animal. Sport may be brutal, but at least it is so far removed from vivisection of a helpless animal that advocates of the latter would not dare admit that they take pleasure in the act itself. (2) The higher animals must always suffer pain and terror under vivisection, and, if the act is morally wrong, no results, however important, can justify it. (3) The likening of surgical operations to vivisection is a mere quibble. No operation is justifiable which has not for its immediate object an endeavour to save the life, or alleviate the pain, of the person operated on. Vivisection, on the other hand, necessarily causes death and inflicts pain. Moral sentiment revolts against operations purely experimental and designed merely to add to the sum of knowledge, without regard to the subject of them. (4) The names of the eminent men who advocate vivisection show how that practice and the thirst for knowledge may blunt moral perceptions. They may have to steel themselves to the infliction of suffering at first, but there is abundant evidence that utter callousness is rapidly developed, and that students find the keenest scientific enjoyment in the actual work, thinking nothing of its alleged ultimate benefits to humanity. (5) It is denied by authorities as high as those who assert it, that any truly valuable medical or surgical discovery is attributable to vivisection. (6) The law purporting to regulate vivisection is constantly evaded. Even when chloroform is given to the animals, it is in small doses which cannot altogether free the victim from pain, and in any case the contemplation of the quivering, helpless body, with life slowly ebbing from it beneath the knife, must have a brutalising effect upon the operator and

students. (7) The cry against vivisection is based on the belief that the torture of the helpless, whether human or animal, is wicked, and that from a wicked action no good can flow.

### ABOLITION OF IMPORTED STATE GOVERNORS.

PRO (1) The institution of the Commonwealth with the appointment of a Governor-General as a representative of the Crown throughout Australia renders the maintenance of representatives in the individual States quite unnecessary. (2) As the executive head of the Government, the Chief Justice is able to do all that is required of him without additional expense to the people, as has been proved by experience. (3) The contention that judicial and executive authority should not be entrusted to one individual has no practical weight in this case, because the executive acts of the Governor are all directed by his Ministers, and no opportunity arises for conduct which would affect his relations with any portion of the community. (4) If it is considered desirable to separate the office of Governor from that of Chief Justice, the former should be filled by some person within the State, who is entitled to distinction. It is undesirable that the highest post of honor should be filled by strangers, to the exclusion of our own people, who are thus deprived of an incentive to worthy ambition. (5) The salary allowed to the Governor, if the office remain in existence, should be very much reduced. Admirals, Generals, and the Judges of our Supreme Courts, who do heavy and responsible work, are now paid much less than Governors, who are, in fact, mere figure-heads. (6) The idea that the Governor's salary should be on a scale permitting lavish entertainment is quite unwarranted. Government House entertainments are given to only a small social clique, and for proper maintenance of a Governor's dignity, it is sufficient that he be enabled to entertain his own friends, and certain officials, and to live at ease, without entrenching on private income. (7) The present system is extravagant; it fosters dependence on the United Kingdom, debars Australian citizens from positions of honor, and tends to make Government House a bulwark of objectionable class distinctions. The English Governor, as a stranger, has no means of knowing who are the people most entitled to such prominence as his friendship can confer, and naturally falls into the hands of the wealthy, who are by no means always the most estimable. Thus the alleged good social influence of the King's representative is more often than not positively bad.

CON (1) Though Australia has a Governor-General, a representative of the Crown is nevertheless still required in each State, which has its own special relations with the

mother country. (2) When the Chief Justice of Victoria has acted as Governor, he has drawn pay for both offices, and if the two offices were permanently amalgamated, the salary would have to be increased. It is also very undesirable that the judicial office should be merged in that of Governor, especially as the Government itself is often a party to action in the courts. (3) It is not the case that the Governor is a mere figure-head, and recorder of the opinions of his Ministers, for positions arise where he must reject their advice, as in the case of having to refuse a dissolution, and in times of political excitement there are numerous instances where a strong Governor must incur the hostility of one party or another, whereas it is eminently desirable that, as Chief Justice, he should be entirely removed from party strife. (4) The local appointment of Governors would be a most dangerous expedient. An unscrupulous Government would be often tempted to appoint a weak man, whom it could coerce, or one on whose goodwill it could rely in the face of his constitutional duties. All kinds of abuses and scheming for office would arise from local appointments. (5) The salaries which the States now pay are no more than sufficient to obtain men of standing in England, and to maintain them in their office with becoming dignity. To pay mean salaries to men of high position is a very bad advertisement for the State which pays them. (6) The social position of a Governor necessarily involves a certain expenditure on entertainments. When Government House is occupied by men of such character and attainments as are usually sent to us these entertainments are an influence for good in social life, and the money spent on them is not wasted from anything but the narrowest point of view. (7) The present system is not extravagant, because English Governors of a high type are desirable, and they cannot be had at a less cost than we now undergo. As to class distinctions being fostered by appointments from England, the tendency is quite otherwise. The local man appointed to a Governorship would necessarily be under obligations to those who helped him to it, if he did not practically purchase the position with his wealth. The English Governor, on the other hand, is perfectly independent, under obligations to no one in the State, and is free to choose his friends and associates from among those who seem to him most entitled from their worth to any prominence in social life which he is able to confer upon them.

#### ABOLITION OF STATE UPPER HOUSES.

PRO (1) Under modern conceptions of Government, the people are supreme. They express their will through their representatives in the State Assemblies, and a second House is therefore unnecessary if elected on a broad franchise—

mischievous if elected on a narrow one, and therefore unrepresentative of popular opinion. (2) Elected Councils, such as that of Victoria, have consistently flouted the desires of the majority. Nominee councils, like that of New South Wales, may be swamped by the election of complacent councillors, unless the Governor rejects the advice of his Ministers, and thus virtually enables the minority to overrule the majority. (3) Quarrels between the two Houses are causes of great political bitterness, and occasion great waste of time, while time is also wasted in the same bills being twice passed through all their stages in the ordinary course of business. (4) The plea that an Upper House is necessary in order to prevent hasty legislation is a poor one, because it could be arranged that certain important bills should be twice passed in separate sessions before becoming law. In other cases the delay caused by the Upper House is merely useless and vexatious. (5) The existence of an Upper Chamber is a direct incentive to careless and hasty legislation, because members of the Lower Chamber are tempted to slum their work, knowing that it will be reviewed elsewhere. Moreover, they are often induced to disingenuously support measures of which they disapprove, knowing that the other House will take the responsibility of rejecting them. (6) An Upper House is necessarily a class House in the States, unless it be a mere useless duplication of the Assembly. In it wealth and privilege are deliberately given power to defend themselves against the just claims of the people for Liberal legislation, and they invariably use their power without scruple. An unpaid House must be a wealthy House, especially as the electorates are so large that, even with a broad franchise, a poor man has practically no chance of election, owing to the expense of electioneering. (7) In Canada several of the provinces have no Legislative Councils, and none of the evils predicted from abolishing the Upper House in Australia arise in the Dominion. (8) The case of the Commonwealth is not available as a precedent to the States, for though the same electors, on the same broad franchise, choose both the Senate and the House of Representatives, they are grouped for the two elections in entirely different ways. As delegates from the States, pledged to maintain State interests, the Senators have a justification for their existence, which cannot be urged for Legislative Councillors, pledged to champion wealth against citizenship.

CON (1) Though the supremacy of the people be granted, it does not follow that the people cannot best give effect to it by the agency of two Houses of Parliament, which shall give due expression and weight to the different interests of the community. (2) The elected Council of Victoria has

justified itself by its work. Some important bills which it has rejected, such as that for taxing land values, have never been proposed since by responsible Ministers, and are therefore evidently not really desired by the majority, and for other bills, like that conferring the franchise on women, there is no proof of any real desire in the country, though the Legislative Assembly has frequently passed them. The Nominee Houses may not be desirable, but as a matter of fact, by means of new appointments, they have always been controlled when the public will was unmistakable, as in the case where Mr. Reid carried his Land and Income Tax Bill against a hostile Council. (3) When the two Houses quarrel the country is educated in politics, and its will always eventually prevails. Time is not wasted in securing full consideration for important measures. (4) Without a second chamber there can be no safeguard against hasty legislation. The provision—if it were ever made—for requiring certain bills to be passed twice in successive sessions would sometimes cause mere senseless delay, and be at other times useless. The Legislative Council ensures revision and consideration from new points of view, which cannot be obtained in a unicameral Legislature. (5) If the existence of an Upper House causes careless or disingenuous legislation by the Lower House, because its members know that their carelessness or dishonesty will be rendered harmless elsewhere, this is a condemnation of the offending Assembly and not of the amending Council. (6) If it be granted that an Upper House is a class House, nevertheless, while classes exist they should be represented. The wealthy have to bear the brunt of extravagant expenditure and resulting taxation, and therefore should have a voice in, at least, calling for consideration. The vast majority of the Council electors are not wealthy men, but they are the more settled elements of the population, and though they are usually willing to defend wealth against spoliation, they never consent to support it in aggression. The fact that Legislative Councillors are usually unpaid gives them independence, and prevents them from degenerating into professional politicians. (7) In Canada, where some of the provinces have only one House, its measures are subject to review and veto by the Dominion Parliament, which recently disallowed the British Columbian Bill for excluding Japanese from the province. (8) The Commonwealth offers an example of a useful Upper House, elected on the broadest franchise, though it might be a factor in greater stability if the franchise were somewhat restricted. In any case, however, it shows that the people of a country can be grouped on different principles for the election of two separate Houses, which have different functions to perform in directing the affairs of the community.

## PREFERENTIAL TRADE.

PRO (1) Everything which tends to draw the mother country and the colonies closer together is desirable, and nothing can do this more effectively than an increase of trade between them, which would be mutually beneficial. (2) If Mr. Chamberlain's proposals were adopted an immense impetus would be immediately given to our production of grain, meat, and dairy produce, while in all probability England would later on also give a preference to our wool. (3) In return for this preference, to be effected by the mother country imposing a duty on products of the same nature coming from abroad, we are asked merely to reduce our duties on goods of British manufacture, retaining them at a higher level against foreign countries. (4) From the free trade point of view this reduction would be entirely to our benefit since it would cheapen commodities to consumers. From the protectionist point of view, it may be argued that the manufacturers who lost a portion of their protection against British goods would be more than compensated by the increased capacity of the local market, brought about by the increased numbers and prosperity of our country population, who would obtain a preference in Great Britain. (5) It is not even by any means certain that Great Britain will not give us a preference on our grain and meat without any reduction of our present duties on British manufactures, provided we give them a preference against foreign goods by increasing duties upon the latter. (6) Even if some sacrifice should be demanded of local manufacturers, they would do well to make it, since the safety of the colonies depends on the strength of the mother country, which can maintain the burden of protecting its colonies only if its trade continues to increase, and foreign countries are everywhere shutting out British goods by means of tariffs. (7) To the argument that it would be unsafe for us to give a preference to British goods for fear of retaliation by foreign countries, which might discriminate against our products such as wool, the answer is, first, that a preference in the British market would be ample compensation for any loss this might entail, and, second, that foreign countries cannot afford to do without our wool, and would, in any case, not risk the further closing of the British market to themselves by endeavoring to interfere with a domestic trade arrangement between Great Britain and her colonies. (8) Apart from material advantages to ourselves, gratitude for the protection of the British fleet is a sufficient reason for giving Great Britain special privileges in our markets. (9) By giving these freely, after the example of Canada, we

could absolutely refute the sneers of those who allege that we wish to increase the price of bread to the British people, in order to increase the profits of our farmers. What Great Britain will do is Great Britain's own affair. If she chooses to enter into any arrangement with us, it will be because its benefits outweigh its disadvantages. British farmers would share in the protected market for farm produce, when foreign produce was made dutiable, and there would not necessarily be any increase in prices. A secure and enlarged market at present prices would be a substantial benefit to the farmers of the empire without any such rise. (10) Though it is true that the preferences of early colonial history—in which Australia did not share—were unsatisfactory, and abandoned in 1846, conditions are now utterly different. The producing capacity of the empire is immensely greater, any arrangement entered into would be by mutual consent of entirely free and self-governing communities, and the increase of British exports to the colonies is essential to the maintenance of the mother country's position amongst the great nations of the world, which year by year are encroaching on markets which she once held, and increasing their export trade at an immensely greater rate than she is doing. The assertion that business arrangements between self-governing portions of the empire would lead to quarrel is ridiculous. England does not quarrel with the dozens of foreign nations with whom she has commercial treaties, and is far less likely to have misunderstandings with her own kith and kin. Any reciprocal arrangements made would be for mutual advantage, and for specified terms, open to revision on their conclusion, if it were found that they bore hardly as to principle or details on either party to the bargain.

CON (1) It is extremely doubtful whether trade bargains which may lead to friction and quarrel would draw the mother country and colonies closer together. The bond of empire is sentiment, and its strength was shown during the South African war. (2) If Mr. Chamberlain's proposals were adopted, Australian farmers might at first reap some advantages, but Canada, which would share the preference, can hopelessly out-distance us in wheat production, and at present Mr. Chamberlain distinctly says that he is not prepared to offer any preference to our wool. (3) In return for a problematical advantage to one set of people—the farmers and graziers—another set of people—the manufacturers and their employes—are asked to submit to the certain disadvantage of greater competition from British goods in the Australian market. (4) From the free trade point

of view, a reduction of Australian duties would be dearly bought at the expense of Great Britain abandoning the principle of free trade, and ceasing to exist as a great example. From the protectionist point of view, any increase in the prosperity and purchasing power of the country population would be useless to the manufacturers, if British goods, against which they say they need protection, were admitted to free competition with their own. (5) There has as yet been no kind of suggestion that Great Britain will put a tax upon her people's food in return for any such trumpety preference as she would derive from an increase of Australian duties upon foreign goods, without a reduction of duties which would give easier admission to British goods. Preference by increase of duties upon foreign goods is a purely protectionist move, which can result in no reciprocal move in the United Kingdom. (6) Against a reduction of duties upon British goods, freetraders have nothing to urge. They would rather see some reductions in the tariff than none at all. They would, therefore, welcome such a preference to the mother country, and would only protest against any demand for England to tax herself because we had reduced our taxes. At the same time, statistics show that British trade is not declining, but that exports from the United Kingdom steadily increase. (7) Should we increase our duties against foreign goods, there is a distinct danger of retaliation by Germany, which would be disastrous to our wool trade. The United Kingdom cannot possibly use all the wool we produce, and Germany buys an immense quantity of it. At present, we have almost a monopoly of merino wool, but efforts are being made to devise means by which other wool may take its place, and discrimination against merino wool in Germany might do Australia tremendous injury. Germany has already discriminated against Canada in consequence of the Canadian preference to the United Kingdom, and would probably do the same in our case. (8) Australia owes much to Great Britain for the protection of the fleet, and a fit return for it would be free admission of British goods to our markets, which no Australian preferentialist proposes. (9) The English preferentialists are alleging that the colonies desire a tax on foreign food imported into England, and all those in the colonies who advocate reciprocal preference do desire it. These duties will either raise prices or they will not. If they do, the masses of England will suffer for the profit of colonial farmers. If they do not raise prices, the colonies will not gain, for they already have a market for all the food they can raise at the world's price. Further, it is quite possible that such competition would be engendered by the higher prices at first

obtainable, as to lead to over-production—Canada is capable of producing enough wheat for Europe—and an eventual disastrous slump. While British grain would share in the higher prices resulting from preference in England, British farmers would not derive any benefit. They are tenants, not cultivating their own land, and with the increase in prices their rents would be proportionately raised. (10) Until the repeal of the Corn Laws, Canadian products were granted a preference in the British market, and so far was this privilege from promoting imperial unity, that in the days of preference much of Canada was disloyal, and rebellions had to be put down by armed force. Since the preferential policy has been abandoned, the empire has gradually grown in strength and unity. There has been no bargaining, no imposition of restrictions upon the people of one British community in order to pay for restrictions imposed on another, and therefore a fruitful source of sordid quarrel has been removed. As a result, imperial sentiment and good will between the different portions of the empire have attained a strength which will surely be sapped if the British poor have the cheap loaf bargained from them to enrich colonial farmers, and colonial manufacturers are bargained into suffering unwelcome competition from the manufacturers of England.



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